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No. 71-864
FCC v. Business

E~ecutivest

Move for Vietnam Peace

No. 71-865
Post-Newsweek Stations v. Business ~tives' Move for Vietnam Peace
No. 71-866
ABC v. Democratic National Committee
Cert to CA DC: Nright, Robinson; dissenting:

~1 cGo~

This case was before the Court a little while ago an a
stay pending appeal.

The Court denied that stay.

~.a

At issue is the rule of the DC CA that flat bans on
advertisements are prohibited by the

~

1st Amemdment.

~litieaL-

That

court remanded these cases to the FCC to devise regulations
as to how some access to politicaJ advertisement could be
achieved given the ~x~Exme problems of limited broadcast time

-2-

and fairness to ~pposition .

The court did not rule that
-~

the radio and t . v. stations had to sell advertising time to
the two complaining parties, the Democrats and the Businessman.
It did not rule that the media had to be available to all who

-

-

It prohibited only a fxxx flat ban

wanted to purchase time.

on editorial advert isements and it remanded to the FCC to
work out equitable rules for

~NxiXiEx

editorial advertisements .

Since the FCC had initiated such a review before the opinion
couft
in the ~XENNK below, it did not even disrupt the FCC's procedures .
Before this opinion, the situation was that some , probably
most, radio and t . v . stations would sell editorial advertisementso
But local station \ITOP refused to sell the Businessmen a minute
to talk againstx the war.

Moreover, the Democfy/ts , anticipating

the necessity of heavy use of the media to xix raise money for
the upcoming campaign, sought a ruling fNm from the
the legality of flat bans .

FCC on

After the FCC upheld that

x~&gxxxif~x

legality, this appeal to the DC CA resulted .
Before I get into to the arguments advanced x by pets
seeking cert , I want to indicate my bias in favor of what the
DC CA did .

It is standard 1st Amen}ent doctrine that a govt

(and there is no question of state action here) cannot close
a XNXN!RX forum to a would-be S::JO!RXE speaker , arbitrarilY. .
Radio and t . v . permit commercial advertisers to pay money and
utilize the fxNm forum .

But they arbitrarily , at least in

some cases , say that persons presenting what they call :JONN
political views may not have access to that XNN forum .
!R

r~ason

The

they give fNxx to justify this !R!Rm seemingly arbitrary

,,

action is that Xk!R¥ they are compelled by the fairness doctrine ,
which has been upheld by this Court , to air both sides of

'"

-3political questions.

But the obvious fallacy in that postition

is that the media, and not the interested parties, control
the initation and content of such presentations.

Moreover,

the line between commercial advertisement and ~Mxixi~x editorial
advertisement is certainly not a bright one.

Witness for

example the oil companies ads on t.v. trying to counteract
the bad publicityx they have received from gxx environmentalists.
Or, the railroads ad, featuring some

xxxxNXMg~xx

astronaut,

in which they actually request the viewerg to oppose a bill
pending before Congress.

What CA DC has

sai~s

that this

arbitrary line between editorial and commercial advertising

.....

cannot stand and that some editorial advertising must be sold

KN if any advertising is sold.

It left the FCC free to develop

regulations of editorial advertising, which presumably could
aNx include a ban on spot advertising or even short, one
minute ads, if it were determined that political issue cannot
be responsibly sold like soap.

In short, I think the opinion

below is both xxx very narrow in scope and is consistent with
1st amendment doctrine.
Petrs argue xk that when the Court upheld the fairness
doctrine in Red I.ion

~XHNN~HXXXNN

395 U.S. 367, that ix it

x~g

Broadcasting Co. v. fCC ,

recognized the concept that no

1roup has an MNEXiNg unabridgeable right to access to the
media and that the FCC has primary responsibility to control
access to the airwave in the public interest.
the decision below infringes on that

~X~~

It is said that

responsibility.

Congress and the FCC hade chosenk NKXMXR to use the fairness
doctrine to insure the public interest which allows the media
to determine the initial access and gives opponents a right to

responde.

To pr'e vent unfair control of in'tial access, the

"

stations are charged with a responsibility of airing pro~ms
in the public interst, and the FCC enforces that responsibility.
/'""

The dtcision below is said to en$croach.

The various

n!tw~ks

involved in this suit say that the decision below will play

-..

havoc with this system--the

~~most

affluent will have access,

no control over issues that m2Y be to insignificant to_9ir
will be exercised; valuable time will be wasted on replys.

""'
Finally, the dc~cision
is said to ~Nf conflict with the Court's
opinion in Red Lion where it was said that there was no general
right of access ENXK but that the public had a 1st amemdment
right to receive suitable information.
Resps R do not deny that there are substantial issues that
kexg~xx

the Court will have to resolve, but they say that the

case is not ripe at this time.

The

d~cision

below does not

alter station control over broad:cast time--as opposed to
commerical x±em time--and it was broadcast time that was the
subject of Red T.ion.

I

Horeover, all that has been done is to

remand to the FCC to devise rules; therefore, all the horribles
such as

~NNKXNX

at this time.
of a

~

dominance by the affluent, are mere speculation
And since many stations do not follow a policy

flat ban on editorial advertisements, it cannot be

accurately said that such horribles will in fact followe.
Since the FCC has already begun to study the matter, and might
inf fact conclude from this study that a flat ban is impermissible
the Court should stay its hand HRXXH awaiting the results of
the study.

The court below has not denied that the FCC has

still primary responsibility for

regu~ating

KN±x br0adcasting.

To this petrs xe~xk~ reply that there is a difference

-5between a study by the FCC that is free to conclude that all
~~x

editorial advertisement may be banned and a study that must

permit editorial advertisement, but in a regulated form.
As a secondary arguemtn, some of petrs say that two old
cases, Nassachusetts Universalists Convention v. Hildreth &
Rodgers Co ., 183 F . 2d 497 (1st Cir . 1950); Mcintire v. William
Penn Broadcasting Co., 151 F . 2d 597 (3rd Cir. 1945)., both
of which rejected claims of a right of access.

But in each

of these cases, one of the gournds was that the activities of
private broadcasters was not an act of the state so that the
ixxxx 1st Amendment was not involved.
been

Nix~x~Nixx~x

That theory has since

discredited xi because of the involvement

of the govt in the boradcasting industry.

Mcintire , however,

lA,

does contain language that is sqarely in opposition to the
1\

opinion below.
Were this case not so narrow, I am sure that I would
recommend a grant , EXK but I think that tme Court can wait
to decide the constitutional ixxe issue.

No one is going

to be required to change his policy toward editorial advertisments immediately, if the Court does not grant review.
Such a change would come about only after the FCC desings
its

regulations.aNNXXXKRXXKN~~

After that happens, they will

undoubtedly be appealed, and the case will undoubtedly be
before the Court on cert again.

At that time there will be

a full record on the feasibility of various ways of regulating
editorial advertisffiments as well as a set of proposed regulations.
With such a recodd, the Court could make a better judgment, I
beWe on the Constitutioal issues.

As in many cases, the

Constitutional issue cannot be divorced x~x from the facts.

'

.
-6I

fN For example, in determining whether or not editorial advertising can be flatly banned, it will be essential to determine
if there is any good way to limit it.

There is no question, and

CA DC did not hold, that the 1st amendment right of access
was unlimited.

To review this limited right, it is going to

be necessary to determi'ne what those limits are.
a

~x*~xxx

hear it

practical matter, I would deny the case now, and

~NXXNNXKR~~N~xg~xx

when it comes up again with a full

record.
DENY
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R~EiKX~K

McGowaa

These cases were combined in the court of appeals
XEN and have been treated as one case.
M~KRXSOCMgk~x~~

The Business Executives

Move sought to purchase advertising time on WTOP

in Washington in which it would broadcass a message in opposition
to the govt's policies in Vietnam,

WTOP had a rule against

selling advertsing time for political mexxxxgexxx messages-outside of an actual campaign-- and refused to xee sell the time.
The Bu ~ess Executives than sou~ht relief before the FCC which
ruled against them.

The Democrats also sought relief before

the FCC against CBS and ABC which have policies against selling
CONTROLLING CASE: Red Lion Broadcasting Co, v, F,C,C.,
395

u.s.

367 (1969)~ Police Dept v. Mosley, 40 LW 4877 (1972).

advertising time for so-called editorial advertisements.
The Democrats did not specify precisely what kind of advertising
they were interested in other than their interest in off"year
advertisement to help raise money to pay off the
campaign debt from 1968.

~xm~xxRgx

In both case:s the FCC refused to

rule that the networks and stations had to sell so-called
editorial advertising.

It did not rule that they were prohbited

from doing so, but only that the fairness requirment imposed t:Y

-

statute and regulation did not require them to do so.
The court of appeals reversed the FCC and xameRXNX
remanded the case for a series of administrative hearings.
It's actual ruling was

~sxxe

quite narrowa

"We hold specifically that a flat ban on paid public
issue announcements is in violation of the First KM~RemeR~
Amendment, at least when other sorts of paid announcments
are acdepted. We do not hold, however, that the planned
announcements of the petttioners--or, sxx for that matter
of any ohter particular applicant for air time--must
necessarily be accepted by b~dcast licensees. Rather,
we confine ourselves to invaiioating the flat ban alone,
leaving it up to the licensees and the Commission
to develop and administer reasonable procedures and
regulations determing which and how many "editorial
advertisements" will be put on the air."
Because, as of this date, there are no briefs filed in this
case by resps, I will go into the reasoning of the court of
appeals in some depth in order to balance the quite extensive
briefs filed by the FCC and the three major networks.

My discussion

will no doubt miss some of the tri::R things raised in the resps'
briefs, so I urge you to give them special attention when they
come in.
Although resps argued before the court of appeals
from the statutory public interst and fairness requi{ment ~

-3-

the opinion below was based on the Constitutional
The

Ml!m~

claim,

~i:aii:x

doctrine that constitutional claims should be avoided

xReXex where there are available statutory claims was circumvented
by the argument that the non-constiturional arguments closely
~:ax:aiiie paralleled the xx:ax constitutio~l ones, the implication

being that if, and only if, there was a constitutional violation,
there was also a statutory violation,

It may well be that

resps will argue that the statutory claims are seperate and
that they are entitled to be reconsidered on a remand in

~ke

the event that the Court rules against them on the constitutional
ground,
The opinion :klii!IJ§XXHex below next establishes that
the First Amendment is applicable here.

It does so by first

noting that the Red Lion case defined a first amendment i:xxNe
interest of the general public as underlying the fairness
doctrine,

From this, it is concluded that the dominant first

amendment iaterest is that of the public, and not of the networks
and stations,

The latter follows in part and ties in with the

argument that there is governmental action when a network or
station refuses to sell advertising time,
not mere private businesses

:kle~:a:Na:ax

-;_;.;.~

u.....<'c;/~

N Broadcasters are

because of the extensive

involvement of the government in a regulatory role,

Almost

no other busniess is so intimately regulated and involved with
the government,

Moreover, there is J!!Xex specific governmental

involvement in this case because the FCC gavm its imprimatur
to a flat ban on editorial advertising,

In other

cas ~,

the

specific acquiescence of a governmental regulatory agency in an

-4-

activity of a private, regulated business has been held to be

x governmental action.
343

u.s.

In Public Utilities v. Raxxak Pollak,

451 (1952), the Court found governmental action sufficient

to bring the First Amendment into play, whe.n a g regulatory
agency had held hearings on

and dismissed a complaint against

piping in radio programs on city buses in the District of
Columbia.

~aiMEM

Secondly, the court neted that broadcasting was

an important almost essential form of communication in this
society.

So essential is it, that it cannot be regarded as purely

private.
Having brought the First Amendment into play, the court
noted that there was no first amendment interest of the broadcasters
involved, because the focus was on advertising, in which persons
other than the boradcaster spoke, rather than on normal programming
in which the broadcaster was the speaker.

The question then is

what is the public's First AmendmentxixxMexiRX interest in
advertising time.

The court of appeals identified theee interests.

The first was specifically recognized by the Court in Red Lion,
which was in having access to a 1!1XXJ!!Rilfg spectrum of information.
Second, the public has an interext in an uninhibited presentation
of that infromation.

Third, memeers of the public have an

interest in effective self-expression.

This last interest does

not mean that every member of the public has an unabridgeable
right to aceess to the airwaives; such a right would be physically
impossible.

But the public has a limited interest in being able

to use the air waves to present its views.

Because advertising

is iRiK iniated and its content for the most part controlled by
the advertiser, rather than by the braodcaster, as is the case in

-5in normal programming, it is important to wide-open debate
and individual self-expression,
could contain the entire

x~e«g

Even if regular programming
spectrum of political views,

it could not present them all in the same ways that memeEe
advertisers could and would, and the fact that it was supervised
and controlled by the broadcaster would tend to have some inhibiting
effect,

IBxkE* Moreover, it is zxxxx fairly

obvio~s

that

regular programming cannot present all viwpoints,
The court of appeals argues that even considering only

£very

JN'f,-/;u./ the Jiju public's First Amendment interest

v 1 ewj>o ;11f
ca ;?nu -1- 6e..

~e'f1A"-/ef

cuiA?reJ 6y
nor-m11/

fJ ro.j r et m .,...'I!!),;
onl!

m

~.Jcr
t/'l •.'{;.,.,f

~

e-e.n~

EI§E«xf«:Xxxx~xxe«ag»xx

specifically recognized in Red Lion, the interest i:RX in access
to a wide spectrum of views, it is clear that xxxxxkaxexxi: that
interest cannot be met by programming alone,

~~/
Ti\eee a per se

ban on editorial advertising admittedly interfer&s to some
-exxe»lli extent with a xai::xlli valid first amemdment i:xxx interest,
Recognizing all this, the court considered the specific
case of a

•
stat~on

a<'<-·

..

t1

or network which exc .pts advertising but not

political advertising,

It left open the question of a station

that e accepts no advertising,

It notes that several lower

courts have already ruled that stations cannot distinguish
between non-controversial advertising and controversial advertising
unless they can show a clear and present llixg»exxxssx« danger
would result from the latter.

The clear and present danger

test or something like it requires that before access to a
fprum is prohibited, there must be some compelling reason,
This requires a balance, with significant weight being attached
to the constitutional value,

Prohbited speech cannot be

-6distinguished on the basis of content alone, becauee those
who

control~

the forum have no right to censor the flow of

ideas or to discriminate between ideas they like and those
that they do not like,
Thus, the court argued that the networks could not
distinguish editorial advertising because it was controversial
political
because such a distinction favored the/status quo and apathy
and because the line was difficult to draw.

Some would find

Army recruitment ads controversial and reflective af a repugnant
~NXX«

political view,

In the court be N

Some other justification is necessary,

it was arguecdl that if editorial advertising

were accepted, there would be too much of a dmeand thereby
creating chaos, the rich could buy up the time, thereby creating
an imbalance, and broadcasters who accepted advertising on one
side of an issue might have to give up a lot of free time for

equ~treatment

which would be financially disasterous,

court rejected all these arguments as

J!!Xft:IXI!!

The

premised on the

assumption that if editorial advertising were permitted it
would have to be unlimieed,

The court acknowledged that

broadcasters were not common carriers who had to accept all
advertisements; it ruled only that editorial advertisements
should be considered and that some should be aired,
advertisement would be

sub~ect

That

to regulation by the broadcasters,

An outside limit on the total amount of such time sold could
be imposed as could a limit on where and when the advertisments
could be aired,

The details of the regulation were left to

the FCC to decide on remand Nat: after hearings,

Guidelines

could be developed to make sure that all the time was not sold

-7to persons of one persuasion,

Nor would the fairness

ru~e

have to be enforced with such rigidity to bring about financial

«xx disaster.

None of these problems are serious enough to

outweigh First Amendment interests.
Judge McGowan filed a brief dissent to the court's
lengthy opinion,

He emphasised his belief that the result of

the court's opinion would be the dominance of the editorial
advertising by the xXfxMe»« affluent who were likely t to be
of the same political

~exxMxxxxaxx

persuasion. He expressed

doubt that the FCC could work out rules that would prevent
such a result,
PrrRS'

AR~Ems

The focus of petrs is on the entire programming of
broadcasters, not just on advertisments.

This entire programming

is governed by the fairness requirement, which this Court approved
in Red Lion, and which requires a balanced presentation
views on public issues,

o~ onflicting

This doctrine recognizes that the

broadcasters' First Amendment rights are XMEax»XaxxxMEax subordinate
to those of the general public,

But when it comes to how the

public's interest should be promoted, Congress has empowered the
FCC with discretion and power to make these complex and difficult
decisions,

There is no set way to promote this interest, and

the Commission must necessarily be given some leeway, provided
of course that the means it chooses are consistent with the
First AMe»NexxAMeN Amendment,

If the Commission rejects &R

xffxxmxxx a certain approach because it regards it as impractical,
its judgment should be sustained if possible.

Such an approach

recognizes that these are complex matters not easily resolved

-8-

by courts and are more properly left to the expertese of the
administrative agency to which Congress has committed the
decision.
In this case the FCC's decision is sustainable.

It

is clear that broadcasters are not common carriers who have
to accept advertisements from everyone who is willing and able
to buy time; the federal statutes clearly rejected a provision
that would required licensed ENXRNN
carriers.

~

broa~casters

to be common

But the NX decision of the court of appeals in this

case approaches such a requirement.

The Commission's app~ch

of studying the matter is a superior and permissilbe
iKX~RRNNKXEexa

x one.

The court of appeals erred by focusing on

advertising time only; the proper question is whether in the
entire amount of broadcasting time, is
to discussion of public issues.
First Amendment

~aRxme

~

enough1 time devoted

That goal, which is all the

requires, can be met without selling

editorial advertising.
There are, in addition, practical reasons why editorial
advertising may be rejected by broadcasters.

Only those persons

of sufficient wealth will have a right of acess, yet the Court
in Red Lion disapproved a system in which only the highest bidder
would axe have an opportunity to speak.

A

firt-come~first-serve

approach would not resolve this problem, and if the FCC were
required to regulate who could speak, in order to achieve a
balanced approach, it »NX would be interjected into

day-to~day

decisions in a way that it is probably incapble of handling.
Mor~er,

it is possible that the Commission's decision requiring

-9-

broadcasters to occasionally give free time to achieve a balanced
presentation of views from persons who cannot afford to buy time
might be applied to editorial advertising,

This ooight result

in an unreasonable erosion of advertising revenues.

If the

Fairness Doctrine xxe were suspended to avoid these problems,
the presentation would not be balanced,

Finally, since the

amount of editorial advertising would no doubt be limited,
the Commission would have to find a way of dec tA ing competing
claims and thi'K would require it to choose between persons,
'father than

affirm~

the court of appeals, the Court should

permit the FCC to continue the comprehensive inquiry it has
already begun conce'ning coverage of controversial public issues.
II

The FCC does not argue, but the networks do argue that
governmental
.---- there is no :sx:xxe/action when a braodcaster, iE licensed by
the govt, NeHie:s refuses to sell advertising time.

Broadcasters

are said to be private persons who themeselves have First
Amendment rights

XJ!!X~xax:e~x

assertable against the govt and

not a part of the government.

The mere existence of

:iiER~e:sRiR~

licensing and regulation, plus the Commissions specific enlflorsement
of the challenged policies, dOE!S not convert their actions
into governmental action,
A slightly different

a~ument

than the Commission°s,

which the networks advancep is that the only First Amendment
right the public has in this case is the right to hear varying
views on public issues.

It has never before been held to have

a right to assert those views ix:sei« itself.
proven that this right has been abridged.

Resps have not

Quite the contrary

-10=
I

with respect to the

~XRRX

Vietnam war, it is clear that the

public has been exposed ot all views,
DISCUSSION
1. STATE (GOVERNMENTAL) ACTION
The threshold ±Rxex question is whether or not there is
sufficient involvement of the national govt in thel activities of
licesned broadcasters so as to infuse their action in refusing
to sell advertising time with governmenatl action.

If there

is no gmceacxR governmental action, x:Rexe the First Kalelhi:m:.eR:Kj{
Amendment does not apply,

While I think that

~here

is clearly

govt action in this case, I am not sure that a :fxRN::icg finding
that therel was no govt action would get petrs off the hook,
For one thing, resps sued under the Federal Communications Act
fairness standard as well as the First Amendment.

The l!fl!IXL'Court

of appeals found that the statutory standards were so related
to the First Amendment that

i~xx

it was easier to

res~e

that

issue, but even if it were held that the First Ameddment did
not apply, there would still be a statutory claim.

Since that

statutory claim seems to be at least closely related to First
Amendment concepts, regardless of whether the First Amendment
itself actually adheres, something very close to First Amendment
analysis would seem necessary in this case at any rate,

In

addition, there is the fact that the FCC is involved as a party
in the case.

There can be no question that action by the FCC is

governmental action,since it is an agency of the national govt.
Thus, the First Amendment would apply to actions of the FCC,
and it could at least be argued that there is a First Amendment

-11-

violation as a result of FCC actions approving the refusals
to sell commercial time for

~~«

editorial advertisements,

I am convinced that in any case there is ample govt
action.

As you know from Moose Lodgeythe question of govt

action is one of dgree, the issue being whether there is sufficent
govt involvement to say that there is govt action in the actions
of anN otherwise private party,

In the Wilmington Parking Lot

case, the Court found state action in a situation where a state
state-owned
leased a space in a/building to a private restaurant, In this
case, Congeess has determined that the national govt must
hand out and control the use of the limited number of air spaces

x that are available for bmaodcast use,

Those licenses are,

needless to sayx, quite valuable and essenatill privileges,
Licensees are regulated to a d~ree that probably surpasses
regulation of any other industry,

Thus, the govt has said that

only certain private persons may utilize this vital means of
communication,and that they may communicate according to rules
set by the national govt, It seems to me that that is sufficient
gll§Elt govt involvement so that it can be said that denying

others the use of the media for advertising
state action.

~~

purposes is

The private licensees only have the power to

do this because of their govt-granted licenses and because of
govt regulations,

Mll§XNRX~X¥XXHX

Moreover, in this case, the

govt agency specifically apjbroved the

~i

policy of denying

editorial advertisements, if the licensee so chose, so that
the denial of access to the airwaves carries with it a specific
govt imprimatur.

Surely, this case is far removed from the

-12Moose Lodge

situation both in the nature of the license granted

E~XX8NXXXXE~Hxxxx by the govt in relation N to theJeperations of
the private party and in the amount of xgxxegNxaxN regulatory
involvement of the govt.

In Moose Lodge, for example, the

Court disapproved E of the state regulation requiring licensees
to

g~x

follow the provisions of their

~kaxge

charters because

one of the provisions of the Moose charter was white's only
and because adherence to that regulation and that provision of
the chatter would have placed the
behind the discrimination.

xN§~x

imprimatu/f of the state

The govt involvement in this situation

seems to be sig!b.ificantly greater than that involvement in
Moose Lodge which did establish a limited state action.
Perhaps the final word <hn govt action can be taken by
implif ation from footnote 3 in the Moose Lodge case which reads:
" Unlike the situation in Public Utilities Comm'n v.
Pollack, 343 u.s. 451 (1952), where the regulatory
agency had affirmatively approved the practice of the
regulated entity after full investigation, the Pennsylvania Liquor ~~Hgxf&:RN Control Board has xe:i}C neither
approved nor endorsed the racially discriminatory
practices of Moose Lodge."

2. FIRST AMENDMENT
It seems to me that a valid starting point for analysis
of this problem is a case, in which you joined, that was decided
after the opinion in the Court of Appeals.

Police Department of

the City of Chicago, v. Mosley, concerned a Chicago ordinance
which

~~x

prohibited all picketing :iH£xxx in front of schools

except labor picketing.

This seems to me analagous to the

challenged broadcaster rules which permit private persons to
buy air time for commercial messages but which prohibit

~~mmex~xa

-13political messages.

In

M~x~x~

Mosley, the Court ruled in no

uncertain terms that a government may not under the Equal Protection
clause (which this Court has ruled is part of the Fifth Amendment
Due Process clause and applies to the federal govt as well as
to the states) and the First Amendment

x~xkxx~k

the use of a forum on the ba!lis of the content,

grant or deny
That is precisely

what is done here and what the court of appeals has said cannot
be done,

In keeping with the Court's pronouncement in Red Lion,

the court of appeals ruled that there was no unabr~eable
First Amendment right of access to the airwaves,

~N

but it

ruled that where broadcasters sell time, they cannot choose to
sell or not to sell time on the basis of whether the message
is commercial or political,
It is important to focus on the narrow holding of the
opinion below,

The court did not rule that time had to be

sold to every person who wanted it to put forth a political
message.

The traditional discretion of the broadcaster over

providing the proper

ERXRN~~x~x

amount and balance of controversial

material, which exists at present with respect to programming,
would be maintained with respect to advertising,

As petfs point

out in their briefs, the content of advertisements is not
completely uncontrolled by the broadcasters at present.
control would be ffjintained.

This

Nor did the court of appeals rule

that the broadcasters had to provide and unreasonble amount of
time for political messages or that they had to pnovide free
time to RHMex answer those messages.
the expert supervision of the FCC.

It left those matters to
It ruled only that where

-14'

time was sold for advertising, a flat ban on so-called political
advertising could not be permitted,

I believe that this result

is dictated by Mosley.
It is argued by petrs that the

~NEXX~

only First Amendment xx

right involved in this case is the public's right of access
which the Court said was paramount in Red Lion.

Even Kk were

this a correct reading of Red Lion xNxKkaK there would still
be a violation of ex equal protection under Mosley, but that is
not a correct reading of Red Lion,

wa~oncerneJ

In Red Lion , the Court

with balancing the First Amendment rights of

broadcasters with the First Amendment rights of the public.
The Court acknowledged that there were other First Amendment
rights that existed, but in striking the balance, it found the
interest of the public in xex receipt of balanced information
was paramount.

It did not rule, howeverp that there were not

other First Amendment rights that were protectable in a proper
case.

The Court did say that there was no unabridgeable right

to access, but it did not imply that there was no right, albeit
non-absoulte,

And in terms of the First Amendment 9 xx it is,

to say the least, conceptually difficult to conceive of a
First Amendment

~ght

re~~ive

to

T/te Fio:s+ A.m,~rnvn+-

Amendment right to sen

out

information, but not First

JfJetd15 c:rF

ormation.

·Fr

if

ec

ntJt".f'rAJM, -/., l:rltn,

That right is admitte

not absolute, but it exists to some extent and cannot be

J

y

*

disregarded as the broadcasters would argue.
Although Mosley

~

seems to say that it is always impermissible

to discriminate on the basis of the content of the expression,
it goes on to consider the discrimination in that case as if
it were based on some other factor which might be permissilbe

-15in some circumstances.

The appraoch is the stan
i.t:. I p~

equal protection approach when a
impaired.

Sj:t"t'c."'

undamental right is being

To justify an impairment of that fundamental xxgkNX

right, it is necessary for the government to demonstrate a
compelling interest.

I

If that approach were adopted here,

I would still think that the court of appeals should be affirmed.
The justification for the discrimination against political
messages xeeemx seems to be that if they are xxaxx»ex available
for sale, either one of two sxxaxxi unsatisfactory alternatives
will result.

First,

axxxxkexxxmexx%xxx»exEasgkkxs~x»~

the rich

and affluent will buy up the vast majority of the time.

Or,

second, to prevent this imbalance, the networks and broadcasters
will have to give away a lot of free time thereby imperiling
their financial situation by cutting their advertising revenues.
On analsysis neither of these reasons holds up.
Both are premised on the belief that the opinion of
the court of appeals affords political advertisers unlimited
access to the airwaves.

As I have tried to emphasise, the

opinion of the court Nfa of appeals does not so xx rule.

It

only says some access must be afforded to some advertisers,
not that every advertiser has a right to preeent his message
if he can pay for it.
~xeg

It further leaves it Xk to the FCC to

draw up xxsxxsxx rules that will prevent just the kind

of unfortunate situations the petrs predict.

Petrs sayx that

no such workable rules can be drawn up, but I am unable to see
why.

All

Xk~

the FCC need say is that a small percentage

of the advertising time must be available for political ads.

I
\

-16I

Presumably., a small enough xxmxe time would be set aside so
that there were many more potential advertisers than theee
were time.

In this situation, the broadcasters, as they do

with regular advertising and programming, would have to pick
and choose between potential political advertisers in an attempt
('"'\,

to provide a bal) anced spectrum.
~~Xi~

While one

side~

of the

political spectrum might be better able to afford the

cost of these ads than another, gtxeR there will be some who
can afford it from both sides, particililarly when resources are
pooled into political organizations as was done by resps in
E~Xk

these cases.

Thus, an imbalance is unlikely given a

limited amount of air space, and it is also unlikely that much
free time will have to be alloted.
all,

These regulations can, after

be reasonable ones; petrs assume that they will be un-

reasonable.
The other practical argument against the opinion of
the court of appeals is that it will

XRKX~

involve k the FCC

too much in the day-to-day functioning of individual broadcastlers.
I frankly do not understand why the involvement will be sufficiently
OVf!r-alf

greater than at the present where the FCC supervizes t e
of regular programming and of advertising in the case of X:Rk:e
the broadcasters who permite political ads.

At present, FCC

control is pretty loose; the broadcasters are generally entitled
to exercise their own discretion in maintaining a balance, and
the issues only come before the FCC when there is a licensing
renewal hearing at which the entire record of the broadcaster
is reviewed,

And even if it were true that more FCC involvement

-17would

result~,

that disadvantage, which is speculative at best,

hardly seems to rise to the level of a compelling reason for
the restriction of free expression.
It should be finally recognized that thex system, where
it exists.) of forbidding political or controversial advertising
is a kxl§kxz:ae haphazard one that is arbitrary in its application,
For example, the railroads have put on the national networks
:kl:ixx blatant poltical ads in which an :a::s:xxxxxsgk:kx astronaught
urges the viewer to XN:kextix£Nxge:kxxx write his Congreesman
(I forget whether it is for or against) a certain bill,

Oil

companies are putting on ads trying to show how much they are
doing to fight polution.

While

I§Xe::s:sa~x:kl:ie~

presumably this

builds good will, it no doubt is also intended to mobilize
public support against what the oil companies view as extreme
forms of regulation of the oil industry for environmental purposes,
Could the Sierra Club run counter ads saying that oil companies
x cause oil spills, or would that be

controversial7

I§N:iXxx~x

political or too

Or could the Quakers or a pacifist group run

ads opposing Army recruiting ads?NKX:kkexgxNNKX The

NExXNNi~

NExXNMi obvious problem is that political or controversial
ads cannot be seperated from commercial ads or public service
messages.

It is this reason ultimately why broadcasters should

not impose this rule

:ixa~xxxxg

forbidding all editorial ads,

because such a rule e inevitably supports the political ::s:x:aNx
status quo and that in itself is a form of political censorship
and discrimination,

Indeed if the Democrats are unsuccessful

in this suit, and if, as is quite possible, their well-known

-18financial problems intensify, after this election they may
bex ruined XN financially if they have no access to the mass
media to raise money.

If the court of appeals is reversed,

they will have no such access outside of an election campaign.
Thus, the decision of the networks not to accept political
ads may have a profound effect on the viability of a two party
system.
I want to again emphasize the narrow appreach that
the

~~Nx

court of appeals took.

It does not

xa~xx

require

that the Nexxesx networks be flooded with poltical advertisements,
that they xeeX sell to all customers, that they give away time.
It says only that if they sell time, they must sell some time
for editorial advertisements,and it leaves to the FCC the job
of working out how xka this goal can best be accomplished so
as to maximize free expression and to

minimiz ~

if not prevens

any adverse effect on the networks.
AFFIRM

Fox

N.B. I neglected to deal with the argument that the
public is already exposed to a balanced treatment of the
controversial issues

xk~xx

through regular programming.

First, the public has, as I have argued before, some limited
and abridgeable right to spe ~k as well to receive information.
Second, there is a considerable difference in the quality of a
message when it is reported by a neutral reporter on a news
program from when it is put forth by an advocate.

The public

cannot get as adequate coverage if its receipt of i:Imx information
is so limited.

Third, k because of time limite, broadcasters
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tart Writer , ·•. JP.~c!e. · three one-mmute c~m- al!~ ABp-~.s •studymg the .s~t- 18 months ,_ to .two years old dashboard if circuits weren't
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o accept com- human volunteers of the arr NBC _· scheduled the commer- ate students. He said a later S
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e
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gs as safety ye;-tent firing.
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"Meet the -· ~re~s" ·· but ·then was loose and a test of the cir- srud he_ was "shocked" by' the
mobiles the
Schaffer said CBS rejected asked f()r a substitute commer- cuit would have shown this. actions of the networks.
e Comntittee the commercials on the basis ciai because it had heard of an He said a test by Fairchild ''There's something wrong
. ' _[that the air bags were not an air bag failing a test made at Hiller also failed becau~e of when networks refuse an item
haffer, vice Allstate product. ABC re- W~y~e eState Uniyersity in J?e- crossed wires. Air bags in- of safety on a paid . basis,"
eral counsel jected .the . commercials on tr01t. _
·
stalled in automobiles ·would Hartke said, noting that they
urance Com- June.· 5 as "too controversial." Schaffer ~aid the . Wayne have circuit· checkers that accept commercials from auto----------'-------------~----------''--------------- mobile manufact urers advertising safetY features on lheir
cars.
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-19can necessarily give only one or two views of the major
factions of a political issue.

xa~gmNx

This necessarily leaves out

smaller factions whose views are still different; there are
after all more than two sides to most issues.
xkex~xBX~NR

Since

MNXKXNX ~

good proportion of the public gets all its information

about current and political events from radio and television,
many persons will be unexposed to views that do not fall into
either of the two major camps and which are therefore not
included within network news shows.

Thus, unless one is either

a member of a major political camp or an extemist type who
says things wild enooghJ to make news, one has no way of presenting
his views to a large
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CHAMB E R S OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

February

4, 1973

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

In 71-863, C.B.S. v. Democratic
National Committee and companion cases I will in
due course circulate a dissenting opinion.

(

William

The Conference
cc:

Law Clerks

o. Douglas

I

I

A\u:prtmt {!fo1trt of tqt ~nittb ~tatts
Jrasirmgton, ~. <!J. 2ll~"~j
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM. J. BRENNAN . JR.

February 5, 1973

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

RE: Nos. 71-863 to 71-866 - Columbia Broadcasting
System v. Democratic National Committee

In due course I shall circulate a dissent in the

above cases.

W. J. B. Jr.

~lt}trttttt

<!Jcnrt cf t4t ~ttittb $5tatttt
~nttlyi.ttgtcn. ~. <!J. 20.S:J~~·

CHAMB E R S OF

.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

February 6, 1973

No. 71-863, etc., - CBS v.
Democratic Natl Committee
Dear Chief,
You have done an extremely thorough job in
this important case, and I agree with the result you reach.
I also agree with much of your proposed opinion, but portions of it, particularly Part IV, cause me considerable
concern.
The upshot is that I shall probably write a
short concurrence, but shall await the dissenting opinion before undertaking to do so .
. Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

.:§nvrtmt <!Jcn:rt cf t4t 'Jllnittb .:§tateil

~atl4inghm. gl. <!f. io.?J!-,;l

CHAMB E R S OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

February 6, 1973

No. 71-863, etc., - CBS v.
Democratic Natl Committee
Dear Chief,
You have done an extremely thorough job in
this important case, and I agree with the result you reach.
I also agree with much of your proposed opinion, but portions of it, particularly Part IV, cause me considerable
concern.
The upshot is that I shall probably write a
short concurrence, but shall await the dissenting opinion before undertaking to do so.
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

.iu:vrttttt (!fttnrt cf tqt ~ttittlt ~tatts
1Jaslri:nghtn, lfl.

<!f.

211~'!-~

CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

February 9, 1973

Re:

Nos. 71-863, 71-864, 71-865 and 71-866 - Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc . v. Democratic
National Committee

Dear Chief:
Because you reach and decide the First Amendment
issue as a statutory matter in Part IV, I do not see the
reason for Part III, which concludes that the conduct of
private broadcasters does not constitute official action
subject to review under the First Amendment. Indeed, I
thought the Court normally avoided constitutional issues
that were unnecessary to decision .
I would n~in any event agree with Part Ill. The
broadcasters make substantial claims that their conduct
is either authorized or requireq by the Fairness Doctrine,
and your Part IV seems to recognize that the Fairness
Doctrine and other Communications Act policies are· greatly
implicated in the challenged broadcaster policy. I had
thought that an otherwise private act ordered or
authorized by statute or other official policy constituted governmen~a1 conduct for constitutional purposes.
Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963);
Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Moose Lodge 107 v. Irvis,

407 u.s. 163, 178-179 (1972).

Otherwise I am in agreement with your opinion.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to Conference

If~

~u.pumt ~curt

of tqt ~ttittb ~tutts

2Jifa:slthtgtott.lJ. <!J.

2.0gt'!.;1

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

February 10, 1973

Dear Chief:
I had hoped to have a dissent
around by Monday the 12th in

No~.71-863,

71,864, 71-865 and 71-866 - CBS v.
Democratic National Committee.
But I'll not be able to do so.
I may possibly have it by Friday the 16th.

The Chief Justice
I

cc: Conference

•

~~~
.iu:pt'mtt ~cud cf t4t 'Jiltti:ttb j;tatt"

Jfa"Irhtghtu. ~.

'~-- .;... ~~A. IJO
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~ /Zv.~.,o.. r~bruary 14,
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1973

l Nos. 71-863 • Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic
National Committee
·
71-864 - FCC v. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace

. ·J • :: ~::: ~ :::~:::·~:::!:::;::~i:::::i::•:.E::::::::~c
~

~ ~EMORANDUM

i

~

);-

National Committee

TO THE CONFERENCE:

At this stage I will not try to respond specifically to comments
and memos received, except to make the following points:

1.

There appears to have been some confusion about the purpose

of Part IV of the opinion.
reach the

11

Some have asked whether it is necessary to

governmental action 11 issue in Part III since Part IV appears

--

to decide, on both statutory and First Amendment grounds, that the CA
erred in imposing a right of access.

It was not my

i~tention,

however,

to decide that the statutory and First Amendment issues are identical,
but rather to suggest that there are

11

constitutional aspects 11 to the statu-

tory question since Congress has most explicitly incorporated First
Amendment

11

values 11 into the Communications Act.

-r"~

Nevertheless, if it

- 2 -

will help, I am willing to clarify Part IV by stressing that there we deal

-

only with the statutory question and deal separately with the First Amendment issue.

But we cannot escape deciding whether the First Amendment

--

itself requires a right of access, unless we stop with a holding of no
governmental a.ction.

I cannot be persuaded that governmental acguies-

cence equals gpvernmental action or that there is governmental action
here.

No case of this Court comes close to sustaining such a holding here.
2.

The approach taken in Part IV of the opinion, of course, will

-

depend on whether or not there is general agreement on "governmental
action 11 is sue.

-----

If the lack of votes "persuades" me to omit Part III, I think we

would be obliged to say, of course, that even assuming, arguendo, bu,t
without intimating an affirmative view, that there is "governmental action"
present,

never~heless

right of access.

the CA is wrong on holding a First Amendment
.
'

To me that is a cart-before-the-horse approach.

I firmly feel this is an appropriate case to rely on alternative
grounds since it is not a case that can be disposed of without dealing with

......---

.

--

both the !!.sJ: and the First Amendment.

-

so that

'

· A.
B.

This opinion should be structured

We find no governmental action.
Even assuming governmental action, we find no
violation of First Amendment rights.
'J

· C,

No violation of the Act.

- 3 -

----

I now have spent months in tearing that issue apart, and I see
in the Court of Appeals 1 holding a greater threat to "free press" than

some others may acknowledge. If a "governmental acquiescence" leads
~==============:11
to a "governmental action holding, I suggest we ponder the implications
in two areas:
(a)

the Fourteenth Amendment, on which I will say no more
than suggest a reading of Professor Jaffe's thoughtful
article in ~ rv. L. Rev. 768, 782-87; and

(b)

the printed media, which we must recognize is heavily
subsidized by special mailing rates, which for some
publications may be the margin of survival, and by antitrust immunity, without which many large newspapers
could not exist.

(Professor Jaffe's article also provides

a helpful analysis on this problem.)
For my part, I do not want to enlarge governmental action concepts so as
to embrace what government permits as distinguished from what it

.££!!!_-

mands.
-..

-

This case is crucial to the media, and I have approached it with

a view to giving broadcasters a posture as nearly as possible like that of
a private

newspape~,

consistent with the regulatory scheme.

I do not

want broadcasters regulated more than they are now, which would surely
be the result of a Court of Appeals' holding.

Lzx~··

~u.vumt Q}llttd O"f

tJrt ~ttiltb ~tafts:
jlra:s:lrhtghm, ~. <!}. 20gt'!~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

February 15, 1973

Re:

No. 71-863 - CBS v. Democratic National Committee, etc.

Dear Chief:
I agree with your memo of February 14th, and with
Potter's comments earlier circulated, to the effect that
g~rnmental acquiescence on the facts of this case does
n9t amount to governmental "action" for First Amendment
purposes ~ would favor the suggestion made by you in
your memorandum that Part IV include the statement that
.
there only the statutory question
is dealt with, so that
there can be no misunderstanding. Assuming that that
sort of a change will be made, I join your opinion.

--·

Sincerelyy

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

I

J
CH AMBE RS OF

..JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

March 8, 1973

')~.;._...,~

~~--~
)~

~~~

Re: CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Committee /~~ _tvNos. 71-863 through 71-866
ll
.... ~ r
Dear Chief,

~ 11.~

~

"

I don't know if you expected responses to your memorandum of February 14, but, if so, here is a brief and belated
one. I am in general agreement with much that is said in your
memorandum, and in particular I agree with what you say on
page 3. My specific thoughts, in a nutshell, are these:
(1) We obviously ll,!Ust deal with both the constitutional and !!_atutox:_y i~sues, because the petitioners cannot prevail ~
unless the respondents are wrong on both issues. I am con.
vinced the respondents are wrong on both issues.

's

an ~~

(2) I .do not believe that in the context of this case
i~epend~nt decision of a radio station or of a r~dio network is gs rt 1..:Je
a decision of the Government. ( ~ ,"}_,1-zdJ.. a-<-~ )
q~

,;;r,

(3) Since the First Amendment is a restriction upon
governmental action only, the decisions of the radio stations
and networks in this case do not implicate that provision of the
Constitution.
(4) Propositions (2) and (3) above are so clear to me
that I would be quite unwilling to "assume" that the broadcasters'
decisions were Government decisions, even arguendo.
(5) If the Government (i.e., the FCC) did impose the
respondents' suggested restriction upon the broadcasters'
freedom of independent decision, then the broadcasters would
have a very serious First Amendment claim.
"

7&

~·

- 2(6) I think the respondents' statutory claim is totally
invalid-- almost frivolous. I would deal with it dlrectly and
briefly without mentioning the First Amendment or any other
provision of the Constitution.
(7) Perhaps my thinking has been unduly influenced
by Hugo Black, but I am instinctively leery of talk about "First
Amendment 'values' " or of the "values" of any other provisions
of the Constitution.
All of the above may seem, to you and to my other
brethren, too abecedarian a view of the issues involved in this
litigation. But that is the way I see them.
Sincerely yours,

o\ S·
The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

/

;%u.prnttt <!Jonrt of tire ~lniit~

~tatca

:Wna-lri:ttgtcn. p. ~· 20~'1-.$ .
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

March 29, 1973

Dear Chief:
In Noo 71-863 - CBS Vo
Democratic National Committee are quite right o
a dissento

you

My opinion is not

I concur in the judgment

of reversal and will circulate a new
drafto

The Chief Justice
cc: Conference

j
.jtqtrtmt Q):ttu.rt ttf tqt 'J[ttittlt ~tetfts

'Dasftingftttt, !lJ. Q):.

20gi'!~

CHAMBERS OF

March 29, 1973

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

71-863, 71-864, 71-865, and 71-866

Dear Chief:
In response to your memorandum of
today on the above cases I had joined Bill
Brennan's dissent this morning.
Sincerely,

T.M.

The Chief Justice
cc:

Mr. Justice Blackmun
Mr. Justice Powell

I
~uvrtutt Qfttttd

of t~t 'J)lnitttt ~tafts
11htslyingLnt. ti). <q. 20~>1~ .

CHAMBERS OF

March 29, 1973

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

Nos. 71-863, 71-864, 71-865, and 71-866

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your dissent .
. Sincerely, ~l___
T.M.

Mr. Justice Brennan
cc:

Conference

.:§u.prtut~

Qfllltri of t4~ ~b .:§taus
Jfasfringhm. ~. <!f. ~ll~~~

CHAMBERS OF'

March 29, 1973

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

Re:

71-863
71-864
71-865
71-866

- CBS v. Dem. Natl. Com.
- FCC v. Bus. Exec. Move for VN Peace
-Post-Newsweek Stations v. Bus. Exec.
- ABC v. Dem. Natl. Comm.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

This case is beginning to take shape in terms of the
"line-up" and I will undertake to suggest a "score sheet" as it
looks to me, bearing in mind this is all tentative:
Bill Douglas
Bill Brennan
Potter Stewart

Byron White
Thurgood Marshall
Harry Blackmun
Lewis Powell
Bill Rehnquist

dissents
dissents
concurs with possible separate
opinion as to ~art IV since he
feels Part III disposed of the
case
possible concur except as to
Part III '
no response
no response
no response
will concur with possible
reservations as to Part IV which
may now be removed if Part IV
is limited to the statutory claims.

The net of this is that there are now four votes for a judgment
t ~rse, and if Thurgood, Harry and Lewis stay witli thei r co ilierenc'e

votes, then the vote willlike1y be 6-3 to reverse with varying positions
among the six.

2

I will therefore now address myself to possible reconciliation of divergences among the six.
Among other things, I will make it clear that Part IV
is directed at the statutory claims.

i

Potter, Bill Rehnquist and I are probably firm in the
view of "no governmental action. " In preparing the opinion
I placed this point in Part III so as to facilitate the sorting out
process. Only if Harry and Lewis conclude to join this will
there be a Court for Part III. With or without a Court on Part
III, I believe we cannot and should not avoid discussion of the
factors in Parts III and IV.

I will now circulate a new draft to see if reconciliation
is possible.

j;u.prtntt <!Jltltrl: of tqt 'J!lnittb j;Wts

JfasJringhtn. J. "f.

2ll&f't~

CHAMBERS 01"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

March 29, 1973

Re:

71-863
71-864
71-865
71-866

To:

Mr. Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Blackmun/
Mr. Justice Powell 7

-

CBS v. Dem. Natl. Comm.
FCC v. Bus. Exec. Move for VN Peace
Post-Newsweek Stations v. Bus. Exec.
ABC v. Dem. Natl. Comm.

I address this separate memorandum to you three because
you may be pondering Part III, the "governmental action" aspect.
If the action of a broadcaster is "governmental action"

I submit that conclusion would create some large new problems
under the Establishment Clause.
1. Can "governmental action" be permitted to
sponsor church service programs on radio and
TV?

\l

2. Can we say that broadcaster action is ••govern- \
mental 11 for the Speech Clause but not for the
Establishment Clause?
With the volume of mail hitting each desk these days, I
send this only to those who have not responded on the circulated
draft and the February 14 memorandum treating Part III in particular.

CBS v. Democratic National Committee
No. 71-863 and companion cases
\\CK

April 12, 1973
I have now reviewed in detail all of the circulations
in these cases.

In present form, the Chief's opinion

relates the factual and regulatory background,in the
Introduction and in Parts I and II ; finds no governmental
action,in Part III; and finds no violation of the public
interest standard of the statute,in Part IV.

Footmote

17, at the beginning of Part IV, reserves the First
Amendment question as a technical matter but goes on
'

to state that the First Amendment question is indistinguishable
from the stat• utory one.
With the mmnor exceptions which I will note at the
end of the memorandum, the statutory discussion is
I think in accordance with your views both of the
statute and of the First

mendme.nt, and I recommend

that you join the statutory discussion.
I find the Chief's discussion

1 '

In contrast,

?i; of governmental

action wholly unpersuasive for the reasons I will
outline below.

And since the opinion, in effect,

decides the First Amendment question in accordance
with your views, the decision on the governmental action
point is unnecessary--at minimum, the governmental
action question is a difficult constitutional question
which the Court ought not to reach out to decide.

I.
There is, in my view, governmental action here on

either of two related theories,

The first is essentially

Justice Brennan's theorya 1) the broadcast industry
is subject to fairly heavy regulation as is evideced
by the provisions detailed in footnote 8 of Brennan's
~

opinion, by the Fairness Docttine imposing ~umber of
specific content-related obligations on the industry,
and by the requirement that one have a license to
broadcast==I emphasize that these are in conjunction
and not alone; and 2) having passed the

threshhol~

of general regulation, the FCC in addition investigated
the specific policy challenged here and declined to
Act.

(

____

I- find__...._____
this case

indistinguishabl~om

Public Utilities Comm'n v, Pollak, 343 U,S, 451(1952),
There, the public ualities commission had general
regulatory authority over a privately-owned bus
company,

When the bus company played irritating

music on the buses, a citizen complained, the Commission
investigated, and then the Commission dismissed the
citizen complaint,

i

The Court stateda

"We do recognize that Capital Transit operates its
service under the regulatory supervision of the
Public Utilities Commission of the District 2of
Columbia which is an agency authorized by Congress,
We rely particularly ._ upon the fact that that
agency, purasuant to protests against the radio
program, ordered an investigation of it and,
after formal public hearings, ordered its investigation
dismissed on the ground that the public safety,
comfort and convenience were not impaired thereby,"
343 u.s,, at 462.
The Chief at~pts on page 24 of his draft to

distinguish Pollak,

He

asser~,

without a single

-3-

supporting citation, that "Congress has not established
a regulatory scheme for broadcast licensees as pervasive
\\

as that in Pollak,

He then shifts to a discussion of

the extent to which Congress wished to leave broadcast
decisions to the licensees.

He does not discuss in

this context the Fairness Doctrine, though later in the
opinion he relies fairly heavily on it in showing that
there is no need for"advertorial" access.

Then,

a~

if to recognize the weakness of the foregoing arguments,
he states a
"Perhaps a more basic distinction between Pollak
and this case is that Pollak was concerned with
a transportation utility that itself derives no
protection from the First Amendment."
Apart from the fact that I do think a traxnsportation
utility has some First Amendment rights, the distinction
between Pollak and this case .. relates not to governmental
~

-

action but to the substance of the First Amendment.
Certainly, in deciding whether the policy of refusing
advertorials is

~

consistent with the First Amendment

.

one ought to weigh heayily the First Amendment rights
of the broadcaster, but I fail to see how this relates
to governmental action.
This brings me to the second theory of governmental
action.

I was suprised to see that Justice Brennan

did not cite and rely upon Railway Employe• s' Dept
v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225(1956) and its progeny,

-4-

Hanson upheld over a First Amendment challenge a provision
of the Railway Labor Act which authorizes rai• lroads
and unions to enter union shop agreements.

The Court

reached the First Amendment question only after finding
governmental actionY
"The enactment of the federal statut te authorizing
union shop agreements is the governmental action
on which the Constitution operates, though it takes
a private agreement to invoke the federal • sanction".
351 u.s., at 232.
Hanson was reaffirmed in Intl Ass'n of Machinists
v. Street, 367 U.S. 740(1961) in which the Act was
construed "to avoid serious doubt of its constitutionality"
as forbidding unions to spend dues for political
purposes over the ob• jection of individual mem• bers.
Finally, in Latn..prop v. Donahue, 367

u.s.

820(1961),

the Court upheld the Wisconsin requirement that a
lawyer join an integrated bar, noting that the case
resembled Hanosn and suggesting by implication that
Street princi• ples would prohibit the bar from using
mem. . bership fees to. engage in poli• tical activities
offensive to its members.

It seem$ to be that

a es stand collectively for the pro osition
or
near-monopoly and
........___., places it in private hands, those
who control the

or near-monopoly are engaged

------------...

to some extent in governmental action for the purposes
of First Amendment limitations.

Of course, mere licensing

-5-

does not place such power in private hands.

The Moose

Lodge involved in Irvis had only one of more than
100 liquor licenses in the area, and those were liquor
licneses rather broadcast frequencies.

Here, at least

arguably, the government drove private persons off
the air in order to establish the present regulatory

g,

scheme and severly restricted the number of licenses.
In short, I think that there is governmental action
here.

I find Pollak almost conslusive as a matter of

precedent, and while the Street argument is a more
complex one calling for further elaboration and limitation
by this Court, it should not be ignored and ought not
to be foreclosed in a case where decision on the
governmental action point is not necessary.
II.
I take it from Justice White's circulation that
he is in basic agreement that the Court need not and

__

'

should
not decide the governmental -action
question.
.
-.,
~---

Informally, I understand that Justice Blackmun is
also uncertain on this point.

That leaves the Chief

and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist.
Jus ice Stewart seems to have been the moving force
in

pl~ng

emphasis on the governmental action question,

As I see it, he wants to rely on this point alone
in order to preserve his freedom in a subsequent case
to state that the FCC may in no case regulate the
content of broadcasting.

This, of course, is inconsistent

D

-!-

-6-

with Red

~ion,

where the constitutionality of the

obligations imposed by the Fairness Doctrine was
upheld.

In addition, Justice Stewart's earlier

circulation suggests that he would denude the
stat• utory discussion of any but the most
obliques references to the First Amendment.

In sum,

his position is that because there is no governmental
action, the First Amendment is not implicated, and
that the statutory claim is frivolous and relates only
to the "public interest" a vague standard the
administration of which is always left to the relevant
agency.

I do not think that this accords with

your '\iew.
An additional comment seems appropriate regardihg
the "parade of horribles" offered by the Chief in
his circulation of March 29, 1973.

There, he

asks
"Can "governmenatl action" be permitted to sponsor
church service programs on radio and TV7"
In my view, the answer is "yes", for two reasons.
To state that an action of the broadcaster approved
ala Pollak is

gover~ental

action is not to conclude

that the boradcaster does . not himself have First
Amendment rights.

Surely the storeowners in Logan Valley

and the company in Marsh were not stripped of their
First Amendment rights by the Court's conclusion that
they must respect the First Amendment rights of others.

-7The second point is that the First Amendment also has
;·

a Free Exercise Clause, which may permit or(conceivably)
require boradcasters to allow religious programs.
The general point is that these are all questions of
First Amendment balancing made more difficult and
touchy by the peculiar nature of the broadcasting
medium--broadcasting is peculiar for First Amendment
purposes and we therefore often defer to the FCC,
but I have seen no reason to support the conclusion
that boradcasting is special for governmental action
purposes.
III.
There are a few nits which I would pick with
Part IV of the Chief 0 s opinion.

We have

alrea~

discussed

two of them, when the cHief circulated his first draft.
One is on page 30,

There, the qinion statesa

"To agree that debate on public issues should
be 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' does not
mean that we should exchange the 0 public trustee'
broadcaster for the unregulated • editorial huckster,
and for no better reason than that we are already
compelled to bear with an overabundance of
unwelcome commercial
hucks:ertbsm."
I find this offensive and wholly unnecessary.

W~

have no reason to believe that the particular persons
who sought access in this case are hucksters, nor
that the general run of such people would be,
A second is on page 32,

Again, I see no point in

referring to the material sought to be presented as
"unwanted propaganda" thrust upon the public.

-8-

Finally, I find footnote 26(page 34) a gratuitous insult
to the Court of Appeals.

This is, after all, a difficult

and important case in• which the CA wrote a scholarly
opinion.

IV.
In corli1usion, I would join the statutory discussion
without the offensive passages, but would await
a brief opinion from Justice White or write one
yourself indicating that the statutory discussion
disposes as well of the First Amendment claim and
stating that you would not reach the question whether
there was governmental action here.

i9u.ptttttt Of4tnrl ttf tltt ~tb ~Udtg

' 11Jas£rhtgf4tn. W. Of. 2llp'!~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

April 16, 1973

##71-863, 71-864, 71-865 & 71-866 Columbia Broadcasting System v.
Democratic National Committee

Dear Chief:
As I have previously indicated, I join
Parts I, II and IV of your opinion in these
cases, as well as the Court's judgment.

I am

still having difficulties with Part III, however, but will either join it or shortly
circulate a brief opinion.
Sincerely,

~·
The Chief Justice
Copies to Conference

I

/
/

~ltltftmt C!fourl of t4t ~tb .i%tatts

-ufrington, ~. <q. 2rlbf~~
CHAMBER S O F

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

April 19, 1973

Re:

Nos. 71-863, 71-864, 71-865 and 71-866 - CBS v.
Democratic National Committee, etc.

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

I
/

April 19, 1973

PERSONAI~

Re: Nos. 71-863, 71-864, 71-865 and 71 -866
CBS v. Democratic National Committee, etc.
Dear Chief:
I hesitate t o mention language changes in an opinion which has
been as difficult and complex as the above, and in a case to which you
have cootr ibuted so much to a satisfact ory result.
It does occur to me, however, that the language of the opinion
in some instances may unnecessarily invite criticism. On page 30, the
opinion refers disparagingly to ''unregulated editorial huckster(s)", and
to "an overabundance of unwelcome c ommercial hucksterism". While
I certainly agree with you as to the characterization of much commercial
advertising, and suspect you are right in your estimate of many of the
"editorials" that would result, I would not wish to brand all parties in
both categories as "hucksters". The same thought occurred to e as
to the phrase "unwanted propaganda" being thrust on the public (page 32).
No doubt most of the paid editorials would be unwanted propaganda, but
I can think of some that I myself would like to pay for to counteract
what I now regard as the biased and often distorted "reporting" of the
regulated media.
I thought I might share these thoughts with you.

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

Re: Nos. 71-863, 71-864, 71-865 and 71-866
CBS v. Democratic National Committee, etc.
Dear Chief and Harry:
In view of our conversations, both of you know that I have had
difficulty with Part III of the Chief's fine opinion for the Court.

I have concluded after further study, including a review of
,Jaffee's article, PubJic Utilitie~q_~mmission v. P ollak, 343 U.S. 451,
and other authorities that I remain in doubt on the governmental action
issue as it is presented in this case. Nor do I think it necessary for
us to decide that issue.
Accordingly, I write to join in the Court's judgment and in
Parts I, II and IV of the opinion. I will also join in Harry's concurring
opinion.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Blackmun
cc: The Conference

j5u.prtm:t

Qfmtrl of tlr~ ~~ j5taf:ts

Jlas4ittghtn. J. OJ.
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CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF' JUSTICE

May 23, 1973

Re: 71-863
71-864
71-865
71-866

- CBS v. Dem. Natl. Comm.
- FCC v. Bus. Exec. Move for VN Peace
- Post-Newsweek Stations v. Bus. Exec. et al
-ABC v. Dem. Natl. Comm.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

The third and probably final draft of the above opinion went
to you earlier today, and I had intended to send a cover letter
calling attention to a substantive change in. Part IV. The
change restores the first draft approach of dealing with both
the statutory claims of the First Amendment claim in Part IV.
In the second draft Part IV was not an explicit First Amendment treatment as it now is. There will probably be a Court
on Part IV since Justices White, Blackmun, Powell and
Rehnquist have indicated in prior voting an acceptance of
Part IV as now written.

P. S. -- For the record I would appreciate hearing from
those woo join.

-...

....,.,.

'·

~u.ptttttt

<!fonrl cf t4t ~tti:ttb $5hdt-0'

~htslpngtcn. ~.

<!f. 2llc?4~

CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

May 24, 1973

Re:

Nos. 71-863, 71-864, 71-865, and 71-866 - CBS
v. Democratic National Committee, et al.

Dear Chief:
Had Part III of your opinion gotten a Court, I would
have preferred to see Part IV cast in nonconstitutional terms.
However, since Part III did not get a Court, I join you in
the redraft of Part IV as well as in the other parts of the
opinion.
Sincerely,

~

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

~ltprttttt . <!}curl cf t~t 'Jllttittb ~taftg
1

'lhtlllrhtgtcn. ~.

<!f.

2llbl'-~~

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

May 24, 1973

Re:

Nos. 71-863, 71-864, 71-865 and 71-866 CBS v. Democratic National
Committee

Dear Chief:
As before, I join Parts I, II and IV of
your opinion (Draft No. 3) as well as the judgment of reversal.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to Conference

.SuvrtttU ~ourt o-f t4t ~ttittb .itatts
'c$as!pttgton. ~. ~· 2ll.;i'-!..;l
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

May 24, 1973

Re: No. 71-863

-

CBS v. Democratic National
Committee and related cases

Dear Chief:
I join your recirculation of May 23, with the explanation of the limits of my joinder as set forth on page 1.
Sincerely,

j/. u. If.
The Chief Justice

cc: The Confe renee

.ju:pt"ttttt C!fou.rt of tqt 'J!!ttittb ~tattg

~aglrittgtou:. ~.

QJ.

2llc?'~;t

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

May 24, 1973

Re: No. 71-863, CBS v. Dem. Natl. Comm.,
and Related Cases
Dear Chief,
In response to your memorandum of May 23,
this will confirm that I continue to join Parts I, II,
and III of your opinion.
Sincerely yours,

(/<;'
I . ,.

/

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

.

"".

~

'ot!; ~~.

......

Re,ferring to your third draft, recirculated May 23, I write
to confirm that l join in Parts I, nand I,V. ,ofyour opinion for the
Court t rewain with Uarry in his conc~rring opinion.

In Part IV the Court determines "whether, assuming
governmental action, broadcasters are required" to accept
editorial advertisements ''by reason of the First Amendment."
Ante, at p. 26. The Court concludes that the Court of Appeals
erred when it froze the "continuing search for means to achieve
reasonable regulation compatible with the First Amendment
rights of the public and the licensees" into "a constitutional
holding." Ante, at p. 37. The Court's conclusion that the
First Amendment does not compel the result reached by the
Court of Appeals demonstrates that the governmental action
issue does not affect the outcome of this case. I therefore
refrain from deciding it.

~u:p-umt

<ijourt of t4t 'Jllnitt~ ~tattt.l
g:l. <.q. 20~,~~

~ail4htghm.

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

May 25, 1973

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re: Nos. 71-863 et seq., CBSv. Dem. Nat'l Comm., etc.
In the light of Harry Blackmun' s revised concurring
opinion, I have had to make changes in my opinion.

Enclosed

herewith are a revised first paragraph and first sentence of
the second paragraph of Part ll of my opinion. I trust that
the printer will be able to make these changes in time to bring
these cases down on Tuesday.

.'') c:? .

/

P. S.

CBS v. DNC, Etc.
PS cone
II.

Part IV of the Court's opinion, as I understand it, seems
primarily to deal with the respondents' statutory argument -that the obligation of broadcasters to operate in the "public
interest" supports the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Yet two
of my concurring brethren understand Part IV as a discussion of
the~~

F irst Amendment issue that would exist in these

cases wer e the action of broadcasters to be equated with governmental action.

So, according to my Brother Blackmun, "the

governmental action issue does not affect the outcome of this
case." Post, at

. The Court of Appeals also conflated the

constitutional and statutory issues in these cases. It reasoned
that whether its decision "is styled as a 'First Amendment decision' or as a decision interpreting the fairness and public interest requirements 'in light of the First Amendment' matters little." 450 F. 2d 642,
at 649.
I find this reasoning quite wrong and wholly disagree with it,
for the simple reason that the. First Amendment and the public
interest standard of the statute are not coextensive.

j;up-rmu <!feud ltf tJrt ~ttitt~.~hdts
._,asfringbm. ~. <!f. 2ll.;t~$
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

May 25, 1973

Re:

No. 71-863

-

CBS v. Democratic National
Committee and related cases

Dear Lewis:
The enclosed is what I am sending down to the
Printer as a substitute for my circulation of May 14, in
which you have joined.
I am assuming, from our conversation of this
morning, that this will be acceptable to you. It is in
somewhat different form from that which you handed me
at conference, but I feel certain that the content is the
same.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
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___

Recirculat ed:
71-866
_ __,___ _ _,____

Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., Petitioner,
71-863
v.
Democratic National
Committee.
Federal Communications Commission et a.l., Petitioners,
v.
71-864
Business Executives' Move for On Writs of Certiorari
to the United States
Vietnam Peace et al.
Court of Appeals for
Post-Newsweek Stations, Capithe District of Cotal Area, Inc., Petitioner,
lumbia Circuit.
V.
71-865
Business Executives' Move for
Vietnam Peace.
American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., Petitioner,
71-866
V.
Democratic National
Committee.
[February -, 1973]
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of
the Court.
We granted the writ in these cases to consider whether
a broad~st licensee's general policy of not selling advertising time to individuals or groups wishing to speak out
on issues they consider important violates the Federal

71-SO:l, ETC.-OPINION
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Communications Act of 1934. 47 lT. S. C. ~151 el seq., or
the First Amendment.
1n two orders announced the san1e clay, the Federal
Communications Commission ruled that a broadcaster
who meets his public obligation to provide full and fair
coverage of 1)ublic issues is not required to accept editorial aclYertisements. In re Busi11ess Executives' Jl,fove
fo~elnarn Peace, 25 F. C. C. 2cl 216; !11 re Democratic
Kationnl CommiLLee, 25 F. C. C. 2d242. A divided Court
of Appeals reversed the Commi:::sion, liolclitw that a
broadcaster's fixed policy of refusing editorial advertisements violates the First Amendment; the court remanded
the cases to the Commission to develop procedures and
guidelines for administering a First Amendment right of
accesf'. Business Executives' }.1 ave For Yietnmn Peace
v. FCC,- U. S. App. D. C.-, 450 F. 2cl 642 (1971).
The complainants in these actions are the Democratic
Committee (DNC) and the Business Executives' Move
for Vietnam Peace (BEM). a national organization of
business owners and executives opposed to the Vietnam
War. In January l 970, BEM fi]ccl a complaint "·ith the
Commission charging that radio station WTOP in \Vashingtoll, D. C., had refused to sell it time to broadcast
a series of one-minute spot announcements expressing
BEM vie\\·s on the Vietnam \Var. \YTOP, in common
with many but not all broadcasters, follo\\·ed a policy
of refusing to sell time for spot announcements to individuals and groups to expound their vie\YS on controversial issues. WTOP took the position that it presented full and fair coverage of important public questions. including the Vietnam \Var, and, therefore, it "·as
justified in refusing to accept editorial acl vert ism en ts.
WTOP also submitted evidence shO\\·ing that the station had aired the views of war critics on numerous occasions. BEM challenged the fairness of WTOP's cover-

71-~fi:>,
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ago of antiwar vie\\·s, but it presented no evidence in
support of that claim.
Four months later, in May 1970, the DNC filed with
the Commission a req uost for a declaratory ruling:
"That under the First Amendment to the Constitution and the Communications Act, a broadcaster
may not. as a general policy, refuse to sell time to
responsible entities, such as the DXC, for the solicitation of funds and for comment on public issues."
DNC claimed that it intended to purchase time from
radio and television stations and from tho national networks in order to conduct a national campaign to present
the viC\YS of the Democratic Party and to solicit funds.
Unlike BEM, DNC did not object to the policies of any
particular broadcaster but claimed that its prior "experiences in this area make it clear that it will encounter
considerable difficulty-if not total frustration of its
efforts-in carrying out its plans in the event the Commission should decline to issue a ruling as requested."
DNC cited Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 3!)5 U. S.
367 (HH39), as establishing a lin1ited constitutional right
of access to the airwaves.
In t"·o opinions issued the same clay, the Commission
rejected the respondents' claim that "responsible" individuals and groups have a right to purchase advertising time to comment on public issues without regard to
whether the broadcaster has complied with the fairness
doctrine. The Commission vie\Yed the issue as one of
major significance in the administration of the electronic
media, one "going to the heart of the system of broadcasting ''"hich has developed in this country . . . . " 2&
F. C. C. 2d, at 221. After reviewing the legislative history of the Communications Act, the provisions of the
Act itself, the Commission's decisions under the Act and

71-SO;},
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the difficult problems inherent in administering a right
of access, the Commission concluded that the demands
of BEM and DNC must be rejected.
The Commission also denied BEM's claim that WTOP
violated the Fairness Doctrine by failing to air views
on the war such as those held by members of BEM; the
Commission pointed out that BEM had made only a
"general allegation" of unfairness in WTOP's coverage
of the war and that the station had adequately rebutted
the charge by affidavit. Tho Commission did, however,
uphold DNC's position that tho statute recognized a
right of political parties to purchase broadcast time for
the purpose of soliciting funds. The Commission noted
that Congress has accorded special consideration for
access by political parties, see 47 U. S. C. § 315 (a) and
that solicitation of funds by political parties is both
feasible and appropriate in the short space of time generally allotted to spot advertisements. 1
A majority of the Court of Appeals reversed the Commission, holding that "a flat ban on paid public issue
announcements is in violation of the First Amendment,
at least when other sorts of paid announcements are accepted." 450 F. 2d, at 646. Recognizing that tho broadcast frequencies arc a scarce resource inherently unavailable to all, the court nevertheless concluded that the First
Amendment mandated an "abridgeable" right to present editorial advertisements. The court reasoned that
a broadcaster's policy of airing commercial advertisements but not editorial advertisements constitutes unconstitutional discrimination. The court did not, however, order that either BEM's or DNC's proposed
announcements must be accepted by the broadcasters;
1 The Corrunission's rulingl:> against BEl\I's Fairncs~ Doetrinc romplaint and in favor of DNC's claim that political partirs should be
J)Crmitted to purchase airtime for solicitation of funds wcrr not appralcd to the Court of Appeals and arc not before u;; hrrc.

71-8G:3, ETC.-OPINION
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rather. it remanded the cases to the Commission to develop "reasonable procedures and regulations determining
which and how many 'editorial announcements' will be
put on the air." Ibid.
Judge McGoYmn dissented; in his view, the First
Amendment did not compel the Commission to 'U11dert~kc thetaSk assigned to it by the m~ority:
"It 1s presently the obligation of a licensee to
advance the public's right to know by devoting a
substantial amount of time to the presentation of
controversial views on issues of public importance,
striking a balance which is always subject to redress
by reference to the fairness doctrine. Failure to
do so puts continuation of the license at risk-a
sanction of tremendous potency, and one which the
Commission is under increasing pressure to employ.
"This is the system which Congress has, wisely
or not, provided as the alternative to public ownership and operation of radio and television communications facilities. This approach has never been
thought to be other than within the permissible limits of constitutional choice." 450 F. 2d, at 666.
Judge McGowan concluded that the court's decision to
overrule the Commission and remand for development
and implementation of a constitutional right of access
put the Commission in a "constitutional strait jacket" on
a highly complex and far-reaching issue.
We granted certiorari because of the fundamental importance of the Court of Appeals' decision to the Communications Act and the First Amendment.
I

Mn. JusTICE WHITE's opinion for the Court in Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 (1969),
makes clear that the broadcast media posef unique and

\
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special problems not present in the traditional free speech
case. Unlike other media, broadcasting is subject to an
inherent physical limitation. Broadcast frequencies are
a scarce resource; each frequency must be portioned out
among applicants, and those so allocated must in turn be
subdivided among all those who would usc it to communicate. All who possess the financial resources and
the desire to communicate over the airwaves cannot be·
satisfactorily accommodated. The Court spoke to this
reality when, in Red L1:on, we said "it is idle to posit an
unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write,
or publish." Red Lion, s~tpm, 395 U. S., at 388.
Because the broadcast media utilizes a valuable and
limited public resource, th~·e j§__also p~~1t an unusual
o~ of First Amendment values. In Red Lion we discussed at length the application of the First Amendment to tho broadcast media. In analyzing the broadcasters' claim that the Fairness Doctrine and two of its
component rules violatrd their freedom of expression, \Yoheld that "Ln]o one has a First Amendment right to a
license or to monopolize a radio frequency; to drny a
station liecnse because 'the public interest' requires it 'is
not a denial of free speech.'" Red Lion, supra, 395
U. S., at 389. While tho broadcaster is not without protection under the First Amendment, United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U. S. 131. 166 ( Hl48),
"[i]t is the right of tho viewers and listeners. not the
right of tho broaclcastrrs. which is paramount. . . . It
is the right of tho public to receive suitable accrss to
social, political, esthetic. moral and other ideas and
experiences which is crucial here. That right may not
constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by
the FCC." I d., at 300.
Balancing the various First Amendment interests involved in tho broadcast media and cletermini ng \Vhat best
servos the public's right to be informed is a task of a great

H
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difficulty. The process must necessarily be undertaken
" ·ithin the framework of the regulatory scheme that has
evolved over the course of the past half-century. For
during that time, Congress and its administrative agency
have established a delicately balanced system that is
intended to best meet the interests of all concerned. Ad
hoc tampering may \Yell upset the balance and destroy
·w hat has thus far been accomplished. The problems of
regulation are rendered more difficult because the broadcast industry is dynamic in terms of technological change.
Solutions adequate a decade ago arc not necessarily so
now, and those acceptable today may well be outmoded
10 years hence.
Thus. in evaluating the First Amendment claims of respondents, \YC must afford great "·eight to the decisions
of Congress and the experience of the Commission. Sec
Red Lion, supra, 395 U. S., at 381. Professor Chafee
aptly observed:
"Once we get away from the bare \YOrc.ls of the
[First'] Amendment, we must construe it as part of
a Constitution which creates a government for the
purpose qf i)crforming several very important tasks.
The [First] Amendment should be interpreted so as
not to cripple the regular work of the government.
A part of this "·ork is the regulation of interstate
and foreign commerce, anc.l this has come in our
modern age to include the job of parceling out the·
air among broadcasters, which CongreFs has entrusted
to the FCC. Therefore, every free speech problem
in the radio has to be considered with reference to
the satisfactory performance of this job as well as to
the value of open discussion. Although free speech
should weigh heavily in the scale in the event of
conflict, still the Commission should be given ample
scope to do its job." II Chafec, Government and
Mass Communications 640-641 (1949).

7H~fi0,
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The judgment of the legislative branch cannot be
ignored or undervalued simply because one broadcast
constituency casts its claims under the umbrel1a of the
First Amendment. That is not to say we "defer" to the
judgment of the Congress and the Commission. nor
that we shirk any duty to invoke the Constitution should
we determine that the Commission has not fulfilled its
task with appropriate sensitivity to the interests in free
expression. The point is, rather, that when we face a
complex problem with many hard questions and few easy
answers it makes sense to pay careful attention to how
the other branches of government have addressed the
same problem.
II
This Court has on numerous occasions recounted the
origins of our modern system of broadcast regulation.
See, e. g., Red Lion, supra, 395 U. S., at 375-386; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190,
210-217 ( 1943); FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940); FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 137-138 (1940). We have
noted that prior to the passage of the Radio Act of 1927,
44 Stat. 1162, the broadcast media was marked by chaos.
The unregulated and burgeoning private use of the new
media in the 1920's had resulted in an intolerable situation demanding congressional action:
"It quickly became apparent that broadcast frequencies constituted a scarce resource whose use
could be regulated and rationalized only by the Government. \Vithout government control, the medium
would be of little use because of the cacaphony of
competing voices, none of which could be clearly
and predictably heard." Red Lion, supra, 395 U. S.,
at 376.
But, once it was accepted that broadcasting had to be
regulated because of its use of the public domain, Con-
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gress was confronted with a major dilemma: how to·
strike a proper balance between private and public control. Cf. Farmers Union v. W. Day, 360 U. S. 525, 528
(1959).
One of the earliest and most frequently quoted statements of this dilemma is that of Herbert Hoover, when
he was Secretary of Commerce. While his Department
was making exploratory attempts to deal with the infant
broadcasting industry in the early 1920's, he testified before a House Committee:
"We cannot allow any single person or group to
place themselves in [a] position where they can
censor the material which shall be broadcastecl to the
public, nor do I believe that the government should
ever be placed in the position of censoring this
material." Hearings before the House Committee
on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 68th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1924).
When Mr. Hoover's single sentence is parsed carefully,
it will be seen that he was saying the government must
walk a tightrope in regulating the broadcast media. The
Congress, the Commission and the courts have struggled
with this problem ever since. Congress appears to have
concluded, however, that of the two choices government
censorship would be the most pervasive, the most selfserving, the most difficult to restrain and hence the one
most to be avoided.
The legislative history of the Radio Act of 1927, the·
m.odel for our present statutory scheme, see FCC v.
Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940), reveals
that in the area of discussion of public issues Congress
chose to leave broad discretion with the licensee. Congress specifically dealt with-and firmly rejected---=tiie
argumenttiiat the broa~st facilities should .be opel~
nonselective basis to all persons wishing to talk about --"

a

il-SG:~,

ETC.-OPINION

10 COLUMBIA BROADCASTING v. DEMOCHATIC C011·1M.

public issues. Some members of Congress, those whose
views were not ultimately to prevail, strenuously objected to the unregulated power of broadcasters to reject
applications for service. Sec, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 404,
69th Cong., 1st Sess., at 18 (minority report). They
regarded the exercise of such power to be "private censorship," which should be controlled by treating broadcasters as public utilities.~ The provision that came
closest to imposing an unlimited right of access on broadcasters •vas part of the bill reported to the Senate by
the Committee on Interstate Commerce. The bill that
emerged from the Committee contained the following
prOVISIOn:
"[I] f any licenf::ee shall permit a broadcasting station to be used ... by a candidate or candidates for
any public office, or for the discussion of any question affecting the public, he shall make no discrimination as to the usc of such broadcasting station, and with respect to such matters the licensee
.'{hall be deemed a common carrier in interstate commerce: Provided, that such licensee shall have no
po,ver to censor the material broadcast."
Rce 67 Cong. Rec. 12503 (1926) (emphasis added).
When the bill came to the Senate floor, the principal
architect of the Radio Act of 1927 and the Chairman of
the Commerce Committee, Senator Dill, offered an
amendment to the provision to eliminate the common
"Conl!rc;:~mnn Dn 1·is , for exaniJ>I<', ~tat eel 011 thr floor oft lw Hou~r
the Yicw thnt Cong:rr~:,; found un:H·crptaolr:
'' l do not think nny mrmlwr of thr committrr \Yill drn~· th:il it i><
ab,olut!'ly inr1·it:1blr th:1t wr arr !!Oing to haw to rrg:ulatr tlw radio
public utiliti<:>s just as wr rrg:ulatc othrr public utilitir-;. \Yr arr
g:oing to lww to rcg:ulatr the ratrs and the !'<:'!Tier. and to fo rcr
t.ht'lll to g:i1·r C'(]llal sr n ·icr :111cl rqunl trratmcnt to all." 07 Cong.
Hrr. 54R3. Srr also Gi Cong. Rcr., at M84.

7H.:(i:~, ETC.-OPI:\10~

COLUMBIA BHOADCASTING v. DEMOCRATIC COMM. 11

carrier obligation and to restrict the right of access to
candidates for public office. Senator Dill explained the
need for the amendment:
"When we recall that broadcasting today is purely
voluntary, and the listener-in pays nothing for it,
that the broadcaster gives it for the purpose of building up his reputation, it seemed unwise to put the
broadcaster under the hampering control of being a
common carrier and compelled to accept anything
and everything that was offered him so long as the
price was paid.'' Ibid.
The Senators were also sensitive to the problems involved
in legislating "equal opportunities" with respect to the
discussion of public issues. Senator Dill stated:
"f"Public questions") is such a general term that
there is probably no question of any interest whatsoever that be discussed but that the other side of
it could demand time; and thus a radio station
would be placed in the position that the Senator
from Iowa mentions about candidates, namely, that
they "·ould have to give all their time to that kind
of discussion, or no public question could be discussed." 67 Cong. Rec. 12504.
The Senate adopted Senator Dill's amendment. The
provision finally enacted, § 18 of the Radio Act of 1927,
44 Stat. 1170, was later re-enacted as § 315 (a) of the
Communications Act of 1034,' but only after Congress
a Srrtion 015 (a) now read~:
"If an~· Jicrn~rr shall permit any pcr::on who i,; a lrgally qualifird
eandidn tc for an~· public offic·c to URC a broaden~( ing stat ion, hr·
~hall afford rqual opportunitirs to nil othrr such eanclicl:ltes for thnt
ofiirr in thr usc of such broadcasting stntion; Prnvided. That smh
lircmre shall havr no powrr of rcn;.;or~hip ovrr the matrrial broacleaRt under thr provisions of this srction. No obligation is impm;cd
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rejected another proposal that would have imposed a
limited obligation on broadcasters to turn over their
microphones to persons wishing to speak out on certain
public issues.• Instead, Congress after prolonged con1mder this subsection upon an~· liccnsef' to nllm1· ti1C' u~C' of it~ ~tation
b~· nny such candidate'. Appearame b~· a legnll~· qu:t!ified cnndidntc on any" ( 1) bona fide newsrast,
"(2) bona fide nf'WR inten·iew,
"(3) bona fide new~ doctll11C'llt:u~· fif tlw appenranrr of the r:tndicbte if' inridental to the presentation of the subjrct or subjects
conred by the news documentar~·], or
" ( 4) on-the-spot co1·emge of bona fide news events fincluding
but 110t limited to political conventions and activitirs incidental
thereto],
":<ball not be deemed to be u"c of a broadcasting station IYithin
the meaning of this subsection. Kothing in the foregoing ;;cntPnre
shall be C'nnstrucd as relieving broadcaster, in connection with the
prc~Pntation of newscasts, news interviews, news documcntarie~, and
on-the-spot coverage of news event, from the obligation impor-;ed
upon them under this chapter to operate in the public interest and
to nfford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting
Yiews on issues of public importance." 47 U.S. C.§ 315 (n).
'1 The Senate passed a pro1·ision providing that:
" ... if an~· licensee sh[lll permit any person to use a broadcasting
stat ion in support of or in opposition to any candidate for public
office, or in the prpsenlation of vieu·s on a public question to be

voted upon at an elertion, he shall afford equal OJJportuuity to an
equal number of other persons to use such station in support of nn
OJlposing candidate for such public office, or to reply to a person
who has used such broadcasting station in support of or in opposition to a candidate, or for the presentation of opposite views 011

such public questions."
Sec Hearings before the Senate CommiHee on InterRtate Commerce,
73d Cong., 2d Sc~~ .• on S. 2910, nt 19 (March 1934) (emphasis
[lddf'd). The provision for discussion of public ist>ue~ wa s deleted
by the House-Senate Conference. See H. R. Rep. No. 1918 on
S. 3285, 73d Cong., 2d Se~s., at 49.
Also noteworth~· nrc two bills offered in 1934 that would have
rc~trictcd the cant rol of broadcaster::; oYer the di~cu::~sion of rertain
is::~uc::;. Congres::;man Me Fadden propo::;cd a bill that would have
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sideration adopted § 3 (h), which specifically provides
that "a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not,
insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier." "
Other provisions of the 1934 Act also evince a legislative desire to regulate broadcasting within the context
of private journalism required to fulfill certain public·
obligations. Although the Commission was given theforhidden broadcastPrs from discriminating against programs f<ponsorc'd b~, religious, charitable, or educational aRsociation~. H. R.
7986, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). The bill wns not reported out of
committee. And, during the debates on the 193.J. Act, Senators
Wagner and Hatfield offpred an amendment that would hnve ordered
the Commission to " re ~e rve and allocate only to educationnl, rPli!!;ious, agricultural, labor, coopera tive, and similar non-profit-mnking
associntions one-fourth of all the radio broadcasting facilities within
its jurisdiction." 78 Cong. Rec. 8828. Senator Dill explained
why the Committee had rejected the proposed amendment, indicating that the practical difficulties and the dangers of cen:;orship were
crucial:
"MR. DILL. . . . If we should provide that 25 percent of 1ime
shall be allocated to nonprofit organizations, ·omeone would have
to determine-Congress or somebody else-how much of the 25
percent should go to education, how murh of it to labor, how much
of it to fraternal organizations, and so forth. When we enter this
field we must determine how much to give to the Catholics probably
and how murh to the Protestants and how much to the Jews."·
78 Cong. Rec. 8843.
Senator Dill went on to say that the problem of determining the
proper allocation of time for di:;cussion of t hese subj ects should be
worked out by the Commission. 78 Cong. B ee. 8844. The Senate
rej ected the amendment. 78 Cong. Rec. 8846.
"Section 3 (h) prO\·idel:i as follows:
"'Common carrier' or 'carrier' means any person engaged aii a
common carrirr for hire, in inten;tate or foreign communication by
wire or radio or in interstate or foreign radio trau s mi ~~ion of energy,
except where reference i::; made to common carriers not subj ect to
this ehaptcr; but a per;;on engaged in radio broadcasting shall not,
insofar as such pen:lon is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier."·
4~ Stat. 1065, as amended, 47 U. S. C. § 153 (h).
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authority to issue renewable three-year licenses to broadcasters 6 and to promulgate rules and regulations governing the use of those licenses, 7 both consistent with
the "public interest, convenience and necessity," ~ 326
of the Act specifically forbids the Commission from
censoring the material broadcast by licensees or from
promulgating regulations that would "interfere \Vith the
right of free speech by means of radio communication." 8
From these provisions it seems clear that Congress intended to permit private broadcasting to develop as far
as is consistent with its public obliga.tions without the
interference of the Federal Government. Only when
the interests of the public are found to outweigh the
legitimate journalistic interests of the broadcasters will
government step in.
Subsequent developments in broadcast regulation illustrate how this regulatory scheme has evolved. Of particular importance, in light of Congress' flat refusal to
r.
7

a~

4F: Rtat. 10R0, a~ ;lmC'ndcd, 47 U. S. C. § 807.
80rtion 3m of th0 Comrmmications Art of 1!J:H, 4R Rtat. 10R2,
anwndrd, 47 U. S. C. § 303. pro\'idr~ in rriP\'ant pari:

" Excrpt :1~ othrr\l'i~r pro1·idrd in thi~ chaptc·r, thr Commi~ .-ion from
timr to tim0, :1::; public com·rniC'll('<', intrr0,.:t or nrcc"'sit~ - n · quirr~,
shnll"(h) Prescribe t hr nnt urr of t hr srn·ire to br n•ndrrrd
rlnss of lif'rnsrcl stations and rarh stntion within an~· cl:i~" ;

h~ -

rnch

" ( 4) makr :;:nrh nrlrs :1ncl r0gulat iom nnd prrsrribc snch rrst rirtions nne! condition'. not ineon.~istrnt \l'ith lmr, n~ may br nC'('f'>'"nry
to rn rr~ - out t hr proYi>'ions of this rh:-~pt rr. . .. "
' Rrrtion 32f\ of thr Comrnnnieations Art of 1084, 4S Stat. IO!H,
as nmrndrd. 47 U. S. C. § 826. proYidr":
" :\othing in this rlwptrr shall br undrr~toocl or ron"trurd to gi1·0
thr C'ommi";;;ion thr powN of rrnsorship m·rr the radio romrnnni('afions or signnl~ tmnsrnitt0cl h~- an~ ' radio ~tntion, ami no rrgnl:ition or condition i-'hnll be promulgatrd or fixrd h)· thr Commi.,;:ion
which Rh:J!l intNfrrr with thr right of frrr sp00C'h b~ - mrnn~ of radio
rommuniration."
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impose a "common carrier" right of access for all persons
,\·ishing to speak out on public issues, is the Commission's "Fairness Doctrine," which evolved gradually over
the years spanning federal regulation of the broadcast
media.° Formulated under the Commission's power to
issue regulations consistent with the "public interest,"
the doctrine impose two fundamental responsibilities
on the broadcaster: coverage of issues of public importance must be adequate and it must fairly reflect differing
viewpoints. Sec Red Lion, supra, 395 U. S., at 377. In
fulfilling its Fairness Doctrine obligations. the broadcaster must provide free time for the prcsclltation of
opposing vien·s if sponsorship is unavailable. Cullman
Broadcasting Co., 25 P & F Radio Reg. 895 (1963), and
it must initiate programming on public issues if no one
else seeks to clo so. Sec John J. Dempsey, 6 P & F
Radio Reg. 615 (1950); Red Lion, supra, 395 U. S., at
378. Since it is physically impossible to provide time
for all viewpoi11ts, however, the right to exercise editorial
judgment was granted to the broadcaster. The broadcaster, therefore, is allowed significant journalistic discretion in deciding how best to fulfill its Fairness Doctrine
obligations. ' 0 although that discretion is bounded by rules
0
In 1959, Congrr~~ amrnclrd § 3115 of thr Af•t to giYr ~Ia tutor~·
npprontl to thr Faimr~~ Dortrinr. Act of Srptrm])('r 14, 19.19, § 1,
7il Stat. 557, as amrnckd, +7 F. S. C. §;)].')(a).
For a sum mar~· of 1hr clr\·rlopmrnt am! nat me of 111C' F:tirur~s
Doctrine, i:'rr Red Lion, supra. 395 U. S., nt 87.'5-380.
' 0 Ser 11fadalun Murrau . .') P & F Radin Hrg. 2cl 263 (1965).
Factor~ that thr broadcaster mu"t 1akr into nrrount in rxrrri~ing
his di-:cretion inrludr the following:
"In detrnnining whrt hrr 1o honor ~prrific rrqur~t~ for timr, the
~tat ion will inr\·itably be confroll!rcl with ~uch qur~t ions as whrthrr·
t hr ~ubjrct. i~ worth considrring, whrt her t hP viewpoint of 1hr rrque~tin~ part~' hm; alrratly rccri\'<'Cl a ~>nfficirnt amount of broadcnst
timr, or whrther 1hrrr may not be other avuilahle group~ or individual~ who might be more appropriate spokesmen for the particular·
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designed to assure that the public interest in fairness
is furthered. In its decision in the instant cases, the
Commission described the boundaries as follows:
"The most important consideration in this respect
is that the licensee cannot rule off the air coverage
of important issues or views because of his private
ends or beliefs. As a public trustee, he must present
representative community views and voices on controversial issues which are of importance to his
listeners. . . . This means also that some of the
voices must be partisan. A licensee policy of excluding partisan voices and always itself presenting
views in a bland, unoffensive manner iYould run
counter to the 'profound national commitment that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide open.' New York 'Pimes Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U. S. 254, 270 ( 1964); see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. F. C. C., 395 U.S. 367, 392 (n. 18)
(1969) . . . . " 25 F. C. C. 2d, at 222- 223.
Thus, under the Fairness Doctrine broadcasters are
responsible for providing the listening and viewing public
with access to a balanced presentation of information
on issues of public importance. 11 The basic principle
point of view than the pcr~on [or group] making the req11e1<t."
Hrport in the I\'Ia1ter of Editorializing by Broadrar:;t Licensee~, 13

F. C. C. 1246 (1949).
11

The Commission has al so ndopted variom; component regulations under the Fairne"~ Doctrine, the most notable of \Yhi r h arc
the "personal att::trk" and " political Pditorializing" rules which we
upheld in Red Lion Broadcasters v. FCC, supra. The " per~onnl
attack" rule provides that "when, during the prer:;entation of views
on a controversial iso;ue of public importame, an attnrk is made on
the hone:-:ty, character, integrity, or likr pPrsonal qunlitieR of an
identified per;:;on," thr licensee mw;t notify the prr"on at tacked and
give him an opportunity to re::;pond. E. g., 47 CFR § 73.12:3. Similarly, the "political editorializing" rule prm·idcs that, when a lircn~ce
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underlying that responsibility is "the right of the public
to be informed, rather than any right on the part of the
government, any broadcast licensee or any individual
member of the public to broadcast his own particular
views on any matter .... " Report on Editorializing, 13
F. C. C. 1246, 1249 (1949 ). Consistent with that philosophy, the Commission on several occasions has ruled that
no private individual or group has a right to command
the use of broadcast facilities. 1 ~ See, e. g., Dowie A.
Crettenden, 18 F. C. C. 2d 499 (1969); Mrs. Margaret
Z. Scherbina, 21 F. C. C. 2d 141 (1969); Boalt Hall Student Assn., 20 F. C. C. 2d 612 (1969); J.Wrs. Madalyn
endorses a political candidate in an editorial, he must give oi her
candidates or their spokei<men an opportunity to respond. E. g.,
47 CFR § 7:3.123.
The Commission, of coursr, has taken other steps be)·ond the
Fairness Doctrine to expand the diversit)' of expression on radio and
television. The chain broadcasting and multiple ownership rulPs
are longstanding examples. E. g., 47 CFR §§ 73.131, 73.240. More
rrcently, the Commission promulgated rule~ limiting tdPvision net"·ork i'yndirat ion pract icPs and reserving 25% of prime time for nonnrtwork programs. 47 CFR §§ 73.658 (j), (k).
'"The C urt of AppPals, and respondents here, have relied on
dirtum in United Broadcasting Co., 10 F. C. C. 515 (19-l-5), as
illustrating Commission approval of a privatr right to purrhase air
time for the discussion of controversial issues. In that raRe the
complaint alleged not only that the station had a policy of refusing
to sell time for the discussion of public i;;surs, but also that the
station had applied its policy in a discriminatory manner, a factor
not shown in the cases presently before UR. FurihPrmore, thP c!Prision
was handed down four year!" before tlw Commission had full)· dev<:>lopecl and articulated the Fairnes Doctrine. See Heport on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensers, 13 F. C. C. 1246 (1949). Thu~,
eYen if the decision is read without referPHce to i he allegnt ioll of
discrimination, it stands as merely an i~olated statenwut, made during
the period in which the Commission was still working out the problrms a~~ociatrcl with the discu::;sion of public i~sups; the dictum has
not, been followed since and has been modified by the Fainwss
Doctrine.
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Murray, 40 F. C. C. 647 (1965); Democratic State Central Committee of California, 19 F. C. C. 2d 833 (1968);
U. S. Broadcasting Co., 2 F. C. C. 208 ( 1935). Congress has not yet seen fit to alter that policy, although
since 1934 it has amended the Act on several occasions 1 3
and considered various proposals that would have vrstcd
private individuals with a right of access.' ''

III
That "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the ]~
freedom of speech, or of the press" is a restraint on gov- V

l

'"In Hl59, for rxnmplr, Congrr~:-; nmrndrd § :~15 (n) of thr
.\ct. to gi1·r ~tntntor.1' npproY:tl to thr Commis~ion'R Fnirnr~' Dortrinr. Art of Septrmbrr 14, 19.j9, § 1. 73 Stat. 557, nmrnding 47
U. S. C. § 315 (a). Vrry rrrrntl~ · . Congrr~s nmrndrd ~ ~12 (a) of
the 19:;4 Art to aut horizr t hr Cmmni:;.. ion to rcYokr :1 ~tnt ion JirrnRr
·' for flllful or rrpratrcl failmr to :1ll011' rrnsonnblr arrr.'" to or prrmit
pmehnsr of rrn><onnhlr amounts of timr for thr ll>'C' of :1 hmndrn~ting
:-tat ion b~ · a lrgnll~: IJlla!ifird rnndidntr for frdrr:1l rlrrt i1·r offirr on
hrh:'tlf of his rnndidnr~· ." Cnmpnign Communicntion~ Rrform Art
of 1973, Pub. L. No. 92-22ii. This nmrndmrnt r:-;~rnti:lll~ · rodifird
ihr Commi~"ion'R prior inirrprrtniion of§ 315 (n) a~ n•CJuiring broadrn.·d rr" io m:1kr i imr nl'a ilablr to pol it ieal randid:d C'". Farmers
[ ' nion , .. lrDAJ', :3fi0 U.S. 525,534 (1959). 8rr FCC ~Trrnomndnm
on Srrond Srntrnrr of Srrtion 315 (n). in Political Bro:ldr:l~t,-E1Jll:1l
Time, Ilraring' brforr 8nhrommii1l'(' of thr Hou~r 1ntrr-:tntr nnd
Forrign Commrrrr Commis~ion, SSth Cong .. 1st Sr~"·· on IT . .T. Tirs.
247, pp. S4-90.
11
8re, e. (1., n. n. :3:395, 80th Cong., lHt Rr~'· (19-fi) . . \ l\101'('
rrrrnt propo~ :d wa~ ofTrrrd b.1· Srn:1tor ]<u!brighl. ITi" bill would
hn 1·r nnlt' ndrcl § ~1.5 of t hr Art to pro.1·idr:
"(cl) Lirrnsrrs Rhnll prcll'idr a rra"onnhlr amount of puhlir ~<'I'I'i<'r
time to :lllthorized rrprr,rnt:liivrs of thr Srn~1tr of ihP Unitrd Statr~,
:mel ihr Hon"o ol' Rrprr~rntntivr:-; of tho Unitrd Stntr" , to j)l'('."<'nt
lhr l'iC'\\'~ of thr Srnntr :md tlw Hou>'r of Hrprrsl'ntat in·~ on i~"nrs
of pnhlir imporl:1nrr. ThP public ~C'I'I'irr timr rrqnirrd to hr proYided undrr thi,: subsrrt ion shall br m:Hlr :11·nil:lhlr to ('.1<'11 snrh
uuthorizl' cl rrprrsrntati1·r at lraRt , but not limitrd to. four timrs
during ('f\Ch ralrndnr ~ '(':11'.
S. J. n('~ . 209, OlRt Cong., 2cl Rr~:-; .
(1970).
11
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emment action, not that of private persons. Public
Utility Commission v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 , 461 (1952).
We have not yet had occasion to consider whether the
action of a broadcast licensee such as that challenged
here, is "governmental action" for purposes of the First
Amendment. The holding under review thus presents a ~
novel question, and one with far-reachmg implications.
See L. Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 786 (1972).
The Court of Appeals held that broadcasters arc instrumentalities of the government for First Amendment
purposes, relying on the thesis, familiar in other contexts. that broadcast licensees are granted usc of part of
the public domain and arc regulated as "proxies" or
"fiduciaries of the people." 450 F. 2d, at 652. This
characterization is not without validity for some purposes, but it docs not resolve the sensitive constitutional
issues inherent in deciding whether a particular licensee
policy is subject to First Amendment restraints.
In dealing " ·ith the broadcast media. as in other contexts, the line between private conduct and governmental
action cannot be defined by reference to general formulas
unrelated to particular exercises of governmental authority. ·w hen governmental action is charged there must
be cautious analysis of the quality and degree of governmont relationship to the particular acts in question.
"Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can
the non-obvious involvement of the State in private
conduct be attributed its true significance." Burton Y.
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715,722 (1961).
In deciding whether the First Amendment encom- l ~
passes the conduct challenged here, it must be kept in \1
mind that we are dealing with a vital part of our system \\
of communication. The electronic media have swiftly become a major factor in the dissemination of ideas and
information. More than 7,000 licensed broadcast sta-

I
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tions undertake to perform this important function. To
a large extent they share with the printed media the role
of keeping people informed.
As we have seen, with the advent of radio a half century ago Congress was faced "·ith a fundamental choice
between total government ownership and control of the
new medium-the choice of most other countr.ies-or
some other alternative. Long before the impact and potential of the medium was realized. Congress opted for
a system of private broadcasters licensed and regulated
by Government. The legislative history suggests that
this choice was influenced not only by traditional attitudes toward private enterprise, but by a desire to maintain for licensees, so far as consistent with necessary
regulation, a traditional journalistic role. The historical
aversion to censorship led Congress to enact § 326 of
the Act, which explicitly prohibits the Commission from
interfering with the exercise of free speech over the
broadcast frequencies. Congress also refrained from divesting broadcasters of their control over the selection
of voices; § 3 (h) of the Act stands as firm congressional
statement that broadcast licensees are not to be treated
as common carriers, obliged to accept whatever is tendered by members of the public. Both these provisions
clearly manifest tho intention of Congress to maintain
a substantial measure of journalistic independence for
the broadcast licensee.
The regulatory scheme evolved slowly, but very early
the licensee's role developed in terms of a "public
trustee" charged with the duty of fairly and impartially
informing the listening and viewing public. In this
structure the Commission acts in essence as an "overseer," but the initial and primary responsibility for fairness, balance and objectivity rests with the licensee. This
role of the Government as an "overseer" and ult.imate
arbiter and guardian of the public interest and the role
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of the licensee as a journalistic "free agent" call for a
delicate balancing of competing interests. The maintenance of this balance for more than 40 years has called
on both the regulators and the licensees to walk a "tightrope" to preserve the First Amendment values written
into the Radio Act and its successor, the Communications
Act.
The tensions inherent in such a regulatory structure
emerge more clearly when we compare a private newspaper with a broadcast licensee. The power of a privately owned newspaper to advance its own political,
social, and economic vie>vs is bounded by only two factors,
first the acceptance of a sufficient number of readersand hence advertisers-to assure financial success, and
second the journal_istic integrity of its editors and publishers. A broadcast licensee has a large measure of
journalistic freedom but not as large as that exercised by
a newspaper. A- licensee must balance what it might
prefer to do as ~e entrepreneur with what it is
required to do as a "public trustee." To perform its
statutory duties, the Commission must oversee without
censoring. This suggests something of the difficulty and
delicacy of administering the Communications Act-a
function calling for flexibility and the capacity to adjust
and readjust the regulatory mechanism to meet changing problems and needs.
The licensee policy challenged in this case is closely
related to the journalistic role of a licensee for which it ·
has been given initial and primary responsibility by
Congress. The licensee's policy a ainst accepting editorial advertising canno
e examined as an abstract
..........__
}~on, but musT be viewed 111 the context of its
journalistic role. It does not help to press on us the
ic~rial ads are "like" commercial ads, for their
purposes are very different. The editorial ad-if analogies have value here-are more properly classified with

I

-
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editorial commentary and balanced news coverage. The
licensee's policy against editorial spot ads is expressly
based on an editorial judgment that 10- to 60-second ~pot
announce~11ents are ill suited to intelligible and i!_1elligent treatment of public i sues; the broadcaster has
chosen to prov1 e a balanced treatment of controversial
questions in a more comprehensive form. Obviously the
licensee's evaluation is based on its own editorial judgment of priorities and nmysworthiness.
Moreover, the Commission has not fostered the licensee
policy challenged here; it has simply declined to command particular action because it fell within the area of
editorial discretion. The Commission explicitly emphasized that "there is of course no Commission policy
thwarting the sale of time to comment on public issues."
25 F. C. C. 2d, at 226. The Commission's reasoning,
consistent with nearly 40 years of precedent, is that so
long as a licensee meets its "public trustee" obligation
to provide balanced coverage of issues, the station has
broad discretion to decide how that obligation "·ill be
met. We do not reach the question "·hether the Act
can be read to preclude the Commission form determining that in some situations the pub1ic interest requires licensees to re-examine their policies with respect
to editorial advertisements. The Commission has not
yet made such a determination; it has, for the present
at least, found the policy to be within the sphere of
journalistic discretion which Congress has left \\'ith the
licensee. Its determination is consistent with the statute.
Thus, it cannot be said that the government is a (.
"partner" to the action of broadcast licensee complained
of here, nor is it engaged in a "symbiotic relationship"
with the licensee, profiting from the invidious discrimination of its proxy. Compare Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
hvis, 407 U. S. 163, 174-177 (1972), with Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715, 723- 724
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(1061). The First Amendment docs not reach actions
that neither the Congress or the Commission have sought
to make their own.
Our conclusion is not altered merely because the Commission rejected the claims of BRM and DNC and
concluded that the challenged licensee policy is not
inconsistent with the public interest. It is true that in
Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952),
we found governmental action sufficient to trigger First
Amendment protections on a record involving agency
approval of the conduct of a public utility. Though we
held that the decision of a District of Columbia bus
company to install radio receivers in its public buses was
within the reach of the First Amendment, there Congress had expressly authorized the agency to undertake
plenary intervention into the affairs of the carrier and
it was pursuant to that authorization that the agency
investigated the challenged policy and approved it on
public interest standards. !d., at 462. Here, Congress
has not established a regulatory scheme for broadcast
licensees as pervasive as that in PoUak. More specifically, as we have noted, Congress has affirmatively indicated in the Communications Act that certain journalistic
decisions arc for the licensee, subject only to the restrictions imposed by evaluation of his overall performance
under the public interest standard. In Pollak there was
no suggestion that Congress had considered worthy of
protection the carrier's interest in exercising discretion
over the content of communications forced on passengers ..
Perhaps a more basic distinction between Pollak and
this case is that Pollak was concerned with a transportation utility that itself derives no protection from the
First Amendment. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 344 U. S. 131, 166 (1948).
Were we to read the First Amendment to spell out
governmental action in the circumstances presented here,
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fmy licensee decisions on the content of broadcasts or the
processes of editorial evaluation would fail to be potential targets for constitutional scrutiny. In this sensitive
area so sweeping a concept of governmental action would
go far in practical effect to undermine nearly a half
century of unmistakable congressional purpose to maintain-no matter how difficult the task-essentially private broadcast journalism held only broadly accountable
to public interest standards of fairness. To do this
Congress, and the Commission as its agent, must remain
in a posture of flexibility to chart a \vorkable "middle
course" in its quest to preserve a balance between the
desired public accountability and private control of the
media. Possibly the only alternative is the total government control Congress abjured at the outset of broadcast regulation.
More profoundly, it would be anomalous for us to
hold, in the name of promoting the constitutional guarantees of free expression, that the day-to-day editorial
decisions of broadcast licensees are subject to the particular restraints of the First Amendment urged by respondents. Journalistic discretion would in many ways
be lost to the rigid limitations that the First Amendment
imposes on government. Application of these standards
to broadcast licensees would be antithetical to the very
ideal of vigorous, challenging debate on the issues of the
day, particularly since every licensee is already held
accountable for the totality of its performance.
The concept of private, independent broadcast journalism, regulated by government to assure protection of
the public interest, has evolved slowly and cautiously
over more than 40 years and has been nurtured by processes of adjudication. That concept could not co-exist
with a reading of the conduct of the Commission or the
licensee as governmental action. Nor could it exist without administrative flexibility to meet changing 11ceds and
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the S\\"ift technological developments. We therefore conclude that the policies complained o~e
governmental action violative of the First Amendment.
Mcl?ilire v. Wilham Penn Broadcasting Co., 151
F. 2d 597 (CA3 1045), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 770 (1946);
Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Heldreth &
Rogers Co., 183 F. 2d 497 (CAl 1950); Post v. Payton,
323 F. Supp. 799 (EDNY 1971).

Sec

IV
A conclusion that there is no governmental action in a.
broadcaster's rejection, pursuant to a fixed policy, of paid
editorial advertisements would ordinarily end the consideration of any constitutional aspects of the claims asserted. But ongress expressly wrote First Amendm~nt
values into the ommumcations Act and, as we noted
~' DNC urges that a licensee's refusal to accept
editorial ads violates the "public interest" standard of
the Act. We therefore go on to consider whether the
statute, including the First Amendment principles embodied in the Act, requires a licensee to grant the right
of access claimed by respondents.
The Commission's conclusion that the Act does not
require a licensee to grant private access to broadcast
time is, of course, entitled to great weight. See, e. g.,
Red Lion, supra, 395 U. S., at 382; Zemel v. Rusk, 381
U. S. 1, 11-12 (1965). In Red Lion, supra, at 381, we
noted the "venerable J,?rinciple that the construction of
a statute by those charged with its execution should be
followed unless there are compelling indications that it is
wrong. . . ." We find no such indications here. The
Commission's conclusion wholly comports with the constitutional holding of Red Lion. There we emphasized
the right of the public to have access to "ideas and
experiences," not the interest of every individual to
broadcast what he believes the public ought to hear.

~
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"vVhat is essential is not that everyone shall speak,
but that everything "·orth saying shall be said." A.
Meiklejohn, Political Freedom, 26 (1948). The application of this valid generalization is a delicate exercise, calling for a flexible discretion sensitive to all
the considerations embraced in the Communications
Act. Anything approaching an absolute right of access
to broadcast time would disrupt the mechanism Congress enacted to permit the Commission to adjust to
the changing conditions of a dynamic medium.
At the outset it \\'Oulcl seem clear that the public
interest in having access to the marketplace of "ideas
and experiences" would scarcely be served by a system
so heavily weighted in favor of the financially affluent. or
those with access to wealth. Cf. Red Lion, supra, 395
U. S., at 392. Even under a first-come-first-served system, proposed by the dissenting Conunissioner in these
cases,'" the vie,Ys of the affluent could \Yell prevail over
those of others, since they \YOulcl have it within their
power to purchase time more frequently. Moreover,
there is the substantial danger, as the Court of Appeals
acknovvledgecl. 450 F. 2cl. at 664, that the time allotted
for editorial advertising could be monopolized by those
of one political persuasion-or a few affluent zealots.
These problems vvould not necessarily be solved by applying the Fairness Doctrine, including the Cullman
doctrine, to editorial advertising. If broadcasters were
required to provide time, free when necessary, for the
discussion of the various shades of opinion on the issue
discussed in the advertisement. those ''"ith financial resources could still determine in large part what .issues
arc to be discussed. Thus, the very premise of the Court
of Appeals' holding--that a right of access is necessary to
allow individuals ancl groups the opportunity for self'"Sec 2.) F. C. C. 2d 21G,

2:~-1-2:~5

(.Tohn~on, di,~rntiug).

71-~G8,

ETC.-OPINION

COLU:\IBIA BHOADCART1NG v. DEMOCTIATIC COMM. 27

initiated specch-"·oulcl have little meaning to those who
could not afford to purchase time in the first instancc. 1 r.
If the F~c~ were applied to editorial ad- )
vertising, there 1saJ8o the substantial danger that the
effective operation of that doctri11e would be jeopardized.
To minimize financial hardship and to comply fully with
its public responsibilities a broadcaster might well be
forced to make r·cgular programming time available to
those holding a view different from that expressed in an
editorial advertisement; indeed, BEM has suggested as
much in its brief. The result would be a further erosion
of the journalistic discretion of broadcasters in the coverage of public issues, and a transfer of control over the
treatment of public issues from the licensees "·ho arc
accountable to private individuals who are not. The
public interest would no longer be "paramount" but
subordinate to private v,;him especially si11ce, under the
Court of Appeals' decision, a broadcaster would be
largely precluded from rejecting editorial advcrtisments
that dealt with matters trivial or insignificant or already fairly covered by the broadcaster. 450 F. 2d,
at 657. n. 36, 658. If the Fairness Doctrine and the ·
Cullman doctrine were suspended to alleviate the~e
problems, as respondents suggest might be appropriate,
the question arises whether we would have abandoned
1nore than we have gained. The congressional objective
of balanced coverage of public issues would be threatened.
Nor can we accept the Court of Appeals' view that
every potential speaker is "the best judge" of what the

I

'"To on•rcomr thi,; ineon~i~trnc.1· it has brrn ~up:gr~trd thnt a
ratr H.nstem" br C'Htnbli;;hcd for tho~r nnablr to afford
tl\C' normal c·oHt for airtimr. Srr ~.') Hnn·. L. llr1·. G~9. G9!i-69fl
(Hl/2). That proposnl lm~ brrn ('ritic·izrd. IH' think .inHtifiabl~·. as
rai~ing ''incrrcliblc admini~t rati1·c JHoblem,.;." L ..T:1fl'c, Tlw hi it orial
Hr,.ponHibilit~· of thr Broacka~tC'r: Heflections on Fnimr~~ :md ArC'<'~~, ~5 Hm'l'. L. Hrv. 7oS, 7S9 (1972).
" ~nbm~1rkrt
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listening public ought to hear or indeed the best judge
of the merits of his or her views. All journalistic tradition and experience is to the contrary. For better or
worse, editing is what editors are for; and editing is
selection and choice of material. That editors-newspaper or broadcast-can and do abuse this power at times
is beyond doubt. but that is not reason to deny the
freedom Congress provided; calculated risks of abuse
arc taken in order to preserve higher values.
It is reasonable for Congress and the Commission to
conclude that the public interest in being informed requires periodic accountability on the part of those
vvho are entrusted with the use of broadcast frequencies,
scarce as they arc. In the delicate balancing historically
followed in the regulation of broadcasting Congress and
the Commission could appropriately conclude that the
allocation of journalistic priorities should be concentrated
in the licensee rather than diffused. This policy gives
the public some assurance that the broadcaster will be
answerable if he fails to meet their legitimate needs.
No such accountability attaches to the private individual,.
whose only qualifications for using the broadcast facility
may be a "deep pocket" and a point of view. To agree
that debate on public issues should be "uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open" does not mean that we should
exchange the "public trustee" broadcaster for the unregulated editorial huckster, and for no better reason
than that we are already compelled to bear with an overabundance of unwelcome commercial hucksterism.
The Court of Appeals discounted those difficulties by
stressing that it was merely mandating a "modest reform," requiring only "that broadcasters be required to
accept some editorial advertising." 450 F. 2cl, at 662.
The court suggested that broadcasters could place an
"outside limit on the total amount of editorial advertising they will sell'' and that the Commission and the

?
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broadcasters could develop " 'reasonable regulations' designed to prevent domination by a few groups or a. few
viewpoints." 450 F. 2cl, at 663, 664. If the Commission
decided to apply the Fairness Doctrine to editorial advertisements and as a result broadcasters suffered financial
harm, the court thought the "Commission could make
necessary adjustments." 450 F. 2d, at 664. Thus, without providing any specific answers to the substantial objections raised by the Commission and the broadcaster,
other than to express repeatedly its "confidence" in the
Commission's ability to overcome any difficulties, the
court remanded the cases to the Commission for the
development of regulations to implement a constitutional
right of access.
By minimizing the difficult problems involved in implementing such a constitutional right of access, the
Court of Appeals failed to come to grips with another
problem of substantial importance to broadcast regulation and to the First Amendment-the risk of an enlargement of government control over the content of broadcast discussion of public issues by the new voices purchasing time. Sec, e. g., Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345
U. S. 67 (1953); l\'iemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268
(1951). This risk is inherent in the Court of Appeals
remand requiring regulations and procedures to sort out
requests to be heard-a process involving the very editing that licensees now perform as to regular programming.
Although the use of a public resource by the broadcast
media permits a limited degree of Government surveillance, as is not true with respect to private media, sec
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S.
190, 216-219 (1943), the Government's power over licensees, as we have noted, is by no means absolute and is
carefully circumscribed by the Act itself." Under a
17

Sec 47 U. S. C. § 326.

r
~
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mandatory right-of-access system urged by respondents
and mandated by the Court of Appeals, the Commission
\\"ould be required to oversee far more of the clay-to-day
operations of broadcasters' conduct, deciding such questions as whether a particular individual or group has had
suffi.cien t opportunity to present its viewpoint and
whether a particular viewpoint has already been sufficiently aired. Under the Fairness Doctrine the Commission's responsibility is to judge whether a licensee's
overall performance indicates a sustained good faith
effort to meet the public interest in being fully and fairly
informed. ~
The Commission's responsibilities under
a right-of-access system would tend to draw it into a
continuing case-by-case determination of who should be
heard and when. Indeed, the likelihood of Government
involvement is so great that it has been suggested by
some that the constitutional principles against control
of speech content would need to be relaxed with respect
to editorial advertisements.'!) We fail to sec the need
for such a sacrifice of the First Amendment values of the
Act for no assured gain.
The Commission is also entitled to take into account
the reality that in a very real sense listeners and viewers
constitute a "captive audience," especially vulnerable to
those who wish to thrust unwanted propaganda upon
.
them. Cf. Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak,
343
U. R. 451, 463 (1952); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77
(1949). This problem was recognized as early as Hl24,
when Secretary Hoover remarked at the Fourth N ational Radio Conference that "the radio listener docs not
have the same option that the reader of publications
has-to ignore advertising in which he is not interested1

-

' ' Srr Editorinlir.ing b~ · Broadra~t Li<•rJvr<·~ , 1:1 F. C. C. 12-Hi,
1251-1252 (19-l9).
'" f-l<•r 85 Han·. L. Ht>L 689, G07 (Hl72).
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and he may resent its invasion on his set." "0 As the
broadcast media became more prcvasivc in our society,
the problem has become more acute. In a recent decision
upholding the Commission's power to promulgate rules
regarding cigarette advertising, Judge Ba~:clon, \Yriting
for a unanimous Court of Appeals, noted some of the
effects of the ubiquitous commercial:
"Written messages arc not communicated unless
they arc read , and reading requires an affirmative
act. Broadcast messages, in contrast, are 'in the
air.' In an age of omnipresent radio, there scarcely
breathes a citizen •vho does not know some part
of a loading cigarette jingle by heart. Similarly,
an ordinary habitual television watcher can avoid
these commercials only by frequently leaving the
room, changing the channel, or doing some other
such affirmative act. It is difficult to calculate the
subliminal impact of this pervasive propaganda,
\Yhich may be heard even if not listened to, but it
may reasonably be thought greater than the impact
of the written word." Banzhaf] v. FCC, U. S.
App. D. C. - , 405 F. 2d 1082, 1100-1101 (1968).
It is no answer to say that because we tolerate pervasive \
commercial advertisement we can also live with its political counterparts.
These considerations, we think, compel the conclusion
that the Court of Appeals erred in imposing a right-ofaccess on the broadcast media either under tho First
Amendment or the Act."' The rationale for the Court of
"" Hrprintrd in Hrarinl!;;; bdorc lhr ~rnalr Commillrr on InterCornqwrec on H~dio Control , G9th Cm1g;., bt Sl'~~ .. at 5-t. (HJ~G).
"' DXC hn~ urg;rd in this Court thai wr at lrn~l rrrog-nir.c• ~~ right
of our national partirH to purrha~r airtimr for thr pmpo~r of di;;<'U~~ing; publie i s~ tH'H. Wf' ~rr no prinriplrd mean~ under the Fir;;;t
AmendmNJ(. of fa \'oring neec:;H b~ · org;anir.rd political partie:; o\·cr
other g;roup:; and indi,·iduak
~latr
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Appeals' decision \vas that the licensee impermissibly
discriminates by accepting commercial advertisments
while refusing editorial aclvertisements.~ The court relied on decisions holding that state supported school
ne,•;spapers and public transit companies were forbidden
by the First Amendment from excluding controversial editorial advertisements in favor of commercial advertisements.23 The court also attempted to analogize this case
to some of our decisions holding that States may not constitutionally ban certain protected speech 'vhile at the
same time permitting other speech in public areas. Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536 (1965); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 354 U. S. 67 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U. S. 268 (1951). This theme of "invidious discrimination" against protected speech is echoed in the briefs of
BEM and DNC to this Court. Respondents also rely on
our recent decisions in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 40
U.S. L. W. 4881 (U.S. June 26, 1972), and Pol£ce Dept.
of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 40 U. S. L. W. 4877 (U. S.
June 26, 1972), where we held unconstitutional city
ordinances that permitted "peaceful picketing of any
school involved in a labor dispute," but prohibited dem2

2
" The Court of Appeals disclaimed :-tny intention to deridr whrthrr
broadcasters who nrrept no advcrti~emrnts whatrnr must nevcrthrles:; air paid rditorial advertisrments. The court's disclaimer,
howeYcr, is somewhat puzzling in light of its conrln~ion that the
Fairness Doctrine i ~ inadequate to protect the pnblir's intrrest in
bring informed and fosters a " paternalistic schrme in whirh the
1irensres and bureaucrats decide what issurs arc 'important,' how
'fully' to cm cr them, and the format, time and st .dr of the coverage." 450 F. 2cl, at 656.
""Lee v. Board of R!'ge11ts of State Colleoes, W. D. Wi~., :lOo F.
Snpp. 1097 (1969), atT'd, 7 Cir., 4,11 F. 2d 1257 (1971); Zucker
v. Panitz, S. D. N. Y., 229 F. Snpp. 102 (1969) ; Kisoiuoer ,._ New
r ork City Transit Authority, S. D. N. Y., 27 4 F. Supp. 438 ( 1967) ;
llillsid!' Cornmunitu Church, Inc . v. City of 'l'acoma, Wash., 455
P. 2d 350 (1969); Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Tra11 sit District,
6-t Cal. Rptr. 430, 434 P. 2d 9 2 (1967).
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onstrations for any other purposes on the streets and
side>Yalks within 150 feet of the school.
These decision provide little guidance, however, in resolving the question of a constitutionally mandated private right of access to the broadcast media. In none of
those cases did the forum sought for expression have an
affirmative and independent statutory obligation to provide full and fair coverage of public issues. Here Congress has made a deliberate choice to compel broadcasters to devote a reasonable amount of time to coverage
of public issues. In short, there is no "discrimination"
against controversial speech present in this case. The
question here is not whether there is to be discussion of
controversial issues of public importance on the broadcast media, but rather who shall determine what issues
are to be discussed by whom, and when.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals asserts that the
Fairness Doctrine, insofar as it allows broadcasters to
exercise certain journalistic judgment over the discussion
of public issues, is inadequate to meet the public's interest in being informed. The present system, the court
held, "conforms ... to a paternalistic structure in which
licensees and bureaucrats decide what issues are 'important,' and how 'fully' to cover them, and the format,
time and style of the coverage." 450 F. 2d, at 656.
The forced sale of advertising time for editorial spot announcements would, according to the Court of Appeals
majority, remedy this deficiency. That conclusion was
premised on the notion that advertising time, as opposed
to programming time, involves a "special and separate
mode of expression" because advertising content, unlike
programming content, is generally prepared and edited
by the advertiser. Thus, that court concluded that a
broadcaster's policy against using advertising time for
editorial messages "may well ignore opportunities to
enliven and enrich the public's overall information."
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450 F. 2d, at 658. As we have already noted, that approach would transfer the responsibility for balanced
broadcasting from an identifiable, regulated entity-the
licensee-to tho unregulated speakers who could afford
the cost.
We reject the suggestion the Fairness Doctrine permits broadcasters to preside over a "paternalistic" regime.
Sec Red Dian Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, 395 U. S.,
at 390. That doctrine admittedly has not always brought
to the public perfect or indeed even high quality treatment of all public events and issues; but neither is it as
disma.l as respondents would have us believe. The Commission stressed that. while the licensee has discretion in
fulfilling his obligations under the Fairness Doctrine,
he is required to "present representative community views
and voices on controversial issues which are of importance
to his listeners," and he is forbidden from "excluding
partisan voices and always itself presenting views in a
bland, inoffensive manner .... " 25 F. C. C. 2d, at 222.
A broadcaster neglects that obligation only at the risk of
losing his license. '&o reeord befe~1 e as docs ne~t demon •
stFttte that, at tho present stage of broadea.et teehnolo§-y,
the Fairml~S DoGtrino do€s not ~€P'e the publie's interest
in being informed.
Conceivably at some future date Congress or the Commission may devise some kind of limited right of access
that is both practicable and desirable. The Commission
noted in these proceedings that the advent of cable television will afford increased opportunities for the discussion of public issues. In its proposed rules on cable television the Commission has provided that cable systems
m major television markets
"shall maintain at least one specially designated,
non-commercial public access channel available on
a first-come, nondiscriminatory basis. The system

71-RG3, ETC.-OPJNIO~

COLUMBfA BH.Oi\DCARTTNG v. DENIOCHATIC COMM.

35

shall maintain and have available for public use
at least the minimal equipment and facilities necessary for· the production of programming for such
channel." 37 Feel. Reg. 3289, § 76.251 (a) (4).
For the present, the Commission is conducting a wideranging study into the effectiveness of the Fairness Doctrine to sec what needs to be done to improve the coverage and presentation of public issues on the broadcast
media. Notice of Inquiry in Docket 19260, 30 F. C. C.
2d 26, 36 Feel. Reg. 11825. Among other things. the study
will attempt to determine whether "there is any feasible
method of providing access for discussion of public issues
outside the requirements of the fairness doctrine." 30
F. C. C. 2d, at 33. The Commission made it clear, however, that it docs not intend to disca.rcl the Fairness
Doctrine or to require broadcasters to accept all private
demands for air time.~~ The Commission's inquiry on
this score was announced prior to the decision of the
Court of Appeals in this case and hearings arc underwa.y.
The problems perceived by the Court of Appeals majority are by no means new; as we have seen. the legislative history and the activities of the Commission over a
period of 40 years reflect a continuing examination of
means to achieve reasonable regulation compatible with
First Amendment interests of the public and the licensees.
The Commission's pending hearings arc but one step in
~~

Ruhsequent to thr nnnounrrmrnt of the Court of Apprnls' drthr Commisf'ion expnndrd the scope of the inqnir~· to comply
with the Court of Appeals' mrrndatr. Further Notirr of Inquiry
in Docket 19260, 33 F. C. C. 2d 554, 37 Fed. Tieg. 3383. After
wr gmntrd rrrtiomri nnd ~ta~·f'd the mnndatc of thr Conrt of Appenb, the Commis~ion wit hdrrw th:"lt not ire of nn ex]Xtnded inf]uiry
nnd continued its Rtud~· :1f' originnllv planned. Order nnd Fnrthcr
:\"otire of Tnqnir~· in Dorkrt 19260, 33 F. C. C. 2d 798, 37 Fc•d.
Heg. 4080.
ri~ion,
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this continuing process. At the very least, courts should
not embalm this necessarily dynamic )roccss into a hard
and fast constitutional olding. See Amencan ommercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 392
u. s. 571, 590-593 (1968).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals IS

Reversed.
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lu,tely to sell any part of their advertising time to groups
or individuals wishing to speak out on controversial issues
of public importance. In practical effect, the broadcaster
policy here under attack p~ts airing of onb:: those paid
presentations which advertise productsQ_r ctea1 with "noncontroversial'' matters. while relegating the discussion of
COJ1troversial publiC1ssue7tOlarmats such as aocumentaries, the news, or panel shows, which are tightly controlled and edited by the broadcaster. The Court holds
today that this policy-including the absolute ban on
the sale of airtime for the discussion of controversial issues-is consistent with the commands of the First
Amendment." I cannot agree. In my view, the principle
2 The Court al~o holdR that thi:,; rxclu:sionary policy doe:,; not violate the "public intrrr~t" requirrment::; of thr CommunicationR Act
of 19:34, 47 U. S. C. §§ :307 (dJ, :309 (a). Thi~ :statutory quel:ition
i:s, of cour:se, inextricably linh•d to the con:stitutional question, for
the "public intrre~t :standard of the Act necrs ·arily implie:s reference
to the Fir::;t Amendment'::; goal::;." Red Lwn Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 390 (1969). And, a::; the Court of Apprals
rrcognizrcl, whrther Its "drci::;ion Is ~~~·Ire! as a ·Fir~t Amendment
decision' or a~ a deci;;ion mterpreting the fairnes::; and public interest
requirement::; 'in light of the Fir::;t Amendment' matters little."
U. S. App. D. C. - , 450 F. 2d 64:3, 049 (1971).
There i::; one a:spect of thr Court's statutory cli:scu::;,;ion, however,
that merit::; at least brief attention. In upholding the absolute ban
on thr ::;air of editorial adverti:sing, the Court relies hravily upon 47
U. S. C. § 15:3 (h), which drclarrs that broadcastrrH :shall not br
clremed ''common carrirr:s" In m~· view, th1:s reliance I::; mi:splaced.
Even a cursory examination of tlw legi:slativr hi::;tory of this provi:sion reveals that It was rnactecl in recogmtwn of the fact that
traditional doctrine~:> govrrning true ·'common earners," :such a::;
transportation companieH, would not :>Uit the particular problem::;
of radio broadca~:>tmg. Specifically, It wa~ feared that HLich "common
carrier" Hiatus for broadcaster~:> would mran that they "would havr
io give aJ.l their time to [vublic i:ssur~J." 67 Cong. Rcc. 12504
(Sen. Dill) (empha~i~ added); :ser abo ibid. (Sen. Brow;~ard);
td .. at 12:35fi (Sen . Fe~:;) . Srctwn 15:3 (h) wn~ intendrd :soldy
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at stake here is one of fundamental importance, for it
concerns the people's right to engage in and to hear
vigorous public debate on the broadcast media. And balancing what I perceive to be the competing interests of
broadcasters, the listening and viewing public, and individuals seeking to express their views over the electronic
media, I can only conclude that the exclusionary policy
upheld today can serve only to inhibit. rather than to
further, our "profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be unin·
hibited, robust, and wide-open." ·f.:ew York 1'imes Co.
v. Sulliva·n, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964). I would therefore affirm the determination of the Court of Appeals that
thE' challenged broadcaster policy is violative of the First
Amendment.
I
The command of the First Amendment that "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press'' is, on its face, directed at governmental
rather than private action. Nevertheless, our prior de·
cisions make clear that " [cIon duct that is formally 'private' may become so entwined with governmental policies
or so impregnated with a governmental character as to
become subject to thE' constitutional limitations placed
lo a~~ure that hrondca~trr:> would not lw reqnirrd to ::;urrrncler all
of t hrir airtiml' to willing pnrcha~rr:,:; it dar~ not brn r upon the
qur:>tion whrt hrr lhr~· rna~· br rrqun'('(l to HE'll a reasonable aud
limited amount of airtime to mrmhcrs of thr public for diHcn~Hion
of controvcr,;ial i~8UP~. Sr(' :2 Z. Chafrr, Govrrnmrnt and Ma~H
Communication:,: 6:35 u. 75 (1947). lndrrd , thr Commi~::;iou ha~
it8rlf rejrctrd thr Comt'~ intprprrtatiou of § 15:3 (h) wheu it dPclarPd, ovrr 25 ~·par~ ago, that "t hr oprrution of anr station under
l hP rxtn•mr principlrs that no time ~ hall br sold for t hr di sc u ::;~ ion
of controvrr::;ial public is::.;u<·~ . . . '" incon::;istent with thr concept
of publ1c intere:>t r~tabli:shcd b~· tlw Commumcations Act. . . . "
United Broadcasting C'o., 10 F. C.(' . 51.'i. 511-1 (1945) .
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upon [governmental! action." Evans v. LY ewton, 382
U. S. 296, 299 (1966). Thus, the reach of the First
Amendment depends not upon any formalistic "privatepu~ but, rather, upon more functional
C2.QSiderations concerning the extent of governmental involvement in, and public character of, a particular "private" enterprise. "Only by sifting facts and weighing
circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the
[Government l in private conduct be attributed its true
significance." Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 U. S. 715, 722 ( 1961); sec Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
lrvis, 407 U. S. 163, 172 (1972). And because of the
inherent complexity of this case-by-case inquiry, "[t]his
Court has never attempted the 'impossible task' of formulating an infallible test" for determining in all instances
whether particular conduct must be deemed private or
governmental. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369, 378
(1967); see Kotch \'. Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U. S. 552, 556
(1947).
This docs not mean, of course. that our prior experience in this area offers no guidance for the purposes of
our present inquiry. On the contrary, our previous decisions have focused on myriad indicia of "governmental
action,., many of which are directly applicable to the
operations of the broadcast industry. As the Court of
Appeals recognized, "the general characteristics of the
broadcast industry reveal an extraordinary relationship
between the broadcasters and the federal governmenta relationship which puts that industry in a class with
few others.'' 450 F. 2d, at 651. More specifically, the
public nature of the airwaves. the governmentally
created preferred status of broadcast licensees, the pervasive federal regulation of broadcast programming, and
the Commission's specific approval of the challenged
broaclcaster policy combine in thif' case to bring the
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promulgation and enforcement of that policy within the
orbit of constitutional imperatives.
At the outset, it should be noted that both radio and ·
television broadcasting utilize a natural resource- the
electromagnetic spectrum '-that is part of the public ·
domain. And although broadcasters are granted the temporary use of this valuable resource for terminable threeyear periods, "ownership" and ultimate control remain
vested in the people of the United States. Thus, ~ 301
of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U. S. C. ~ 301,
specifically provides :
"It is the purpose of this lAct] . . . to maintain
the control of the United States over all channels of
interstate and foreign radio transmission; and to
provide for the use of such channels, but not the
ownership thereof. by persons for limited periods of
time, under licenses grantee! by Federal authority,
and no such liceuse shall be coustrued to create any
right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of
the license . . .. "
Such public "ownership'' of au essential element in the
operations of a private enterprise is, of course, an important and established indicia of "governmental involvement." In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
supra, for example, we emphasized the fact of "public
ownership' ' in holding the proscriptions of the Fourt eenth Amendment applicable to a privately owned res~ Sre grnrrall~· Bu~iness Executives Move fo1' Vtetnam Peace, 25
F. C. C. 2d 242, 25:3-204 (1970) (di~;;rntin!); opinion), whrrein Commi~~ionrr .T ohnson idrntifird no lr ~~ 1 han r1ght se parate indi cia of
''govrrnmrntal action" lllvolved 1ll thr promulgation nnd Pnforccmrnt of 1 he rhallrn!);rd broadcast er poltr~ ·
1
For a di sr u ~H ion of t hr a tt ribu tr::; of t hr elect romagnet 1r sprctrum,
~er gPnerally W . .Tonr ~. Ti rgulat ed lndu;;trirs 1019 (1967); Levin,
The Hadio Sp ectrum H P~o ur rr. 11 .I La w & Eron. 4:-l:3 (19(iX).
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taurant leasing space in a building O\vnecl by the State."
In reaching; this result, we explained that, in part because of the "public ow1wrship" of the building, the
f-'tate "has elected to place its pov,:er, property alld
prestige behind the" actions of the privately owned restaurant. :365 U. S .. at 725. A.nd viewing the relationship in its entirety, we concluded that "I tJhe State
has so far insinuated 1tself into a position of interdependence with I the rcstaura11t I that it must be recognized as a ,ioint participant in thP challenged activity . . . .'' !bid.; see also Moose Lodge ,\'o. 10?' v,
lrvis, supra, at 172- 173, 175; Turn er v. City of Memphis,
3()9 U.S. 350 ( 1962); Kissi·nger v . •Y ew York City Transit
Authority, 274 F. Supp. 438 ( SD~Y 1D67); Farmer v.
Mos es, 232 F. Supp. 154 (SDNY 1D04J .
A second indicia of '·governmental involvement" derives from the direct dependence of broadcasters upon
the Federal Government for their " right " to operate
broadcast frequellcies . There can be 110 doubt that,
for the industry as a whole, governmeutal regulation
alone makes "radio communication possible by . . . limiting the number of licensees so as not to overcrowd th<"
spectrum. " Red Lion Broadcasting ('o . v. FCC , 395

i

" lt i~ true, of rom~r . 1hnt unlikP thr Stntr in Burton , thr Frdpm]
CiovPrnrnpn t bt•n• dor~ no I rrr<'JVP ~ub~t ant 1al fi naneial compc•nsa t ion
for tlw u ~e of tlw " public '' proprrt~· St•r Burton v . Wilmi11gton ·
fJarkinQ Authority, wpra. at 72:3- 7:2-J. ; J1Joose Lodgl' No . 107 v,
lrvis, supra, at li..J.- 175.
N('VNtlwlr~~. thr ab~Pnrc· of ~uch n finanrial arrnngrnwnt rrprr~r nt ~ . in prart1ral rffrrt , goYNnmrnt :-;ub~ idiza
lion of broadra ~ ((•r~. thrrrb~· rnhanring tlw drgrrr of govrmmrntal
involvrmrnt. Cf. KaiYrn , Broadrn~t ing , Puhlir Polic· :~· and t hr FirHt
Amr ndnwnt , 10 .J Law ,~,: !<:ron. 15, :n (H)(i7) . :\lorrovrr, m; in
Burton , thr pubhrl~ · O\I'JH'd propc•rt .\' ~~"not ~ mplu" ~ tatr proprrty"
hut , rather, ron~t1tutr~ an "intrgrnl and , llldrPd , indi ~ p<'n"ablr part "
of ihr go\'t'rnrnrntal ~ehrnw Burtlm \'. IT'ilmiugton Parking Au.thority. supm. at 72:3- 7:2-+, ::irr al~o -+7 l1 R, C. § :10:1 (g) ,
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U. S. 367, 389 (1969). 0

{hu,.t

Moreover, with respect to inclivicluallicensees, it is equally clear that "existing broad~
casters have often attained their present position,'' not
as a result of free market pressures' but. rather. "bew
cause of their initial government selection . . . . " !d.,
at 400. Indeed, the "quasi-monopolistic" advantages
enjoyed by broadcast licensees "are the fruit of a preferred position conferred by the Government," !bid,
Thus. as CHIEF JusTICE (then .Judge) BuRGER has himw
self recognized, "la] broadcaster seeks and is granted the
free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of
the public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is
burdened by enforceable public obligations." Office of
C01mnuuication of Lhe Um:ted Church of Ghrist v. FCC,
U. S. App. D. C. - . 359 F. 2d 944. 1003 (1966).
And, along these same Jines. vve have consistently held
that "when authority derives in part from Government'~
thumb on the scales. the exercise of that power by pri.,.
vate persons becomes closely akin , in some respects, to
its exercise by Government itself." American Commu,~
nications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 401 ( 1950);
see, e. g., Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U. S.
451. 462 n. 8 (1952).
A further indicia of ''governme11tal involvemeut" in
the promulgatim1 and enforcement of the challenged
broadcaster policy may be seen in the extensive governmental control over the broadcast industry. It is true,
of course.A this "Court has never held" that actions of
an otherwise private entity necessarily constitute govern" For <l diHcu;;;;ion of thr Fairn('Ho; Doctrinr and It~ rrlrvancr to thi::;
raHr, :-;rr trxt and not r~ . at llll. 15-:34, infra .
' Indrrd , thr Communication,; Act of 19:3-J. makr::; it a criminal
ofTr n"'<' to opr rntr a broadca"'t tran~miitrr without a lieC'JIH('. SrC'
47 lT. S. C. § 501. Thu,;, t hr Frdrral C:ovrrumC'nl ~preifi<"ally inHulafr~ tlw JirenHrP from an~· rral. tlurat of rronomir romrwtitiou.

J1
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mental action if that entity "is subject to ... regula~ \J
tion in any degree whatever." Moose Lodge i\'o. 107 v. ~
Irvis, supra, at 173. Here, however, we are confronted
not with some minimal degree of regulation but rather,
with an elaborate statutory scheme governing virtually
all aspects of the broadcast industry.' Indeed, federal
agency review and guidance of broadcaster conduct is
automatic, continuing and pervasive." Thus, as the
Court of Appeals noted, "[a Jlmost no other private
business- almost no other regulated private business" Thus, thr Communication::; Art of 19:3-l authorizr::; thr Frdrral
Communication::; CommiHl:'ion to a:;~ ign frequenc~· band::;, 47 U. S. C.
§ :~D:3 (c): allocate liccnsr,.; b~· loration , § :3o:3 (d) : rrgulate apparat11,.;,
§ :~0:3 (r); p,.;tablish ~rrYicP nrra,.;, § :30:3 (a) ; rrgulntr rhain ownPr~ hip , § ;{0:3 (k) ; rrquire t hr krPtJing of drtailrd rrcorcb, § ::lO::l (j);
r~tabli ~ h qualifications of licrnsrrl:', § :30:3 (I) (one): ~u~pPnd Jicrnse::;,
§ :30:3 (m) (onr) ; in::;prct ::;tat ion facilitl('::; , § :3o:3 (n) ; rPquirr publication of call letter" and othrr informntion , § :30:3 (p); makr rulr::;
to rffrct regulation of rHdio and trlrvis10n. §:3m (r); rrquirr that
telrvioion :;pt~ bP capablr of rrcriving all ~ignals, § :3Q:{ (::; ); rrgulnt!'
the granting of licPnl:'rs and thr terms tlwrrof, §§ :307, :309; prr::icribe information to br HllJlplicd b~· applicant,; for licrn:;c::;, § :30~ (b) ;
rrgulatP thr transfE'f of hrensrs, § :310 ; impo:;r ~anction::; on licrni:ier,.:,
including rPvocation of license , § 312; rrquire fair coverage of con-·
trovrrsial il:'sllrs, § :315 ; control the operation of transmitting apparn t11,.;, § :3ls; and prohibit t hr use of offrnl:'ivc la nguagc , § :32(5.
"Pur~uant to statutory authority , ~rr n. S, SU]Jra, the Commisl'iOil ha~ promulgated myriad regulations govPming all a~prct::; of
licrn:;cr conduct. Sec 47 CFH § 7:3.17 et seq. The~r rt>gulations
affect ~ncb matiNs a::; hom~ of oprrat ion, § 7:3.2:3; mult iplc ownrr~hip of licrn::;c::; b~· a ::;inglc individual , § 7:3.:35 ; stntion location and
program origination , § 73.:30 ; maintenance of clrtailcd logs of programming , oprration , and mamtenanrt• , §§ 7:Ull- llfl ; billing practices , § 7:3.124; thr prr:;onal attack nnd political rditorial fairnr~::~
rrquirrments, § 7:3- 12:3 ; relationship of licPn :;pp~ to JlE'twork,.;,
§§ 7:U:H- 1:39 ; permi~~ ible rquipment, §§ 7.'3.:39- 50. Thr aboveCited regulations relatE' only to A:\1 radio, but ~1milar rrgulation:;
<·xist for Ff\1 radio, ~ 7:3.201 1'1 ~ Nf .. and triPvision, § 7:3.()01 et seq.
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is so intimately bound to government .... " 450 F. 2d,
at 652.
Even more important than this general regulatory
scheme, however is the specific _governmental involvem ~th~ b.£:_adcaster p~licy presently under consideration. There is, for example, an obvious nexus between the Commission's Fairness Doctrine and the
absolute refusal of broadcast licensees to sell any part of
their airtime to groups or individuals wishing to speak
out on controversial issues of public importance. Indeed, in defense of this policy, the broadcaster-petitioners
argue vigorously that this exclusionary policy is authorized and even compelled by the Fairness Doctrine. And
the Court itself recognizes repeatedly that the Fairness
Doctrine and other Communications Act policies are
inextricably linked to the challenged ban. Thus, at one
point, the Court suggests that "[ilf the Fairness Doctrine
were applied to editorial advertising, there is . . . the
substantial danger that the effective operation of that
doctrine would be jeopardized." Ante, at - . Similarly, the Court maintains that, in light of the Fairness
Doctrine, there simply is no reason to allow individuals
to purchase advertising time for the expression of their
own views on public issues. See ante, at - . 10 Although
I do not in any sense agree with the substance of these
propositions, they serve at least to illustrate the extent
to which the Commission's Faimess Doctrine has influenced the development of the policy here under review.
Moreover, the Commission's involvement in the challenged policy is not limited solely to the indirect effects
of its Fairness Doctrine. On the contrary, in a decision
In addition, ihr l'onrt contend~; that , becansr of the Fairne~ii
Dortrinr, the rhallmged broadca:strr policy dor>i not di~rriminate
again~;t controver~ial ::;peech . Srr aute. at .
10
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which must inevitably provide guidance for future
broadcaster action, the Commission has specifically considered and specifically authorized the flat ban. 1 ' In so
doing, the Commission-and through it the Federal Government-has unequivocably given its imprimatur to the·
absolute ban on editorial advertising. And, of course,
it is now well-settled that specific governmental approval
of or acquiescence in challenged action by a private entity
indicates "governmental action."
Thus, in McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
R. Co., 235 U. S. 151 ( 1914), for example, the Court dealt
with a statute which, as coi1struecl by the Court, simply
authorized rail carriers to provide certain types of cars
. white passengers without offering equal facilities to
for
blacks. Although dismissal of the complaint on procedural grounds was affirmed, we made clear that such
a statute, even though purely permissive in nature, was
invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment because a carrier refusing equal service to blacks would be "acting in
the matter under the authority of a state law.'' Id., at
162. And, some 50 years later, we explained this finding
of "governmental action" in McCabe as "nothing less
than considering a permissive state statute as an authorization to discriminate and as sufficient state action
to violate the Fourteenth Amendment . . . . " Reitman
v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369, 379 ( 1967). Thus, "[o] ur
prior decisions leave no doubt" that any action of the
Government. through any of its agencies, approving, authorizing, encouraging or otherwise supporting conduct
which if performed by the Government would violate
the Constitution, "constitutes illegal [governmental] involvement in those pertinent private acts ... that subsequently occur.'' Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,
202 (1970) (separate opinion); ser. e. g., Moose Lodge

---

11

Srr Business Executives Move fo?' V'il'tnmll Peace. supra, n. 1;
Demo('f'aLi!' National Committl'e, &u.pm , n (.
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No. 107 v. Irvis, supra; Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385·
(1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, supra; Evans v. Newton,
supra; Robinson v. Florida, 379 U. S. 153 (1964); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 ( 1963); Peterson v. City
of Greenville, 373 U. S. 244 ( 1963); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra; McCabe v. Atchison, 'J'ow
peka & Santa Fe R. Co., supra.
Finally, and perhaps most important, in a case virtually identical to the one now before us, we held that
a policy promulgated by a r.rivately owned bus company,
franchised by the Federal Government anc regula e by
the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia, ~be subjected to the constraints of the First
Amendment. Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343
U. S. 451 ( 1952) . In reaching that result, we placed
primary emphasis on the specific regulatory acquiescence
in the challenged action of the bus company. Thus,
after noting that the bus company "operates its services
under the regulatory supervision of the Public Utilities
Commission of the District of Columbia which is an
agency authorized by Congress," we explained that
our finding of "governmental action'' was predicated
specifically
~

"upon the fact that that agency, pursuant to protests against the l challenged policy], ordered an investigation of it and, after formal public hearings,
ordered its investigation dismissed on the ground
that the public safety, comfort and convenience were
not impaired thereby.'' 343 U. S., at 462.
See Moose Lodge No . 107 v. Tn1is, supra, at 175-176

n. 3.
Although the Court strains valiantly today to distinguish Pollak, it offers nothing more than the proverbial "distinctions without a difference." Here, as in
Pollak, the broadcast 1icrnsees opcratr "under the regulatory :mpervision of . . . an ag;Pnc:v authorized by

7H~6:~,
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Congress." And, again as in Pollak, that agency received
"protests" against the challenged policy and, after formal consideratiou, "dismissed" tho complaints on the
ground that the "public interest, convenience, and necessity" were not "impaired" by that policy. Indeed, the
argument for finding "governmental action" here is oven
stronger than in Pollak, for this case co11cems not an ·incidental activity of a bus company but, rather, the primary activity of the regulated entities-communication.
Thus, given the confluence of these various indicia
of "govern men tal action "-including the public nature
of the airwaves,'" the governmentally created preferred
status of broadcasters, the extensive Government regulation of broadcast programming, and tho specific governmental approval of the challenged policy-! can only
·conclude that the Government "has so far insinuated
itself into a position" of participation in this policy that
the absolute refusal of broadcast licensees to sell airtime
to groups or individuals wishing to speak out on controversial issues of public importance must be subjected
to the restraints of the First Amendment.
TI

Radio and television have long been recognized as
forms of communication "affected by a First Amendment interest" and, indeed. it can hardly be doubted
that broadcast licensees are themselves protected by that
'" 1\IIorrover, thr appropriatenr~~ of a part1cular forum, even if
privately owned, for rffective communication ha::; in somr in~tancr~
bren rmpha~ized to r~tabli~h thr rclrvancr of FirHt Amrndment proteetion~. Sre, e. (J., Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 5.90
v. Logan V a/leu Plaza, inc., :391 U. 8. :308 ( 1968) ; !If arsh v. Alabama,
:)2() ll. S. 501 (194G) . Herr, a;; the Comt of Appral;; recop:nized,
"thr broadca~t mrdin arr ~prcifically dedicated to communication.
Thr~· function a:; both our foremost forum for public :;perch and om
mo~t important rducntor of an informed prople ." -±50 F. 2d, at
()5:), Sc(> abo t t>Xt a ncl not r~. at nn . ;).')-:37, i·11[m
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Amendment. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra;
at 386. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
334 U. S. 131, 166 ( 1948); Z. Chafee, Free Speech in
the United States 545-546 ( 1941). Recognitio11 of this
fact does not end our inquiry, however, for it is equally
clear that the protection of the First Amendment in this
context is not limited solely to broadcasters. On the
contrary, at least one set of competing claims to the
protection of that Amendment derives from the fact that,
because of the limited number of broadcast frequencies
available and the potentially pervasive impact of the
electronic rnedia, "the people as a whole retain their
interest in free speech by radio and their collective right
to have the medium function consistently with the ends
and purposes of the First Amendment." Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 390.
Over 50 years ago, Mr. Just.ice Holmes sounded what
has since become a dominant theme in applying the First
Amendmeut to the changing problems of our Nation.
"fTlhe ultimate good,'' he declared, "is better reached
by free trade in ideas," and "the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market .... " Abrams v. United States,
250 U. S. 616, 630 ( 1919) (dissenting opinion); see also
Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 372 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring); Gitlow v. A'ew York, 268
U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Indeed,
the First Amendment itself testifies to our "profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen,'' 1 " and the Amendment "rests on the assumption
that the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the
"New York Times C'o. v. 8uli1van, supra, at 271; ~<'E' al::;o
Pickering v. Board of Rducation, :391 ll. S, 5fi:3, 57:3 (1968); Mills
v. Alabama. :384 ll. S. 214, 218 (19Hfi) .
1

r
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welfare of the public . . . . " Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U. S. 1, 20 (1945). For "it is only through
free debate and free exchange of ideas that government
remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful
change is effected.'' Tenniniello v. Chicago, 337 U. S.
1, 4 ( 1949); see also Thor11hill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
102 (1940); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 327
( 19,3 7).
With considerations such as these in mind, we have
specifically declared that, in the context of radio and
television broaclcasti ng, the First Amendment protects
"the right of the public to receive suitable access to
social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas and
experiences ... :'' Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
supr-a, at 390.'' And, because "[i] t is the purpose of
the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail,
rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private
licensee," "[ijt is the right of viewers and listeners, not
the right of broadcasters, which is paramount." Ibid.
Thus, we have explicitly recognized that, in light of
the unique nature of the electronic media, the public
have strong First Amendment interests in the reception
of a full spectrum of views-presented in a vigorous and
uninhibited manner-on controversial issues of public
importance. And, as we have seen, it has traditionally
been thought that the most effective' way to insure this
"Thi:-; was not nrw dart rinr, for wr hn vr long rrrognized in a
variety of COlltrxt~ that t hr First Amrndm<>nt "n<>rr~;;aril~· protects
the right to rrceivr /.information]." M artiu v. City of Struthers,
:n9 U S. 141, 14:3 (19·-!:3). ~rr, e. g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S.
556, 557 (1969); Time, fur. v. Hill, :385 U. S. :~74, :388 (1967);
Grisu·old v. Connecticut. :381 U. S. 479, 482 (1965); Lamont v,
Post1naster General, :381 U, S. 801, :307- 808 (19()fi).
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"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate is by foster~
ing a "free trade in ideas" by making our forums of communication readily available to all persons wishing to
express their views. Although apparently conceding the
legitimacy of these principles, the Court nevertheless upholds the absolute ban on editorial advertising because 1
in its view, the Commission's Fairness Doctrine, in and
of itself, is sufficient to satisfy the First Amendment
interests of the public. I cannot agree.
The Fairness Doctrine originated early in the history
of broadcast regulation and, rather than being set forth
in any specific statutory provision," developed gradually
in a long series of Commission rulings in particular
cases."' In essence, the doctrine imposes a two-fold duty
upon broadcast licensees: ( 1) coverage of issues of pub~
lie importance must be adequate," and (2) such cov"'The Fairnt'Sii Doctrine waH rt'cognizecl and .i mplicitly approved
by Congre~s in the 1959 amendment~ to § :315 of the Communications Act. Act of September 14, 1959, § 1, 73 Stat. 557, amending
47 U. S. C. § :315 (a). AH amrnded, § 315 (a) recognizes the obligation of broadcaster:; ''to operate in the public mtrrrst and to afford
reasonable apport unity for the cli::;cus;;ion of conflicting views on
issues of public importnnce ."
1 " The Fairness Doctrine was first fully ~et forth in Heport in the
Matter of Editorializing b)· Broadcast Licensee, , 13 F. C. C.
1246 (1949), and was elaborated upon in Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Cant roverswl Issues of Public
Importance, 29 Feel. Reg. 10415 (1954) . The ~;ta t utory authority
of the Comrmssion to promulgate thi8 doctrmr and relat ed regulations derives from the mandate to the "romtmssion from time to
time, as public convenience , mterest , or neresHity n'quires," to
promulgate "Ruch rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditwn::; . . . as may be nece:;sa r~· to carry out the
provision::; of [the Act 1• • • • " ..J-7 U. S C. §§ 30a, 30:3 (r).
17
Sec John J. Dempsey, 6 P & F Radio Heg. 615 (1950); see
also Metropolitan Broadcasting Corp., 19 P & F Radio Rrg. 602
(1960); The Evening News Assoriation, () P & F Radio Rrg. 28:3
(1950),
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erage must fairly reflect opposing viewpoints .'H See
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 377. In
fulfilling their obligations under the Fairness Doctrine 1
however, broadcast licensees have virtually complete discretion, subject only to the Commission's general requirement that licensees act "reasonably and in good faith," '"
11
to determine what issues should be covered, how much
time should be allocated, which spokesmen should appear, and in what format.""" Thus, the Fairness Doctrine does not in any sense require broadcasters to allow
11
non-broadcaster" speakers to use the airwaves to express their own views on controversial issues of public
importance."' On the contrary, broadcasters may meet
1
~ If the broadcaster prr~ent~ onr ;;1dr of a que;;tJOn, and does not
wish to prC';;rnt thf> other ;;ide lmnself, hr can fulfill his fairness
obligation b~ · announcing hi;; willingness to broadcast oppo;;ing virw::;
by voluntrrr::;. Srr Mid-Florida Television Corp., 4-0 F. C. C. 620
( 1964). If the broadcastC'r rrject;; a volunteer ;;pokC',;man a,; "inappropriate," he mu;;t ;;C'ck out other:>. Srr Richard G. R·ujJ, 19
F. C. C. 2d 8:38 (1969). The broadca,;ter mu,;t provide frpp time for
the presentn t ion of opposing VJC'w::; if ;,;poJJ::;orship is unnvailable . Sec·
Cullman Broadcasting Co., 25 P & F Hadio Reg. R95 (1963).
"' Applicabil it~ · of 1lw Fairnr"~ Doctnnr in the Handling of Controvrr;;ial Issue::; of Public Importance, SU]J?'a, n. 16, at 10424.

0
" Notice of Inquiry: The 1/and/ing of Public issues Under the
Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, :30 F. C. C. 2d 2() , 2S (1971); :;eC' abo Applicability of

the FairnC'HS Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial IssuC';; of
Public Importnnce, supra, n. 1(), at 10416; Hcport 111 the Mattrr of
Editorializin~ b~· Broadcast LicC'n~rr~. sU]Jra, n. Hi.
"'Thus, the Fairnrs~ Doctnnr must be ;;harply di:-~tingui;;hed from
the ''equal 1imr" requm?ment, wlurh provide:-; that a broadcaster who
affords airtime to our political candidate must make C'(j11al time available to othC'r candidate:; for thr ~ame offirr. 47 U. S. C. § 315. See
also Nicholas Zapple, 2:3 F. C. C. 2d 707 (1970) (rxten~JOn of "rqual
t1mr '' rule to cover a cand 1datr ';; :-;upport er:-; whrrr spokrsmen for
othC'r candidatr:-; are permitted to pureha;;e airtimr) . Similarly, the
Fmrnc;;s Doctrine must not be confu::;ed wdh the Commi;;sion's "per;;onal attack" and '·pol it irnl rditonalizing" rule.::; which wt'rr 11phC'Icl
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their fairness responsibilities through presentation of carefully edited news programs, panel discussions, interviews,
and documentaries. As a result, broadcasters retain
almost exclusive control over the selection of issues and
viewpoints to be covered, the manner of presentation and,
perhaps most important, who shall speak. Given this
doctrinal framework, I can only conclude that the Fairness Doctrine, standing alone, is insufficient-in theory
as well as in practice-to provide the kind of "unin~
hibited, robust, and wide-open" exchange of views to
which the public is constitutionally entitled.
As a practical matter, the Court's reliance on the Fair.:
11ess Doctrine as an "adequate" alternative to editorial
advertising seriously overestimates the ability-or willingness-of broadcasters to expose the public to the
"widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources." "" As Professor Jaffe
has noted, "there is considerable possibility that the
broadcaster will exercise a large amount of self-censorship
and try to avoid as much controversy as he safely can."""
Indeed, in light of the strong interest of broadcasters
in Red Lion Broadcal3ting Co. v. PCC, supra. Tlw "per~onal attack"
rule provide~ that "when, during the pre~entatwn of views on a
controver~ial issue of public importance, an attack i~ made on the
honest:>' , character, intrgrity, or like personal qualitir~ of nn identified ])rrson," the licen~ee mu~t notify the prr~on attacked and offer
him an opportunit~· to respond. 47 CFH § 73.12:3. The ''political
rditorializing" rulr provides that whrn a licrnsee enclor~es a candidate for political oillce it mu~t givr ot hrr candidates or their spokesmen an opportunity to respond. Srr, e. g., 47 CFR § 73.123. Thus,
unlike the Fairnrs;; Doctrine, the ·'equal time," "personal attack,"
and "political rditorializing" rulrs grant a particular group or individual a limit<'d ''right of acce::;s" to the airways not Hubject to the
''jomnali;;1 ic suprrvi;;ion" of the broadcaster.
""Associated Press v. United States, :326 U. S. 1, 20 (1945).
1
"' Jaffe, Thr Editorial RPs]wnsibility of the Broadcaster: Rrflect ion~ on FairnP8~ and Accrs;.;, 85 Harv. 1 . Hev. 758, 77:3 n. 26 ( 1972).
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in maximing their audience, and therefore their profits,
it seems almost naive to expect the majority of broadcasters to produce the variety and controversiality of
material necessary to reflect a full spectrum of viewpoints. Stated simply, angry customers are not good
customers and, in the commercial world of mass communications, it is simply "bad business'' to espouseor even to allow others to espouse-the heterodox or the
controver.::ial. As a result, even under the Fairness Doctrine, b~ters generally tend to permit only est~b~
lished-or
at least moderated-views to enter the broad----.
cast world's "marketplace of ideas."~'
24 See genrrall~·
D. Lac~·, Frerdom and Communicat ions 69
(1961); .Jaffr, supra, n. 2:{, nt 77:~, 26; Cn nb~·. Thr Fir~t Amrndment
Hight to Per~uade: Accr~s to Radio and Television, 19 U. C. L. A.
L. Rev. 72:3, 727 (1972); !\falonr, Hroadcastmg, Thr Heluctanl
Dragon: Will thr Fin:t Amendment Hight of Acce~~ End the Suppressing of Controver;;ial Idra:::'?, 5 U. Mich . .f. 1. Hrv. 19:3, 205211, 21() (1972); .John~011 & Wrl:'trn. A Twentieth Crntur~· Soapbox: Tlw Right to Purchase Radio and Telrvision Time, 57 Va. L.
Hrv. 547 (1971); Barron, Acces~ to thr Prr:<~-A New First Amrmlment Hight, SO Harv . L. Rrv. 1641 (1967); Notr, Fret' Sperch and
the l\Inso; 11rdia. 57 Va. L. Re\·. ():3(j (1971); Note, A Fair Break
for Controversial S]Jraker~: Limitations of thr Fairnro;o; Doctrinr and
the Need for Individual Accr~o;. :39 Gro. Wash. 1. Hev. 5:32 (1971);
Notr, Wastrl11nd Rrvisited: A !\Iodc•st Attack Upon the FCC's
Catcgor~· S~·strm, 17 U. C. L. A. L. Hrv. 868, 870-875 (1970);
Com mrnl , Frerdom of Sprrch and the lndividual'c: Right of Acce~H
to thr Airways, 1970 Law & 'ocw l Order 424, 428; Notr, FCC's
Fairness Ht'gulations: A Fm;t Step Toward~ Crrntion of a Right
of Accr~~ to the l\Ja~~ Ylruia, 54 Com. L. Hrv. 294, 29() (1969).
Although admittmg that thr Fairne::;~ Doctrmr " ha::; not alwayo;
brought to tlw public pNfrct or indrrd eve n high quality trentment
of all public rvent::; and I ~::;ue;;," the Court nrvrrt hrless l:'uggests that
a hroadcnstrr who fnils to fulfill hi~ fairnrs ~ obligatiOns doe::; so "nt
thr ri,;k of losing his licen"r." Ante, a t - . Thr Court doeo; not
site a siuglr ll1stnncr. however, in which thi~ sanction ha" ever bern
.invoked hecausr of a broadcastrr'::; failurr to romp !~ · with thr Fairur~s Dortrinr, lnderd , thi~ i,; not ~mpn~lllg, for thr Commission

l
I
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Moreover. the Court's reliance on the Fairness
Doctrine as the sole means of informing the public
seriously misconceives and underestimates the public's
interest in receiving ideas and information directly from
the advocates of those ideas vvithout the interposition
of journalistic middlemen. Under the Fairness Doctrine. broadcasters decide what issues are "important,''
how "fully" to cover them, and what format, time and
style of coverage arc "appropriate." The retention of
such absolute control in the hands of a few government
licensee13 is inimical to the First Amendment. for vigorous,
free debate can be attained on ly when members of the
public have at least some opportunity to take the initiative ancj editorial control into their own hands.
Our legal system reflects a belief that truth is best
illuminated by a collision of genuine advocates. Under
the Fairness Doctrine, however, accompanied by an absolute ban on editorial advertising, the public is compelled
to rely exclusively 011 the "journalistic discretion" of
broadcasters, who serve in theory as surrogate spokesmen for all sides of all issues. This separation of the
advocate from the expression of his views can serve only
to diminish the effectiveness of that expression . Indeed,
·we emphasized this fact in Red Lim1: ""
"Nor is it enough that he should hear the arguments of adversaries from his own teachers, presented as they state them, and accompanied by what
they oft'er as rf~futations. That is not the way to
do justice to thl' argumrnts. or bring them into real
hn~

acircl with grrat rp]ueinncr in tht~ arra, tntrrvrnmg in only thr
rxirrmr ca,.;e,.; of broadra~irr abu ~r. Srr Canb~·. supra, at
725-7'27: :\Iallonl', supra. at :215- :Hii ; ,.;rr also Cox & .JohnHon,

mo~t

Broadcastiuo 111 America awl the FCC's Ltcense Renewal Process :
An Oklahoma Case Study, 14 F. C. C. 2d 1 (1959)
2
'' Red Lion Broadcastinu ('o. v. FCC. su]Jra. at :392 n. lS, quoting
.T. ]\fill , OJI Librrty :32 m. :\Jr( 'allum Pd 1947) .
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contact with his own mind. He must be able to
hear them from persons who actually believe them;
who defend them in earnest, and do their very utmost
for them.!'
Thus, if the public is to be ho11estly and forthrightly
apprised of opposing views on controversial issues, it is
imperative that citizens be permitted at least some
opportunity to speak directly for themselves as genuine
advocates on issues that concern them.
Moreover, to the extent that broadcasters actually
permit citizens to appear on "their" airwaves under the
Fairness Doctrine, such appearances are subject to extensive editorial control. Yet it is clear that the effectiveness of an individual's expression of his views is as
dependent on the style and format of presentation as
it is on the content itself. And the relegation of an
individual's views to such tightly controlled formats as
the news, documentaries, edited interviews, or panel discussions may tend to minimize, rather than maximize the
effectiveness of speech. Under a limited scheme of
editorial advertising, however, the crucial editorial controls are in the speaker's own hands.
Nor is this case concerned solely with the adequacy
of coverage of those views and issues which generally are
recognized as "newsworthy." For also at stake is the
right of the public to receive suitable access to new and
generally unperceived ideas and opinions. Under the
Fairness Doctrine, the broadcaster is required to present
only "representative community views and voices on
controversial issues" of public importance." 0 Thus, by
definition, the Fairness Doctrine tends to perpetuate coverage of those "views and voices'' that are already established, while failing to provide for exposure of the public
26

Bl,lsiuess Executives Move for Vietnam Pear·e. wpm, n. 1. at 222:.
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to those "views and voices'' that are novel, unorthodox
or unrepresentative of prevailing opinion." 7
Finally, it should be noted that the Fairness Doctrine
permits, indeed reqU?:res, broadcasters to determine for
themselves which views and issues are suffi.cienty "important" to warrant discussion. The briefs of the broad~
caster-petitioners in this case illustrate the type of "jour~
nalistic discretion" licensees now exercise in this regard.
Thus, ABC suggests that it would refuse to air those
views which it considers "scandalous" or "crackpot," ~s
while ABC' would exclude those issues or opinions that
are "insignificant""" or "triviaL""" Similarly, NBC
would bar speech that strays "beyond the bounds of
normally accepted taste." at and WTOP would protect
the public from subjects that are "slight. parochial or
inappropriate.'' '12
The genius of the First Amendment, however, is that
it has always defined what the public ought to hear by
permitting speakers to say what they wish. As the Court
of Appeals recognized, "[i] t has traditionally been
thought ... that the best Judge of the importance of a
27

Inderd, the failurr to providr adequatr means for group::; and
individtwl;.; to bring nrw i::;sur:; or idea::; to thr attention of the public
explains, at least to ::;omr extrnt, "the clrvelopment of new mrdia to
convey unorthodox, unpopular, and nrw idea;;. Sit -in~ and demonHtration::; testify to . . . thr inahil!ty to Herure accr;;::; to thr ronvrntional mran:; of rraching and changing public opinion . I For by]
the bizarrr and un::;ettling natme of hi;; technique, the demon;;trator
hope;.; to arrest and divert attention long enough to compel thr
public to ponder hi::; mes::mge." Barron. supra, n. 24, at 1647; cf.
Adderley V. fi'londa, :385 n. R :39, 50-51 (19611) (DOUGLAS, J.,
di;;senting).
28 Brief for American Broadca;;tmg Companir:s, Inr . 52.
2 fl Brirf for Columbia Broadra~tmg s~'H(Pm. Inc. :{4.
0
" ld., at
40
'J 1 Brief for National Broaden:stmg Company, In('. 10.
2
" Brif•f for Po~t-NrwswePk Rtation~. Capital Arra. lnr. :n.

71-S03, ETC.-DISSENT (A)

22 COLUMBIA BIWADCASTING v

DE~JOCRATIC

CO:MM.

particular viewpoint is the in eli vicJ ual or group holding
the viewpoint and wishing to communicate it to others."
450 F. 2d, at 656. Indeed, "supervised and ordained discussion" is directly contrary to the underlying purposes
of the First Amendment,"" for that Amendment "presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be
gathered out of a multitude of tongues. than through any
kind of authoritativ0 selection.""' Thus, in a related
context, we have explicitly recognized that editorial advertisements constitute "an important outlet for the
promulgation of information and ideas by persons who
do not themselves have access to lmedia l facilities," and
the unavailability of such editorial advertising can serve
only "to shackle the First Amendment in its attempt to
secute 'the widest possible dissemination of information
from divers<' and antagonistic sources.'" New York
'Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, at 266.
The Faimess Doctrine's requirement of full and fair
coverage of controversial issues is, beyond doubt, a commendable and, indeed. essential tool for effective regulation of the broadcast industry. But, standing alone, it
simply cannot eliminate the need for a further, complementary airing of controversial views through the limited
availability of editorial advertising. Indeed, the availability of at least some opportunity for editorial advertising is imperative if we are ever to attain "the free
and general discussion of public issues [that I seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent
exercise of their rights as citizens." Grosjean v. Amen:ca11 Press Co., 297 F. S. 233. 250 ( 193fi) .
"" Tinker v. Des Moines lwfependent Cmmnumty School District.
:39:3 U. S. 50:3 (1969) .
"' Cnited StatPs v. Assocwtrd fJress. 5:2 F. Supp. :36:2, 372 (SDNY
1Y4:3) , nff'cl. :3:2() U.S. I (1945). Sr<> nl~o Thomas v. Collins, :323
~ 1 • S. 5W. 545 (1945) (.Jnck~ou , .J. ronrurriug) .
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Moreover. a proper balancing of the competi11g First
Amendment iuterests at stake ill this controversy must
consider, not only the interests of broadcasters and of
the listening and viewing public. but also the independent
First Amendment interest of groups and individuals in
effective self-expression. See. e. (J., T. Emerson, Toward
a General Theory of thP First Amendment 4-7 (1967);
Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 33 ( 1941).
"rS]peech concerning public affairs . . . is the essence
of self-government," Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S.
64, 74-75 ( 1964). and the First Amendment must therefore safeguard not only the right of the public to hear
debate, but also the right of individuals to participate
in that debate and to attrmpt to persuade others to their
points of view. See. e. g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S.
516, 537 (1944); cf. lv'AACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415,
429-430 (1963). And, in a time of apparently growing
anonymity of the individual in our society. it is imperative that we take special care to preserve the vital First
Amendment interest in assuring "self-fulfillment r of
expressiou_l for each individual." Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 96 (1972). For our citizens
may now find greater than ever the need to express their
own views directly to the public. rather than through a
governmentally appointed surrogate, if they are to feel
that they can achieve at least somP measure of control
over their own destinies.
ln light of these considerations. the Court would concede. I assume, that our citizens have at least an abstract
right to express their views on controversial issues of
public importance. But freedom of speech does not exist
in the abstract. On the contrary. the right to speak can
flourish only if it is allowed to operate in an effective

71-i-ili:-l. ETC.-DISSENT (A)

24 COLO:\IBIA BROADCASTING v. DEi\IOCRATTC COMM.

forum-whether it be a public park, a schoolroom, a
town meeting hall, a soapbox, or a radio and television
frequency. For in the absence of an effective means of
communication. the right to speak would ring hollow
indeed. And, in recognition of these principles, we have
consistently held that the First Amendment embodies not
only the abstract right to be free from censorship, but
also the right of an individual to utilize au appropriate
and effective medium for the expression of his views.
flee, e. g., Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 559
(1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Indepe-ndent Community
School District, 393 U.S. 503 ( 1969); Amalgamated Food
Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968); Brown \'. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131
(1966); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 ( 1963);
Kunz v. Xew York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 ( 1H46); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S.
413 (1943); Srhneider v. Slate, 308 U. S. 147 (1939);
Hague v. C/0, 307 U.S. 406 (1939).
Here, of course, there can be no doubt that the broadcast frequencies allotted to the various radio and television licensees constitute appropriate "forums'' for thP
discussion of controversial issues of public importance.""
'"' Thr Court doe~ mnkP thr rather novrl ~ugge::>t1on, howPvrr,
that rditonal advPrtising might mdrrd br "inappropriatr" bernu::;r
''IIstenrrs and ,.1rwrrs ron~titnt r· a ·rapt1vr nucliencr,' r::;prcially
vulnerablr to thosP who w1sh to thrust unwantrcl propaganda upon
thrm.'' Ante, at In support of thiH propoHition, the Court
cites our drri::;wn~ m Public Utilities Comm1sswn v. Pollak, supra,
and Kovacs v. Cooper. :3:35 lJ. S. 77 (19-J.9). In Po/la!.:, howevC'r, wr
Pxplicitly rejected a claim that the broadra::;ting of radio programs
m Htreetcar~ Ywlated thr Fir~t and F1fth Amcndmrnt ngbt~ of pa::;~enger::; who did not wi~h to li~tPn to tho~€' program~. And 111
Kovacs, although we uphrld an ordinanr<·' forbidding the u~r on publie ~trPC'b of ~ound t ruckti wh1eh rmtt "loud or raucou~ noi~€'::;," W<'
cl!d ~o i)('cau~r thr ordmancr wn~ roncrrnPcl, not with thr content of
::;prech, but rathrr wtth thr otTenHivenr~s of tlw sounds thrmselves.
Herr, howrvN, thr Court srPms prrfPctl!· willing to allow broadcaHtE'fti to eontmuP to mvade thr "pnvaey " of thr homp through
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Indeed, unlike the streets. parks. public libraries and
other "forums" that we have held to be appropriate for
the exercise of First Amendment rights. the broadcast
media are dedicated specifically to communication. And.
since the expression of ideas-whether political. commercial, musical or otherwise-is the exclusive purpose
of the broadcast spectrum. it seems clear that the adoption of a limited scheme of editorial advertising vvould
in no sense divert that spectrum from its intended use.
(~f. Lloyd Corp. , Ltd. \'. Tanner, supra, at 563; Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local .590 v. Logan 11alley
Plaza, Inc., supra, at 320.
Moreover, it is equally clear that. with the assistance
of the Federal Government. the broadcast industry has
become what is potentially the most efficient and effective
"marketplace of ideas" ever devisrd. "n Indeed, the clecrommrrcial adv('r( Jc;inp; and rvf'n controver~ial programming under
tlw Fairnr;;~ Doctrinf'. Thu~ , thr Court draw~ its linr ~olf'ly on the
ba~J~ of thr contrnt of thr particular ;.;pf'Pch mvolved and , of cour~r.
wr havr com; i~tcntl)· hPid thnt , whPrf' contrnt i:s at J~i:>Uf' , con~titn
tionally protPctcd ~perch rna)· not br prohibitrd brcaw:ir of a "mcrr
dr~ir<' to avoid thP di"comfort and unpl<'a~:wtnf'~~ that alway~ :!<"company an unpopular idf'a.'' Tinker v. Des JIJ oines /nde]Jendent
Community School Dist1·ict, supra, at 509; ~f'<', e. g., Grayned v.
City of Rorkford, 40R U. S. 104, 117 (1972). Thr HuggE'~tion that
con;.;titntionall)· protE'ctcd ~prE'ch may br banned hPcan~E' ~ornE' pcr!<on::; ma)· fiJJ d the JdE'a:; E'xprP~~ed oH'cnt<iV(' 1~. 111 1t~rlf, off<'n~ivr to
t lw vrr)· m<'aning of t hr FirRt AmPndmrnt.
"" lndrrcl. n pproxima t <'l~· 95 ~/c of Amrncan home~ contain a j·
lra"t onr t rlrvJswn ,;ct , and that :;E't i~ t nrned 011 for an a vrragE' of
morE' than fi\'0 one-half hour~ JlE'l' day Sec HE'arings on H. H.
1:37:21 brforr thE' Sulwommit t<'<' on Communicatwn~ <I nd Powrr of
thr Hou~r Commit lE'<' on Intrr~tatr and Foreign CommE'rC'(', 91~1
C'ong. , 2d ~<'~"· · 7 (1970) (:;lat<'mrnl of Dpan Burch , Chairman of
t br FrdNal Commume;ttJOnt< Commi"::;Jon) . A~ to t lw potential
infiuenrP of thr rlrrtroni:-· media on Amrncan thought, ~cr generally
A. Krock, Tlw Con:;pnt of tlw Govrmrcl (i() (1971); H. :VIcndE'bohn &
1 Crrsp1, Poll:; , TPlrvJsion, :md thr :'\rw Politic;.; 251), 264 ( 1970):
.:Vlal01w, ~upm. n . 24. at Hli.
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tronic media are today "the public's primary source of
information,""' and we have ourselves recognized that
broadcast "technology ... supplants atomized, relatively
informal communication with mass media as a prime
source of national cohesion and news . . . . " Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. \'. FCC, supra, at 386 n. 15. Thus,
although "full and free discussion" of ideas may havP
bern a reality in the heyday of political pamphleteering,
modern technological developments in the field of communications have made the soap box orator and the
leafleteer virtually obsolete'. And, in light of the current
dominance of the electronic media as the most effective
means of reaching the public. any policy that absolutely
denies citizens access to the airwaves necessarily renders
even the concept of "full and free discussion'' practically
meaningless.
Regrettably, it is precisely such a policy that the Court
upholds today. In an C'ffort to justify this result. the·
Court apparently rests upon the argument that even a
limited scheme of editorial advertising would impair the
broadcaster's assertedly overriding interest in exercising·
absolute control over "his'' frequency."" This analysis,
17
'

H. R. Rrp. No. !H-:257, 9ht Cong., 1st Se:s;;., 6 (1969). According to one :study, 67 % of Amrncans prdrr thr elrctronic mrdia to
other sources of information. See G Wyckoff, Thr Imagr Candidates 13- 14 (1968). Srr abo Amendment of Sections 73 ..3.?, 73.240,
and 73.636 of the Comm~ssiou's Rules, 22 F. C. C. 2d :339, 344 (1970)
(59 % of Amrncans rlrprnd on telrvision a:s their principal sourer of
neWiS) .

as11 :should be notrd that, although the Fa1rnrss Doctrinr is at
least arguably relrvant to thr public's mterest m rece1ving suitable·
rxposmr to "uninhibitrd, robust , and wide-open" debatr on controversial 1ssues, it IS not in an)· :srn::;r rrlrvant to t hr individual's
intrrrst 111 obtaming accrss to thr :urwavr:s for the purpose of rffPctive srlf-rxprrssion. For tlw individual';; intrrrst in rxpressing his
own virw;; in a mannrr of h1;; own choosing is an mhrrrntly prrsonal
onr, and it can nrvrr br :;at1sfird b~· the exprrsswn of "~imilar" virws
by a :-;urrogatr ::>pokr;;;man..

7i-t:;6:~, ETC-DISSENT (AI

COLmfBIA BROADCASTIXU v. DDIOCHATJC COiVLYI. 27

however, hardly reflects the delicate balancing of interests
that this sensitive question demands. Indeed, the
Court's "absolutist" approach wholly disregards the competing First Amendment rights of all "non-broadcaster';
citizens. ignores the teachings of our recent decision in
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, and is not
supported by the historical purposes underlying broad"
cast regulation in this Nation .
Prior to 1927, it must be remembered, it was clearly
recognized that the broadcast spectrum was part of the
public domain. As a result. the allocation of frequen~
cies was left entirely to the private sector,"" and groups
and individuals therefore had the same right of access
to radio facilities as they had. and still have, to the
printed press- that is. "anyone who will may transmit." '"
Under this scheme, however. the number of broadcasters
increased so dramatically that by 1027 every frequency
was occupied by at least one station, and ma11y were
occupied by several. The result was "confusion and
chaos. With everybody on the air. nobody could be
heard." Yational Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
319 U. S. 190. 212 (1943). It soon became "apparent
that broadcast frequencies constituted a scarce resourc~
whose use could be regulated and rationalized only by
the Government." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
supra, at 376. Thus. in the Radio Act of 1927, 44 ~tat.
1162 ( 1927). Congress placed the broadcast spectrum
under federal regulation and sought to reconcile competing uses of the airwaves by setting aside a limited
" ' Indrrd, prr-1927 reguJatiOJI of radio gavr no di~crrt10n to the
.Frdrral Govrrnmrnt to drny thr right to oprratr a broadcast 1:>tatiou.
Srr 1 A. Socolow, Thr Law of Hadio Broadcasting :38 (1939) ;
H. Warnrr, Hadio & Trlevi,.;Ion L11w 757 et seq. (194R) ; ~er gt>nrrally National Broadr-asting C'o. v. United States. :H9 U. S. 190,
210-214 (194:3) .
'"(i7 Cong. Rrc . 5-!79 (Ht>p Whitr) .
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number of frequencies for each of the important uses
of radio:' 1 And, since the number of frequencies allocated to public broadcasting was necessarily limited, the
Government was compelled to grant licenses to some
applicants while denying them to others. See generally
Red Lion Broadcasting Co . v. FCC, supra, at 375-377,
388; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra,
at 210-214.
Although the overriding need to avoid overcrowding
of the airwaves clearly justifies the imposition of a ceiling on the number of individuals who will be permitted
to operate broadcast station., and, indeed, renders it
"idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right
to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual
to speak, write or publish," '" it does not in any sense
dictate that the continuing First Amendment rights of
all nonlicensees be brushed aside entirely. Under the
41
These includr, of coun;e, not only public broadca:,;ting, but al~o
"amatrur operation, aircraft, police, defrm;e, and navigation . . . . "
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 888.
4
" Although
thi~ licensing scheme nrresl:iarily reBtrictl:i the First
Amendment right · of tho~r groups or individual~ who are denied the
"right" to oprrate a broadca,;t station, it doe:,; not, in and of itself,
violate the Fin;t Amenclmrnt. For it has long been recognized that
when "[c]omprting demands 011 tlw tlame [forum] ... compel the
I Governmrnfl to make rhoirr:s among potential usns and uses,"
neutral rule" of allocation to govern that scarce communications
rrsourre are not pe1' se unron~t itutional. Police Dept. of Chicago
v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 98 (197:2); cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S.
536, 554 (1965); Cox v. New Hampshire. 312 U.S. 369, :374·(1940);
Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 160 (19:39). And, in the context of broadcasting, it would br iromc indeed ''if the First Amendment, aimed at protecting and furthering communications, prevented
the Government from making radio communication posBible . . .
by limiting thr number of license:; so a~ not to overcrowd the
~pectrum." Red Lion Broadcasti11g Co. v. FCC, SU]Jra, at 389 ..
•·a Rea Lion Broadcasting Co. v, PCC. supra, at :38R.
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existing system, broadcast licensees arc gran ted a preferred status with respect to the airwaves, not because
they have competed successfully in the free market but,
rather, "because of their initial government selection . . . . " Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra~
at 400. And, in return for that "preferred status,''
licensees must respect the competing First Amendment
rights of others . Thus, although the broadcaster has a
clear First Amendment right to be free from Government
censorship in the expression of his own views " and,
indeed, has a significant interest in exercising reasonable
journalistic control over the use of his facilities, " [ t Jhe
right of free speech of a broadcaster ... does not ernbrace a right to snuff out the free speech of others." !d.,
at 387. Indeed. after careful consideration of the nature
of broadcast regulation in this country, we have specifically declared that.
" . . . as far as the Ftrst Amendment is concerned
those who are licensed stand no better than those
to whom licenses are refused. A license permits
broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional
right to . . . monopolize a radio frequency to the
exclusion of his fellow citizens." !d., at 389.
Because I believe this view is as sound today as when
voiced only four years ago. I can only conclude that
there is simply no overriding First Amendment i11terest
of broadcasters that can justify the absolute exclusion
of virtually all of our citizens from the most effective
''marketplace of ideas" ever devised.
This is not to say, of course. that broadcasters have
no First Amendment interest in exercising JOUrnalistic
supervtswn over the use of their facilities. On the
r.ontrary, such a 11 interest does indctYI exist. and it is an
11
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interest that must be weighed heavily in any legitimate
effort to balance the competing First Amendment interests involved in this case. In striking such a balance,
however, it must be emphasized that this case deals
only with the allocation of advertising_IJ!ne-airtime that
broadcasters regularly relinquish to others without tlw
retention of significant editorial control. Thus, we are
concerned here not with the speech of broadcasters themselves'" but, rather, with their "right" to decide which
other individuals will be given an opportunity to speak
in a forum that has already been opened to the public.
Viewed in this context, the absolute ball on editorial
advertising seems particularly offensive because, although
broadcasters refuse to sell any airtime whatever to groups
or individuals wishing to speak out on controversial issues
of public importance, they make such airtime readily
available to those "conunercial" advertisers who seek to
peddle their goods and services to the public. Thus. as
the system now operates, any person wishing to market
a particular brand of beer. soap, toothpaste. or deodorant
has direct, personal, and instantaneous access to the
electronic media. He cau present his own message, in
his own words, in any format he selects and at a time of
his own choosing. Y rt a similar indivicl ual seeking to
discuss war. peace, pollution. or the suffering of the
poor is denied this right to speak. Instead. he is compelled to rely on the beneficence of a corporate "trustee"
appointed by the Government to argue his case for him.
lt has long been recognized. however. that although
access to public forums may be ~ubJectrd to rrasonable
"' Tllll~, a~ t I](' Court of AppPal~ recognJZ<'d ' .. rI In norma) programmmg t 1mr, rlo,.;el~ · cont rollrd and eel itrd by broadca~t erH, thr
con~tt'l lation of con,.;tttutional ulterr;;t,.; would br ~uh;;tnntially differPnt. •· 450 F. 2cl, at (i'M .
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"time, place, and manner" regulations,"' "[s]elective
exclusions from a public forum may not be based on
content alone .... '' Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley,
supra, at 96 (emphasis added); see, e. g., Shuttlesworth
v. City of Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147 ( 1960); Edwards
v. South Carolina, supra; fi'owler v. Rhode Island, 354
U. S. 67 ( 1953); Siernotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268
(1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948). Here,
of course, thE> differential treatment accorded "commercial" and "controversial" speech clearly violates that
principle." Moreover, and not without some irony, the
favored treatment given "commercial" speech under the
existing scheme clearly reverses traditional First Amendment priorities. For it has generally been understood
that "commercial" speech enjoys less First Amendment
protection than speech directed at the discussion of controversial issues of public importance. See, e. g., Breard
v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52 (1952).
The First Amendment values of individual selffulfillment through expression and individual participation in public debate are central to our concept of libE>rty.
If these values are to survive in the age of technology,
it is essential that individuals be permitted at least some
opportunity to express their views on public issues over
'"See, e. g., fJolice Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, supra, at 98;
Gtayned v. Cit!! of Rorkfo1'd, supra, at 115; Cox v. Louisiana. supra,
at 554; Poulos v. New Hampshi1'e, :345 U.S. 395, :39~ (195:3); Cox
v. Nev• 1-fampshirr. liUpra. at 575-57(i; Schneider v. State. supra, at
HiO.
Contrary to the Court'~ a~~rrtion, the <'xi~tt"nC<' of tbr Fairnes~
Doctrine cannot in any ~eiW' ratiOnalize 1111~ d1~crimmat ion. Indeed ,
tht• Fairne~::; Doctnne ~~ wholl~· unrr~pon~ivr to the need for mdividnal accr~H to thr airwavr~ for thr purpoH<' of dfrctivr ~rlf-Pxpre~,;ion .
Srr abo n. :38, suprn.
17
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tlw electronic media. Balancing those interests against
the limited interest of broadcasters in exercising "journalistic supervision" over the mere allocation of advertisi1lg time that is already made available to some members
of the public. I simply cannot agree with the Court's
r.onclusion that the interest of broadcasters must prevail.

TY
Finally, the Court raises the spectre of administrative
apocalypsr as justification for its decision today. Thus,
the Court suggests that "[aJnything approaching an
absolute n:ght of access to broadcast time would disrupt
the mechanism Congress enacted to permit the Commision to adjust to the changing conditions of a dynamic
medium.'' Ante, a t - (emphasis added). The issue
ln this case, however, is not whether there is an "absolute
right of access" to the airwaves but, rather, whether there
may be an absolute deuial of such access. The difference is, of course, crucial, and the Court's misconception of the issue presented seriously distorts its evaluation of the admi11istrative difficulties that an invalidation
of the absolute ban might conceivably entail.
Specifically, the Court hypothesizes three potential
sources of difficulty: ( 1) the availability of editorial advertising might, in the absence of adjustments in the
system. tend to favor the wealthy; (2) application of the
Fairness Doctrine to editorial advertising might adversely affect the operation of that doctrine; and
( 3) regulation of editorial advertising might lead to an
enlargement of Government control over the content of
broadcast discussio11. These are, of course, legitimate (
and, indeed, important concerns. But, at the present
time. they are concerns-not realities. We simply have
no sure way of knowing whether, and to what extent if
any, these potential difficulties will actually materialize.
The Court's bare assumption that these hypothetical
problems are both in('vitable and inf)urmouptable indi~
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cates an utter lack of confidence in the ability of the
Commission and licensees "to adjust to the changing
conditions of a dynamic medium.'' This sudden lack of
confidence is, of course, strikingly inconsistent with the
general propositions underlying all other aspects of the
Court's approach to this case.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that, some 25 years ago,
the Commission itself declared that
" .. . the operation of any station under the extreme principles that no time shall be sold for the
discussion of controversial public issues ... is inconsistent with the concept of public interest ... ,
The Commission recognizes that good program balance may not permit the sale or donation of time
to all who may seek it for such purposes and that
difficult problems calling for careful judgment on
the part of station management may be involved
in deciding among applicants for time when all
cannot be accommodated. However, competent
management should be able to meet such problems
in the public interest and with fairness to all concerned. The fact that it placed an arduous task
on management should not be made a reason for
evading the issue by a strict rule against the sale
of time for any programs of the type mentioned."
United Broadcasting Co., 10 F. C. C. 515, 518 ( 1945).
I can see no reason why the Commission and licensees
should be deemed any less competent today then they
were in 1945. And even if intervening developments
have increased the complexities involved in implementing
a limited right of access, there is certainly no dearth of
proposed solutions to the potential difficulties. feared by
the Court. See, e. g., Canby, The First Amendment
Right to Persuade: Access to Radio and Television. 19
1'. C. L. A. L. Rev. 723, 754- 757 ( 1972); Malone, Broadcasting, the Reluctant Dragon: Will the First Amend-
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ment Right of Access EIHl ~upprcssi11g of Controversial ideas'?. 5 1'. Mich . .J. L. Ref. 103. 252- 2ti0 (Hl72);
Johnson & \Vpstl'n. A Twentieth-Century Soapbox: The
Right to Purchase Radio ami Television Time. 57 \~a,
L. Rev. 574 (1071); ~otc, 8F) Harv. L. Rev. 68U, 693- 609
(1972).
With these coitsiderations in mind. the Court of Appeals confined its<'lf to invalidating the flat ban alone.
leaving broad latitude' " to the ( 'onunissio11 and lice I I SeC's
to clC'velop in the first instance reasonable n'gulations to
gowrn the a\·ailability of editorial advertisi11g. In the
context of this case . this was surely the ,,·is(•st (:ourse to
follow , for "if C'xperil•ncc ,,·ith the administration of thC'se
doctrines indicates that they haw the 11et effect of
reducing rather tha11 enhancing lFirst .\.ntendment
value's 1. tlwrc will be time enough to r<'COitsider tht'
constitutional implications." Red Lion Broadca.sting
Co. v. FCC, supra, at 303.
For the present. however. and until such time as these
assertec!ly "overriding" administrative difficulties actually
materiali;~,e, if ever . I must agree with the conclusion
oJ the Court of Appeals that although "it may unsettle
some of us to see an antiwar message or a political party
mC'ssagc in the accustomed place of a soap or beer comlnercial .. . we must not equate what is habitual with
what is right-or what is constitutional. .\ society
alrrady so sa turatcd with commercial ism can \\'Cll afford
another outlet for speech on public issue . All that we
may lose is some of our apathy." 1"
h The ( 'ourt of Appc•al >' did , how<'V('I', ~uggrst
<'<'rtain po~Hihll'
c·ontour.. : of tmpl<'m<•ntntion For rxampl<', tlw court notrd thnt
l>roadca~t<' rs "houlcl h<' pc•rrrutt<•d "to plarc• an out~idc· limit on tlw
total mnount of Pdilorial ath·ertistng thp~· will :-;!'1]," and "n'aHonahl<•
I'PguJat lOll of thr pi:H'('Ill('llt of :id\'PI'(I:-<<'Ill(' lll~ i~ aJtogPt Jwr jlfO[l!'l'.' "
~50 F . ~d. at 6():) .
1H -J.,'j() F. 1d , at (\(),5- (\()(J.
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Mr. JusTICE DouGLAs, dissenting. /
Congress has authorized the creation of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, whose Board of Directors
is appointed by the President by and with the advice of
the Senate. 47 U. S. C. § 896. A total of 223 television
and 560 radio stations made up this nationwide public
broadcasting system as of June 30, 1972. See 1972 Cor-
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poration for Public Broadcasting, Annual Report. It is
a nonprofit organization and by the terms of § 896 (b) is
said not to be "an agency or establishment of the United
States government." Y ct since it is a creature of Congress whose management is in the hands of a Board
named by the President and approved by the Senate, it
is difficult to see why it is not a federal agency engaged
in operating a "press" as that word is used in the First
Amendment. If these cases involved that Corporation,
we would have a situation comparable to that in which
the United States owns and manages a prestigious newspaper like the New York Times. Washington Post, and
Sacramento Bee. The government as owner and manager ·would not. as I sec it, be free to pick and choose
s~ch ~ms as it desired. For by the First Amendment it may not censor or enact or enforce any other
"law" abridging freedom of the press. Politics. ideological slants, rightist or leftist tendencies could play no
part in its design of programs. See Markel, Will It be
Public or Private TV, World, March 13, 1973. p. 57.
More specifically. the programs tendered by the respondents in the present cases could not then be turned down.
Govern men tal action may be evidenced by various
forms of supervi1;ion or control of private activities.
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715.
I have expressed the vimY that the activities of licensees
of the government operating in the public domain are
govcrumental actions, so far as constitutional duties and
responsibilities are concerned. Sec Garner v. Louisiana,
368 U. S. 157, 183-185 ( concurri11g); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 267, 281 (dissenting); Moose Lodge v.
Irvis, 407 U. S. 163, 179 (dissenting). It is somewhat
the same idea expressed by the first Mr. Justice Harlan in
his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554. But
that view has not been accepted. It was rejected--m
M oose odge and IS again rejec eel today. So it is in
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hat posture of the problem that I make the following
observatiOns.
]L ~ the Court holds, a broadcast license is not_engaged in gQ_~rnn~n_!~l _aetiOili9r llilrpo.§...es of the First
Amendment, I fail to see how constitutionally we ca!_l
t~ and the _£a~ii diff~;JiQy]llim "-;e treaL!_le"·sl!JlllQ,l'S. It wonlcl come as a surprise to the public as
well as to publishers and editors of newspapers to be
informed that a newly created federal bureau would
hereafter provide "guidelines" for newspapers or promulgate rules that would give a federal agency power to
ride herd on the publishing business to make sure that
fair comment on all current issues was made. The
sturdy people vvho fashioned the First Amendment would
be shocked at that intrusion of government into a field
which in this Nation has been reserved for individuals,
whatever part of the spectrum of opinion they represent.
Benjamin Franklin, one of the Founders who was in
the newspaper business, wrote in simple and graphic
form what I had ah·ays assumed was the basic American
newspaper tradition that became implicit in the First
Amendment;
"In our early history one view was that the publisher must open his columns 'to any and aU controversialists, especially if paid for it.' " Mott,
American Journalism, 55 (1962).
"Franklin disagreDd, declaring that his newspaper
was not a stagecoach, with seats for everyone; l10·
offered to print pamphlets for private distribution,
but refused to fill his paper with private altercations." 1 Ibid.
It is said that TV and the radio have become so powerful and exert such an influence on the public mind
1
Congress provid(•d in 47 U. S. C. § 153 (h) that "a per::;on eni'•tgcd iu radio broadcasting shall not, insoh\r as such person i~ soengaged, be deemed a common carrier."

1
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that they must be controlled by government. Some
newspapers in our history have exerted a powerful-and
some have thought-a harmful interest on the public
mind. But even Thomas Jefferson, who knew how base
and obnoxious the press could be, never dreamed of interfering. For he thought that govermnent control of
newspapers would be the greater of two evi1s. 2
"I deplore . . . the putrid state into which our
newspapers have passed, and the malignity, the
vulgarity, and mendacious spirit of those ·who write
them. . . . These ordures are rapidly depraving
the public taste.
"It is however an evil for which there is no remedy,
Our liberty depends on the freedom of the press,
and that cannot be limited without being lost."
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 36, in a
carefully written opinion that was built upon predecessor
cases put the TV and the radio under a different regime.
I did not participate in that decision and, with all respect,
would not support it. Much argument could be made
that a broadcast licensee is a governmental agency or
instrumentality for First Amendment purposes. If so,
it is or could become one part of the American press
that could be moulded so as to suit the partisan demands and needs of the day. Administration after administration could toy with it to serve its sordid or its
benevolent ends. In 1973-as in other years-there is
clamoring to make the TV and radio emit those soporific
messages that console certain groups. There are charges
that these mass media are too slanted, too partisan, too
hostile in their approach to candidates and the issues.
The same cry of protest has gone up against the
newspapers and magazines. When Senator Joseph McCarthy was at his prime, holding in his hand papers
2

Democracy by

Th o ma~

Jcffcr:;on (Padoncr ed. 1939), pp. 150-151.
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"containing the names of 208 communists in the State
Department" (Feuerlicht, Joe McCarthy and McCarthyism ( 1972) c. 7) , there were scarcely a dozen
papers in this Nation that stood firm for the citizen's
right to due process and to First Amendment protection.
That, however, was no reason to put the saddle of the
federal bureaucracy on the backs of publishers. Under
our Bill of Rights people are entitled to have extreme
ideas, silly ideas, partisan ideas.
The same is true, I believe, of the TV and radio. At
times they have a nauseating mediocrity. At other times
they show the dazzling brilliance of a Leonard Bernstein;
anct they very often bring humanistic influences of faraway people into every home.
Both TV and radio news broadcasts frequently tip the
news one direction or another and even try to turn a
public figure into a character of disrepute. Yet so do
the newspapers and the magazines and other segments of
the press. Yet the standards of TV, radio, newspapers,
excellence or mediocrity-are
or magazines~hetlier
beyond the reach of government. Government-acting throug 1 courts- isciplines lawyers. Government
makes crinimal some acts of doctors and of engineers.
But the First Amendment puts beyond the reach of
government federal regulation of ne\vs agencies save
only business or financial practices which do not involve First Amendment rights. Conspicuous is the
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1, where enforcement of the antitrust laws against a news gathering
agency was held to be not inconsistent with First Amendment rights.
There has been debate over the meaning of the First
Amendment as applied to the States by reason of the
Fourteenth. Some have thought that at the state level
the First Amendment was somewhat "watered down"
and did not have the full vigor which it had as applied to.

or
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the Federal Government. See Roth v. United States,
354 U. S. 476, 502-503 (Harlan, J., concurring). So far,
that has been the minority view. See Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U. S. 1, 10. But it is quite irrelevant here, for
the First Amendment, like other parts of the Bill of
Rights, was at the outset applicable only to the Federal Government.~ The First J\ mendment is 'vritten
in terms that are absolute. Its command is that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press .... "
That guarantee, can, of course. be changed by a constitutional amendment which can make all the press or
segments of the press organs of government and thus
control the news and information which people receive.
Such a restructuring of the First Amendment cannot be·
done by judicial fiat or by congressional action. The ban
of "no" law that abridges freedom of the press is in my
view total and complete.' The Alien and Sedition Acts,
1 Stat. 566, 570, 1596, passed early in our history were
plainly unconstitutional, as Jefferson believed. Jefferson, indeed, said that by reason of the First Amendment
"libels, falsehood, and defamation, equally with
heresy and false religion, arc "·ithheld from the
cognizance of federal tribunals. That therefore the
act of the Congress of the United States. passed on
the 14th of July, 1798, entitled An Act in Addition
3

Barron v. JJayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 2-18.

"The prrsR in 1hi.- rountr~·. likr thnt of Britnin. wn~ at one 1ime
.·ub.icrt to contempt for it~ (•ommrnt~ on prnding; litigation. Toledo
};cwspaper C'o. v. United States. 2-17 1'. S. 402. But thnt position
wns rh:mgcu. See Briclucs \'. California, :n.t F. R. 252, 207. Frdrral
habra.~ corpus, howeYcr, is available to gi\·e a man hi::; freedom and
the proserntion an opportunity for a new trial where the conuuct
of the pres~ has resulted in an unfair trial. Sheppard v. Maxwell,
:384 U. S. 38. And changr of Yenue may be had where the local
atmosphere has saturated the community with prejudice. See Rideau
v. Louisiana., 373 U. S. 723.
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to the Act entitled 'An Act for the Punishment of
certain Crimes against the United States,' which does
abridge the freedom of the press, is not law, but is
altogether void, and of no force." 4 Ellot's Debates
on the Federal Constitution ( 1876), p. 541.
And see 15 Writings of Thomas Jefferson (mem. ed. 1904,
p. 214; 14 id., at 116; 11 id., at 43-44).
Those Acts hac! but a short life, and 've never returned
to them. \Ve have, however, witnessed a slow encroachment by government over that segment of the press
that is represented by TV and radio licensees. Licensing is necessary for engineering reasons; the spectrum
is limited and 'mvelengths must be assigned to avoid
stations interferillg" with each other. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 388. The Commission has
a duty to encourage a multitude of voices by preventing
monopolistic practices and by promoting technological
developments that will open up new channels. But censorship a or editing or the screening by government of
5
The Scnatr Rrport which arcompanicd tlw bill that brcnmc the
Radio Act of 1927. 44 Stat. 1162 stated:
'·If the clumncl,; of rndio tran~mission were unlimited in nutuber th~
importance of the regulatory body would be grca1l~· lcssrncd. but
tlwsc channel:; arc nmited and restricted in number and the deciiiion
as to who shall be permitted to usc them and on what trnns and for
what periods of time, together with the other quesTions connec:tcd
with the situation, requires the exerci~e of a high order of di~cretion
nnd the most careful application of the prinriplcs of equitnble treatment to all tlH' rlasses and interests affected. For thrse :mel other
rrasons your committee decided thnt all powrr to regulate radio
comnmnieation should be centered in one indcpendrnt bod.1·, a radio
commi:>sion, granting it full and complrte authority oYer the entire
sub,icct of radio." S. Rep. 772, 69th Cong., 1st Se~:'l., p. :1.
a Currently, prr~s rrn~orship cover~ mosl- of thr glohe. In Brazil
t.he present regime of censor~hip is pervasi,·c. As reported in the
New York Times for Feb. 17, 1973 , p. 11:
"The censors' rules. issued a few months :1go and constantly
nmended, cover :1 vast field nnd if strictly applied wonld leave th~
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what licensees may broadcast goes against the grnin of
the First Amendment.
The Court in National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U. S. 190, 226, said, "Unlike other modes of
expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That
is its unique characteristic, and that is why, ulllike other
modes of expression, it 1s subject to governmental
regulation."
That uniqueness is due to engineering and technical
problems. But the press in a realistic sense is likewise
not available to all. Small or "underground" papers
appear and disappear; and the weekly is an established
institution. But the daily papers now established are
unique in the sense that it would be virtually impossible
for a competitor to enter the field due to the financial
exigencies of this era. The result is that in practical
terms the newspapers and magazines, like the TV and
radio, are available only to a select few. That fact may
argue for a redefinition of the responsibilities of the press
in First Amendment terms. But I do not think it gives
press little to discuss. In practice, however, much depends on the
whims and f'11spicions of the local censors.
"General prohibitions include protests against censort~hip, and
discussion of '1 successor to President. Emilio Garrastazu Medici,
whose term is up in 1974, campaigns against the Government's
special po"'''rs by decree and sensational news that might hurt the
image of Br~ zil.
"Others are campaigns to discredit the national housing program,
the finanri1l m1rket or other matters of vital importance to the
Government, the playing np of assaults on banks or credit establishments, t ension between the Roman Catholic Church and the state,
agitation in union and student circles, publicity for Communist personalities and nations. Criticism of state governorti and 'exaltation
of immorality' through news of homosexuality, prostitution and drugs
arc also barred.
"The most contronrsial order issued by the l\1inister of Justice bst
September, bans all news, comment or interviews on a political
relaxation of the regime, on democracy for Brazil, and on the economic and financial situation in general."
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us carte blanche to design systems of supervision and
control nor empower Congress to read the mandate in
the First Amendment that "Congress shall make no·
law ... abridging the freedom ... of the press" to mean
that Congress may, acting directly or through any of
its agencies such as FCC make "some" laws "abridging"
freedom of the press.
Powerful arguments, summarized and appraised in
Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression ( 1970),
cc. XVII and XVIII, can be made for revamping or
reconditioning the system. The present one may be
largely aligned on the side of the status quo. The problem implicates our educational efforts which are bland
and conformist and the pressures on the press, from political and from financial sources, to foist boilerplate
points of view on our people rather than to display the
diversities of ideologies and culture in a world which, as
Buckminster Fuller said, has been "communized" by the
radio.
What kind of First Amendment would best serve our
needs as we approach the 21st century may be an open
question. But the old fashioned First Amendment that
we have is the Court's only guideline; and one hard and
fast principle which it announces is that government
shall keep its hands off the press. That principle has
served us through days of calm and eras of strife and I
would abide by it until a new First Amendment is
adopted. That means, as I view it, that TV and radio,
as well as the more conventional methods for disseminating news, are all included in the concept of "press" as
used in the First Amendment and therefore are entitled
to live under the laissez faire regime which the First
Amendment sanctions.
The issues presented in this case are momentous ones ..
The TV and radio broadcasters have mined millions by
selling merchandise, not in selling ideas across the broad
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spectrum of the First Amendment. But some newspapers have done precisely that, loading their pages with
advertisements; and for news they publish murders, horror stories. scandal, and slanclrrous matter touching the
lives of public servants who have no recourse clue toN ew
York 'Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254. Commissioner
Johnson of the FCC wrote in the present case a powerful
dissent. He said:
"Although the First Amendment " ·oulcl clearly ban
governmental censorship of speech content, government must be concerned about the procedural rules
that control the public forums for discussions. If
someone-a moderator, or radio-television licenseeapplies rules that give one speaker, or viewpoint,
less time [or none at all] to present a position, then
a censorship exists as invidious as outright thought
control. There is little doubt in my mind that for
any given forum of speech the First Amendment
demands rules permitting as many to speak and be
heard as possible. And if this Commission does
not enact them, then the courts must require them."·
But the prospect of putting government in a position \
of control over publishers is to me an appalling one. even
to the extent that Red Lion went. The struggle for
liberty has been a struggle against government. The·
essential scheme of our Constitution and Bill of Rights
was to take government off the backs of people. Separation of powers was one device. An independent judiciary
was another device. The Bill of Rights \vas still another.
And it is anathema to the First Amendment to allo\\·
government any role of censorship over newspapers, magazines, books, art, music, TV, radio or any other aspect
of the press. There is unhappiness in some circles at
the impotence of government. But if there is to be a
change, let it come by constitutional amendment. The
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Commission has an important role to play in curbing
monopolistic practices, in keeping channels free from interference, in opening up new channels as technology
develops. But it has no power of censorship.
It is said, of course, that government can control the
broadcasters because their channels are in the public
domain in the sense that they use the airspace that is
tho common heritage of all the people. But they are a
vital part of the press; and since the First Amendment
allows no government control over it, I would leave these
licensees, as I would leave the press, to their own devices.
Licenses are, of course, restricted in time and while, in
my view, they need not be renewed, there is no po,ver to
deny them for editorial or ideological reasons, because the
First Amendment gives no preference to one school of
thought over the others.
The Court in today's decision sanctions a federal saddle on broadcast licensees that is agreeable to the traditions of nations that never have known freedom of
press and that is tolerable in countries that do not have
a written constitution containing prohibitions as absolute
a.s those in tho First Amendment. The Court has made
gren,t inroads on the First Amendment of which obscenity
is only one of the many examples. So perhaps we are
inching slmdy toward a controlled press. But the regime ~
of federal supervision approved today is contrary to our
constitutional mandate and makes the broadcast licensee
an easy victim of political pressures and reduces him to
a timid and submissive segment of the press whose measure of the public interest will now be echoes of the
dominant political voice that emerges after every election. Tho affair with freedom of which we have been
proud will now bear only a faint likeness of our former
robust days.
I said that it would come as a surprise to the public as
well as to publishers and editors of newspapers to learn

1
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that they were under a. newly created federal bureau ..
Perhaps I should have said that such an event should
come as a surprise. In fact it might not in view of the
retrogressive steps \Ve have witnessed.
We have allowed ominous inroads to be made on the
historic freedom of the newspapers. The effort to suppress the publication of the Pentagon Papers failed only
by a narrow margin and actually succeeded for a brief
spell in imposing prior restraint on our press for the
first time in our history. SeeN ew York Times v. United
States, 403 U. S. 713.
In recent years the admonition of Mr. Justice Black
that the First Amendment gave the press freedom so
that it might "serve the governed, not the governors"
(id., at 717) has been disregarded.
"The Government's power to censor the press was
abolished so that the press would remain forever free to
censure the Government. The press was protected so
that it could bare the secrets of government and inform
the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government. And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the
duty to prevent any part of government from deceiving
the people and sending them off to distant lands to die
of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell." Ibid.
The right of the people to know has been greatly
undermined by our decisions requiring under pain of
contempt a reporter to disclose the sources of the information he comes across in investigative reporting. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665.
The Boston Globe reports: 7
"In the last two years at least 20 Federal Grand
Juries have been used to investigate radical or anti7
The Peoples need to Know, an Editorial Series, Boston Globe,
J anuary 21- 27, 1973.
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war dissent. \Vith the power of subpoena, the proceedings secret, and not bound by the rules of evidence required in open court, they have a lot more
leverage than, for example, the old House UnAmerican Activities Committee."
Many reporters have been put in jail, a powerful
weapon against investigative reporting. As the Boston
Globe states "in realizing what is being undermined here
is press freedom itself." s
In the same direction is the easy use of the stamp
"secret" or "top secret" which the Court recently approved in Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 40~
U. S. - . That decision makes a shambles of the Freedom of Information Act. In tune with the other restraints on the press are provisions of the new proposed
Rules of Evidence which the Court recently sent to Congress. Proposed Rule 509 (a)(2)(b) provides:
"The government has a privilege to refuse to give
evidence and to prevent any person from giving evidence upon a showing of reasonable likelihood of
danger that the evidence will disclose a secret of
state or official information, as defined in this rule."
Under the statute if Congress does not act, this new
regime of secrecy is imposed on the Nation and the right
of people to know is further curtailed. The proposed
code sedulously protects the Government; it does not protect newsmen. It indeed pointedly omits any mention
of the privilege of newsmen to protect their confidential
sources.
These growing restraints on newspapers have the same
ominous message that the overtones of the present opinion has on TV and radio licensees.
The growing spectre of governmental control and
surveillance over all activities of people makes ominous
8

Ibid.
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the threat to liberty by those who hold the executive
power. Over and a.gain attempts have been made to
use the Commission as a political weapon against the
opposition, whether to the left or to the right.
Experience has shown that unrestrained power cannot
be trusted to serve the public weal even though it be in
governmental hands. The fate of the First Amendment
should not be so jeopardized. The constitutional mandate that the government shall make "no law" abridging
freedom of speech and the press is clear; the orders and
rulings of the Commission are covered by that ban; and
it must be carefully confined lest broadcasting-now our
most powerful media-be used to subdue the minorities
or help produce a Nation of people who walk submissively
to the executive's motions of the public good.
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, involved a prosecution
of a newspaper editor for publishing, contrary to a state
statute, an editorial on election day urging the voters to
vote against the existing city commission and to replace
it with a mayor-council government. This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Black, reversed the judgment
saymg:
". . . the press serves and was designed to serve as
a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen
means for kcC'ping officials elected by the people
responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve. Suppression of the right of the
press to praise or criticize governmental agents and
to clamor and contend for or against change, which
is all that this editorial did, muzzles one of the very
agencies the Framers of our Constitution thoughtfully and deliberately selected to improve our society and keep it free. The Alabama Corrupt
Practices Act by providing criminal penalties for
publishing editorials such as the one here silences
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the press at a time when it can be most effective.
It is difficult to conceive of a more obvious and
flagrant abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press." Id., at 219.
I would apply the same test to TY or radio. 9
What \V alter Lippman wrote about Coolidge's criticism
of the press has present relevancy. President Coolidge,
he said, had
"declared for peace, goodwill, understanding, moderation; disapproved of conquest, aggression, exploitation; pleaded for a patriotic press, for a free press;
denounced a nanow and bigoted nationalism, and
announced that he stood for law, order, protection
of life, property, respect for sovereignty and principle of international law. Mr. Coolidge's catalog of
the virtues was complete except for one virtue ....
The monetflr~· and othrr burclrns impos<'cl on the pr<'SS by the
right, of a criticizrd person to reply, like the traditional damage
rrmedy for libt'l, lrad of rour~c to self-cen~orship rc.,prrting mattrrs of import:mre to the public that i he First Amendment denies
the G01·crnment the power to impose. The burdens eertainl~· arr ns
onerous as the indirect rr~trirtions on Fir~t Amendment. rights which
we haYe strnrk clown: (1) the requirement that a books<'Iler examine
the contents of his shop; Smith v. Call:fornia, 361 U. S. 147 (1959);
(2) the requirement that a magazine publisher im·estigat!' hi~ adYrrtisers, Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U. S. 478, 492--4!)3'
(1962) (opinion of Harlan, J.); (3) tho requirement that names
and addressc~ of sponsor;; be printed on handbills, Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); (4) the requirement that organizations
supply membership lists, Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation
Committee, 372 U. S. 539 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v.
NAACP, 366 U. S. 293 (1961); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U. S. 51G (1960); KAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958); and
(5) the requiremrnt that indi,·idunls disrlose organizational members, Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960). In c..'tch instance
we held the restriction unconstitutional on the ground that it discouraged or chilled constitutionally protected rights of speech, press
or associn tion.
9
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"That is the humble realization that God has not
endowed Calvin Coolidge with an infallible power
to determine in each concrete case exactly what is.
right, what is just, what is patriotic. . . . Did he
recognize this possibility, he would not continue to
lecture the press in such a way to make it appear
that when newspapers oppose him they are unpatriotic, and that when they support him they do·
so not because they think his case is good but because they blindly support him. Mr. Coolidge's:
notion ... would if it were accepted by the Amer-·
ican press reduce it to utter triviality." Luskin,
Lippman, Liberty, and the Press, p. (1972).
A scholar 10 who knows history has recently said:
"The ground rules of our democracy, as it has grown,
require a free press, not necessarily a responsible or
a temperate one. There aren't any halfway stages.
As Aristophanes saw, democracy means that power
is generally conferred on second-raters by thirdraters, whereupon everyone else, from first-raters to
fourth-raters, moves with great glee to try to dislodge them. It's messy but most politicians understand that it can't very well be otherwise and still
be a democracy."

10

Douglas J. Stewart of Brandeis University writing in review of
Epstein, Newt> from Nowhere: Television and the News (1972) in
Book World, March 25, 1973, pp. 4-5.
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MR. J usTICE BLACKMUN, concurring.
I join the Court's judgment and Parts I, II and IV of
its opinion. I am of the view that it is not necessary,
in this case, to reach and decide the issue of the presence
or absence of governmental action. I therefore would
defer resolution of that issue to another time and case.
The Court of Appeals recognized that it "matters little"
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''"hether its decision be regarded as one based on the First
Amendment or as one interpreting the Communications
Act in the light of that Amendment. 450 F. 2d, at 649.
The Act certainly embraces First Amendment values.
Assuming then, for purposes of this case, that govern-·
mental action is present, the Court, in Part IV of its
opinion, effectively demonstrates for me that the First
Amendment does not compel the result reached by the
Court of Appeals. Thus, the governmental action issuedoes not affect the outcome of this case, and I refrain
from deciding it.

